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Influenced  by  information  technology  advances,  the  assessment  process  has 
begun to make its way out of the traditional classroom into online environments. The 
online summative assessment is a high-stake examination which counts towards a final 
course mark. Thus, as a result of the important consequences of such summative tests, 
security measures are put in place to ensure that only the ‘right’ students are assessed. 
However, the identity-authentication model adopted for user security is susceptible to 
impersonation challenges.  
This  thesis  introduces  the  concept  of  presence  verification  as  an  essential 
extension  to  the  existing  identity-authentication  user  security  model.  The  presence 
security goal is aimed at ensuring that the correctly authenticated student at the start of a 
test is the same student throughout the test session. Thus, verifying a student’s presence 
beyond  the  initial  login  procedure  minimises  the  impersonation  threats.  In  order,  to 
embrace the gains of ensuring presence during summative e-assessments, a blob-analysis 
solution which follows an object tracking approach is proposed. The design of the blob-
based  presence  verification  (BlobPV)  system  involves  video  processing  techniques 
which can be used to detect, verify and classify a student’s presence status in the test 
environment. Thereby, indicating the likelihood of acceptable or unacceptable activities.  
Experiments were carried to demonstrate the feasibility of a blob-based presence 
verification system in summative test environments. Additionally, the BlobPV system 
was evaluated to determine the accuracy of correctly classifying a student’s presence 
status. For each experiment and evaluation, the methods and results are described. The 
results clearly state that, such an approach would significantly improve the detection rate 
of impersonation attempts during online summative assessments. iii 
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Definitions and 
Abbreviations 
Hash Functions  This  is  an  algorithm  that  is  used  to  condense  an  arbitrary 
length message or text into a fixed length or size. 
Digital Signatures  A digital signature is an electronic signature that can be used 
to identify and authenticate the sender of a message or to 
verify the documents origin and contents.  
Static IP Addresses  A static IP address is a permanent address that can be issued 
to a computer on the network. 
Biometric Templates  These  are  representations  of  the  raw  biometrics  (e.g. 
fingerprints) using series of numbers and letters.  
False Positives  This  is  also  known  as  the  False  Accept  Rate  (FAR)  or 
percentage of impostors accepted. This can occur when the 
biometric measurements from two different individuals are 
perceived to be from the same individual 
False Negatives  This  is  also  known  as  the  False  Reject  Rate  (FRR)  or 
percentage of authorised users rejected. This can when the 
two  biometric  measurements  from  the  same  individual  are 
thought to be from two different individuals 1 
 
 
Chapter 1.  Introduction 
Assessment is an integral part of the student’s learning experience. Influenced by 
information technology advances, the assessment process has begun to make its way out 
of the traditional classroom into online environments. The e-assessment process offers 
enormous opportunities to enhance the student’s learning experience such as delivering 
on-demand  tests,  providing  electronic  marking  and  immediate  feedback  on  tests.  In 
higher  education,  e-assessment  is  typically  employed  to  deliver  formative  and 
summative  tests  to  the  students.  The  online  formative  assessments  are  low-stake 
examinations designed to improve the student’s learning; whilst the online summative 
assessment is categorised as a high-stake examination which takes place at the end of a 
course and counts towards the final course mark. However, due to the high-stakes nature 
of the summative tests, the summative e-assessment process remains a target for user 
security challenges.  
Thus, it is the responsibility of the e-assessment user security model to ensure 
that  only  the  correct  students  take  a  summative  test.  To  accomplish  this  task,  user 
authentication methods such as passwords, smartcards and biometric technologies are 
employed. However, the identity-authentication user security model remains fallible to 
impersonation  threats;  threatening  the  reliability  and  validity  of  the  e-assessment 
process.  According  to  Kerka  &  Wonacott  (2000),  impersonation  threats  are  a  major 
concern and it poses a greater risk to the academic community. Interestingly the impact 
of an impersonation threat on a user security model is varied based on the strength or 
weakness  of  the  authentication  method  adopted.  Thus,  the  shareable  attributes  of  a 
password would make impersonation more appealing whilst the uniqueness of biometric 
traits  would  deter  potential  impersonators.  Biometrics  technology  is  regarded  as  an 
ultimate solution for user security issues in e-assessments (Marais et al, 2006); however, 
adopting  biometric  solutions  in  test  environments  is  plagued  with  cost,  privacy  and 
acceptance issues. Thus, from the above discussions it is concluded that the existing user 
security  model  is  susceptible  to  impersonation  challenges  and  the  existing  user 
authentication methods are incapable of solving the problem. Hence, there exists a gap in 2 
 
the user security process of summative e-assessments and it is a research area seeking 
solutions. 
1.1  Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are to: 
1.  Investigate why summative e-assessments are susceptible to security challenges. 
2.  Investigate a robust solution for monitoring continuous presence in a supervised 
summative e-assessment environment. 
3.  Evaluate (a design of the solution to show) the feasibility and stability of the 
BlobPV system. 
1.2  Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into nine chapters.  
Chapter 2: Learning 
This  chapter  presents  a  background  review  of  learning  and  the  foundational 
learning theories which can influence an assessment process. The concept of e-learning 
and the role of existing learning theories in e-learning are discussed. 
Chapter 3: Assessment 
This  chapter  presents  a  detailed  overview  of  assessment  and  its  related 
components such as, principles of assessment, purposes of assessment, grading schemes, 
methods for the delivery of assessment and feedback in assessment. 
Chapter 4: Electronic Assessment Security 
In this chapter, the purpose and benefits of electronic assessment as an alternative 
assessment delivery method is discussed. This chapter also introduces the core of this 
thesis which is the user security of summative e-assessments. This is followed by an in-
depth  discussion  of  user  authentication  methods  and  their  uses  in  summative  e-
assessments.  
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Chapter 5: Identity-Authentication (I-A) User Security Model 
In  this  chapter,  the  existing  user  security  model  adopted  in  summative  e-
assessments is introduced and the limitations of the model are highlighted. The chapter 
ends with a brief review of impersonation challenges in online assessments.  
Chapter 6: Presence-Identity-Authentication (P-I-A) User Security Model 
This chapter explains in-depth the fallibility of the I-A user security model to 
three types of impersonation threats. Thus, by using a goal-oriented approach the concept 
of presence and its benefits is introduced. Furthermore, potential approaches to achieving 
presence verification are evaluated and a novel blob analysis solution is proposed.  
Chapter 7: Blob-based Presence Verification (BlobPV) System 
This chapter presents the blob statistics operation and the system design of the 
proposed blob-based presence verification system. This chapter also describes the video 
processing  techniques  and  the  fuzzy  logic  implementation  for  the  BlobPV  system. 
Finally,  a  justification  for  adopting  a  blob-based  solution  in  online  summative  test 
environments is discussed 
Chapter 8: BlobPV System Experiments and Results 
This chapter reports the experiments carried out to demonstrate the feasibility of 
blob analysis to achieve presence verification in test environments. An evaluation of the 
activity  risk  classification  approach  which  is  adopted  for  the  BlobPV  system  is  also 
reported. Results from the experiments and the evaluation process are also presented. 
Chapter 9: Conclusions and Future work  
This  chapter  concludes  the  thesis  with  a  summary  of  its  contributions  and 
directions for future work. 
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Chapter 2.   Learning  
Learning  is  not  confined  to  the  boundaries  of  a  formal  education  system. 
Learning can occur throughout an individual’s life time; presented in varying ways and 
settings. This chapter presents a background of existing learning theories based on the 
behaviourist,  cognitive  and  constructivist  schools  of  thought.  In  addition  some 
underlying  principles  of  learning  which  is  influenced  by  the  type  of  learning  theory 
adopted are discussed. Electronic learning may be the learning future which has been 
long  awaited;  thus,  this  learning  approach  is  gradually  being  employed  in  generic 
learning environments. In this chapter, the influences of electronic learning on existing 
learning environments will be presented.  Finally, the role of learning theories in e-
learning is described, providing insights on learning theoretical ideas in modern learning. 
2.1  Paradigms of learning 
The approach to teaching a subject and the manner in which a student learns the 
content is affected by the existing learning theories. In this section, the attributes of each 
theory  will  be  discussed  with  emphasis  on  how  assessment  is  being  administered  to 
students.  
2.1.1  Behaviourism 
Behaviourism  presents  a  traditional  classroom  setting  where  the  lecturer 
dominates the learning environment and the student takes the passive role.  Students are 
subjected to the specific course content delivered by the lecturer, where the aims and 
objectives of the course are expected to yield a known outcome. Theories such as the law 
of effect (Thorndike, 1911) and operant conditioning (Skinner, 1957) give an insight of 
what  is  expected  in  the  learning  environment.    Based  on  prior  work  of  Thorndike, 
Skinner explains that changes to human behaviour are instigated by positive or negative 
responses that occur in the environment. His model is based on the premise that, when a 
particular Stimulus-Response (S-R) pattern is reinforced (rewarded), the individual is 
conditioned to respond (Skinner, 1983).   5 
 
In the context of assessment, students must be assessed at the end of a learning 
event  to  determine  if  the  objectives  of  the  course  were  fulfilled.    In  addition,  the 
behaviourists emphasise the frequent use of rewards/reinforcements during the learning 
process.  Examples  of  incentives  include  practice  questions  and  student  feedback. 
Providing  students’  with  incentives  during  the  course  does  not  automatically  mean 
success during assessment. There are possibilities for the students to achieve top grades 
during assessment; however this is not entirely attributed to the reinforcements received. 
For example, a student receives learning incentives (e.g. extra personal classes) during a 
mathematics course; however, if the student is less interested in mathematics failure may 
be inevitable. In the behaviourists’ school of thought, failure means a constant repetition 
of  the  learning  content  until  mastery  is  achieved.  A  fundamental  principle  of 
behaviourism  proposes  that  a  new  behavioural  pattern  should  be  repeated  until  it 
becomes  automatic  (Mergel,  1998).  However,  repetition  does  not  imply  automatic 
assimilation; rather a habit may be formed from constant repetition (e.g. going on a diet). 
Thus,  if  a  habit  is  not  enjoyed  it  may  become  obligatory  and  the  intended  purpose 
defeated. In assessment, re-sitting a test may not imply thorough understanding of the 
course content and failure may still be inevitable.  
2.1.2  Cognitivism 
The behaviourists’ approach to learning was widely accepted and influential, but 
gradually it became increasingly obvious that there were some anomalies in the theory. 
Tolman (1932) a non-reinforcement behaviourist, proposed a theory that had a cognitive 
flair  and  the  rivalry  between  the  “S-S”  (stimulus-stimulus)  and  the  “S-R”  (stimulus-
response)  learning  theories  was  consummated.  Cognitive  psychologists  believe  that 
individuals have the ability to process information in their brain, to socially interact with 
their  environment  and  to  identify  a  link  between  present  observations  and  past 
experiences. They argue that learning occurs as a change in the mental state of a student 
rather than a change in the students’ behaviour. Organised information and knowledge is 
a key principle in Cognitivism; therefore, there must be a knowledge structure formed in 
the students’ memory.  
Content  delivered  by  lecturers  should  encourage  links  to  existing  knowledge. 
Thus, when information is well organised it is easier to learn and remember (Hartley, 
1998). If content is delivered in a way that will aid easy retrieval, then during assessment 6 
 
students  can  organise  and  relate  the  assessment  questions  to  existing  knowledge  in 
memory. Thus, the assessment questions are scanned against the students’ memory to 
determine  an  appropriate  action.  During  assessment  the  student  is  thus  expected  to 
produce a high degree of mental alertness.  
Cognitivism  theory  also  believes  in  reinforcement  but  from  a  different 
perspective. They argue that students are reinforced through the presentation of new 
information such as receiving feedback about their success or failure in an assessment. 
This is when students receive their results; there are feelings of joy for students that have 
passed (reward) and sadness for those that have failed (punishment). 
2.1.3  Constructivism 
Constructivism  is  based  on  the  premise  that  humans  construct  their  own 
perspective  of  the  world,  through  individual  experiences  and  schema.    Therefore,  it 
suggests  that  learning  is  active  and  students  can  understand  only  what  they  have 
constructed based on personal experiences and their environment. The works of Piaget 
(1955),  Bruner  (1966),  and  Vygotsky  (1986)  among  others  also  provide  historical 
precedents for constructivist learning theory.  In the constructivists’ theory, motivation is 
the key to the students’ success (Von Glasersfeld, 1989). The lecturer is active but plays 
the role of a facilitator (Bauersfeld, 1995); thus the student controls and manipulates the 
things they learn and sets their pace for learning. Learning to the constructivists is about 
creating meaning, constructing personal conceptualisations and finding solutions to their 
own problems. Content is not specified beforehand; thus it is constructed by the students 
own knowledge to fit the situation. Students have the ability to master autonomy and to 
solve problems that allow them to go beyond the information provided.  
Assessment  in  constructivists  approach  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  learning 
process (Holt and Willard-Holt 2000). The assessment process is viewed as a two-way 
process which involves interaction between the lecturer and the student. In this view, the 
student plays a larger role in judging their own progress. Failure means the student needs 
help  and  the  lecturer  needs  to  find  out  what  level  of  their  performance  needs  to  be 
improved. Communication between students is encouraged, because each student has a 
unique way of solving problems.  7 
 
2.2  Principles of Learning 
Learning can have different definitions based on the different school of thoughts 
employed. Ertmer and Newby (1993), asserts that the behaviourists believe learning is a 
change in the form or frequency of observable behaviour, the cognitivists define learning 
as  changes  between  states  of  knowledge  rather  than  probability  of  response  and  the 
constructivists proposes that learning is creating meaning from experience. Based on the 
above definitions, it is sufficient to conclude that learning occurs in various patterns. 
Learning can be described as the ability to give students an opportunity to gain a skill 
based on their past and present information; and also using the skill to expand their 
knowledge.  Due  to  the  diversity  in  learning  patterns,  a  balance  should  be  created 
between the intended learning outcomes and assessment. For example, a trainee caterer 
learns  to  how  cut  tomatoes  in  cubes.  During  assessment,  the  student  will  dice  the 
tomatoes in cubes and not in circles; this is the method learnt to cut the tomatoes  
2.2.1  Scaffolding 
The  initial  representation  of  scaffolding  can  be  portrayed  in  situations  where 
parents  train  their  children,  supporting  them  till  they  are  old  enough  to  attain 
independence (Sharma et al, 2007).The constructivist school of thought have embraced 
‘scaffolding’  and  this  idea  is  attributed  to  Vygotsky’s  (1978)  Zone  of  Proximal 
Development (ZPD). The ZPD is a point when a student needs the support of lecturers 
and peers to achieve a learning activity. Scaffolding can include working in groups, 
performing  role-plays,  access  to  useful  learning  resources,  learning  support  helpful 
lecturer comments, self-assessment and quizzes (Oliver & Herrington, 2003).  All of 
these  methods  form  the  structures  on  which  students  learning  can  be  built  on.  The 
experiences  and  knowledge  provided  to  the  students  during  the  ‘scaffold’  aid  the 
students during assessments. The scaffolds provided by the lecturer are retained as long 
as learning is still fragile (Taber, 2003). However, the assistance and help is gradually 
reduced as the learning progresses to the point where the student is finally able to act 
independently (Oliver & Herrington, 2003).  
Fading is an important concept in scaffolding which leads to independence and 
finally expertise. Scaffolding is intended to be temporary and there is a need to fade 
support as students gain experience and skills (Dodge, 2001). Fading breeds assessment. 
When  a  student  shows  competency  in  a  particular  subject,  it  is  important  to  assess 8 
 
knowledge so that progress can be documented, feedback given and where possible the 
process of scaffold re-started. 
2.2.2  Situated Learning 
Situated learning is a general theory of knowledge acquisition and it is usually 
unintentional  rather  than  deliberate.  In  the  model,  learning  occurs  as  a  result  of  an 
everyday situation (situated), therefore learning is done ‘just in time’, purposeful and 
controlled. A student’s environment involves collaborating with people, creating names 
for objects and interpreting statements. Situated learning offers knowledge presented in 
authentic  contexts,  where  the  situations  support  social  interaction  and  collaborative 
construction of knowledge. In this model assessment may take place alongside learning, 
without being a separate activity. Mueller (2005) asserts that in authentic assessment, 
students are asked to perform real-world tasks that demonstrate meaningful application 
of knowledge and skills.  
In exam conditions, authentic assessments allow students to display a blend of 
originality and novelty. Thus, their critical thinking, cognitive and reasoning skills are 
being assessed. For example, if a group of students were taken on a trip to view a site 
(real-world problem), and upon return they are assessed given a similar scenario. The 
students  will  be  expected  to  demonstrate  proficiency  as  to  what  they  have  learnt 
personally, making decisions on relevance and appropriateness of the test scenario. In 
this  example  the  act  of  plagiarism  is  defeated,  because  there  would  not  be  just  one 
correct answer to the scenario, but the ability of a student to analyse and create new 
meaning to the question will be rewarded. 
2.2.3  Blended Learning 
In  blended  learning,  various  classroom  activities  are  combined  to  enhance 
learning.  Masie (2003) asserts that, “people are not single-method students! We are, as 
a species, blended students”. In this learning approach, two or more methods of learning 
are  blended  (mixed)  together  to  produce  a  well  balanced  and  effective  combination. 
Driscoll (2002) defines blended learning as a combination or mixing of four different 
methodologies: 9 
 
•  To combine or mix models of web-based technology (e.g., live virtual classroom, 
self- paced instruction, collaborative learning, streaming video, audio and text) to 
accomplish an educational goal. 
•  To  combine  various  pedagogical  approaches  (e.g.,  constructive,  behavioural, 
cognitive)  to  produce  an  optimal  learning  outcome  with  or  without  instructional 
technology.  
•  To combine any form of instructional technology (e.g., videotape, CD-ROM, web-
based training, film) with face-to-face lecturer-led training. 
•  To mix or combine instructional technology with actual job tasks in order to create a 
harmonious effect of learning and working. 
The most common type of blend is a two-component blend, which is made up of 
the  face-to-face  classroom  learning  and  e-learning  (using  technology  in  learning).  In 
addition, the institutional culture may also determine the type of components that will be 
blended  into  the  learning  framework.  For  example  blended  learning  could  include  a 
combination  of  lectures,  seminars,  workshops  and  laboratory  work.  Assessment  in 
blended learning will need to draw directly from the methods or components used in the 
combination. A student should be assessed in the similar manner which a course was 
delivered.  
2.2.4  Problem-based Learning 
In Problem Based Learning (PBL) a problem is presented and the students’ are 
expected to construct a deep understanding of the problem. Thus, new knowledge is 
created  which  aids  in  problem  solving.  Problem-based  learning  embraces  the  social 
collaborative attribute of constructivism; where an emphasis is laid on the importance of 
working in small groups. By applying this strategy, students can interact, communicate 
and work cooperatively to solve a problem. This may also fuel their enthusiasm, such 
that  they  go  beyond  their  textbooks  to  pursue  knowledge  from  other  sources 
(Kaminskien! et al, 2006). In the PBL model, the lecturers act as the facilitators during 
group meetings, rather than provide easy answers to learning groups. This may also keep 
a  constant  flow  between  the  lecturer  and  the  student  (Rhem,  1998).  This  presents  a 
different approach from the conventional didactic approach, where the lecturers impart 
knowledge and the students take assessments tasks which are completed individually.  10 
 
In  PBL,  assessment  of  students’  progress  is  often  a  major  weakness  and 
sometimes it is non-existent. Nowak & Plucker (1999) explain that assessment in PBL 
does not often align well with the objectives of the problem-based learning that preceded 
it. They argue that the use of PBL is defeated, if students’ are taught using real-life 
authentic situations and then assessed via traditional multiple choice questions. This may 
result  in  students’  performing  poorly,  since  they  are  un-prepared  for  assessment 
delivered in the format different from their learning pattern. One approach suggested to 
maximising the potentials of PBL is that, if the instruction/learning is problem-based, 
then, the assessment should be similarly structured. 
2.2.5  Ubiquitous Learning 
In  ubiquitous  learning  environments  there  are  no  constraints  to  what  may  be 
learnt,  where  it  may  be  learnt  and  how  it  could  be  learnt.    The  ubiquitous  learning 
environment  provides  an  interoperable,  pervasive,  and  seamless  learning  architecture 
(Yang,  2006).  In  today’s  literature,  ubiquitous  computing  foresees  a  pervasive 
environment where tiny processors and sensors will be integrated into everyday objects 
(Mattern, 2004). These can be achieved, because all the devices will be interwoven and 
connected together by wireless networks which will be in the form of Bluetooth or Wifi 
(IEEE 802.11). Ubiquitous learning lends itself to the school of constructivism where 
learning is not controlled by physical space or schedules (Laurossi, 2004). This learning 
environment is persistent; allowing students to access education flexibly, calmly and 
seamlessly  (Jones  &  Jo,  2004).  The  use  of  handheld  computers  can  also  empower 
students to take responsibility for their own learning.  
Introducing ubiquitous handheld devices can enhance learning and teaching, but 
it  can  also  encourage  cheating  during  summative  assessments.  Bluetooth  or  wireless 
technology  may  cause  a  breach  of  security  in  summative  assessment  if  not  properly 
curtailed. For example, students with Bluetooth enabled laptops or mobile phones can 
exchange answers via the Bluetooth technology.  
2.3  E-Learning 
Electronic  learning  (E-learning),  computer  based  training  (CBT),  web-based 
learning (WBT), Internet-based training (IBT), and a host of other names may be the 
learning future which has been long awaited. The Joint Information Systems Committee 11 
 
in the UK defines e-learning as the “the process of learning which is supported by the 
use of ICT” (JISC 2006). The use of information and communication technology for 
learning  includes  the  Internet,  local  network,  standalone  computer,  interactive 
whiteboard or portable device. In this thesis, e-learning is described as the acquisition of 
information  and  knowledge  via  any  form  of  electronic  media  for  the  purpose  of 
expanding  prior  knowledge  of  the  student.  Electronic  learning  delivered  through 
asynchronous  training  offers  a  self-paced  learning  via  electronic  media  (Internet, 
intranets, extranets, satellite broadcast, tape, interactive TV and CD-ROM). This method 
makes learning more flexible; however, it may or may not include access to lecturers. 
The  most  advanced  form  of  e-learning  lends  itself  to  synchronous  training.  In  this 
method  students’  from  diverse  geographical  locations  can  communicate  with  their 
lecturer  and  peers.    Electronic  media  employed  includes  the  Internet  websites  and 
audio/video conferencing. 
The process of electronic learning promises a wide range of benefits such as the 
access  of  learning  content  and  on-demand  delivery,  life-long  learning,  social  and 
intellectual collaboration. According to Coomey & Stephenson (2001) four features of 
good  e-learning  practice  include  dialogue,  involvement,  support  and  control.    Thus, 
during the dialogue process the lecturer can build virtual structures for interaction using 
e-mail, bulletin boards, chat rooms, group discussions and wikis. All these activities 
embedded into the course content may make learning more robust and interesting. The 
use of varying types of course content (graphics, animations, sounds and texts) may also 
reduce boredom whilst learning and improve retention during assessment. 
2.4  E-Learning Environments 
Since the advent of the Internet, learning has begun to make its way out of the 
traditional  classroom  into  online  environments.  Thus,  electronic  learning  can  be 
conducted anywhere, anytime and learning content delivered through various activities 
(Mason,  2002).  This  section  describes  examples  of  electronic  learning  activities 
employed in generic learning environments. Generic learning environments in the UK, 
context may include (but are not limited to), further education, higher education and 
vocational training.  
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Further Education 
Further Education is provided at a higher level than the secondary school. One of 
the popular uses of electronic learning in further education is as a presentation tool; 
particularly the use of the interactive whiteboard (iWB). Finlayson et al, (2006) asserts 
that using the interactive whiteboard may have an impact on a student’s receptiveness to 
learning and cognition. Electronic learning in further education may be used to provide 
online practice resources, online assessment of key skills and online space for e-portfolio 
development. 
Higher Education 
The  higher  education  level  is  usually  referred  to  education  taken  at  the 
universities.  This  consists  of  undergraduate  degree,  postgraduate  degrees  (Taught 
Masters or Masters by research) PhD degree and the HND/HNCs. Based on the positive 
influence that e-learning has on higher education Garrison & Anderson (2003) asserts 
that, combining information technology with effective pedagogy and reflective teaching, 
will transform higher education. Thus, electronic learning may be used as a medium and 
it  is  integrated  into  virtual  learning  environments  (VLE).  Additionally,  electronic 
learning in higher education may be used to provide online peer and tutor support, online 
practice test resources and online assessment of basic and key skills.  
Vocational Education and Training 
Vocational education and training are traditionally non-academic and includes 
commercial, technical, professional development as well as transferable personal skills. 
This environment is flexible, responsive and relevant to the needs of industry as well as 
individuals.  The  training  acquired  are  designed  to  give  students’  the  skills  and 
knowledge to do a particular job, work in a particular industry or acquire more general 
skills  to  do  a  variety  of  jobs.  In  this  environment,  e-learning  may  be  used  as  a 
presentation tool where the online platform interacts with the students in a personalised 
manner.  Mikalsen  et  al,  (2008)  describes  the  experience  and  implementation  of 
electronic learning employed in a vocational training environment. Their work presents 
an integrated multimedia e-learning model which is formed by textual and multimedia 
resources (e.g. videos) to enhance the learning experience.  13 
 
2.5  Learning Theories in E-Learning 
In this section, the existing learning theories (see section 2.1) are described with 
respect to their roles in electronic learning.  
2.5.1  Behaviourism 
Behaviourism has found a place in E-learning, but there are some constraints in 
exhibiting  its  full  potentials.  The  behaviourist  school  of  thought  presents  a  lecturer-
centred scenario, where students are subjected to the specific course content delivered by 
the lecturer. Mason (2002) argues that, lecturers who emphasise the content delivery side 
of e-learning very often have a behaviourist or cognitive conception of learning (either 
consciously  or  not).  Lecturers  in  the  behaviourist  school  tend  to  choose  and  offer 
learning materials to students; however, the learning resources are tailored to produce an 
expected  learning  outcome.  Thus,  student  efforts  to  organise  learning  activities  for 
themselves play little role. Behaviourists embrace the idea of e-learning because it can 
deliver the same experience and content to large numbers of students. However, this 
approach tends to turn students away from e-learning and become a barrier rather than an 
enabler  of  learning  (Wild,  2007).  Overall,  behaviourists  recommend  a  structured, 
didactic approach in designing an online course (Mödritscher, 2006). 
2.5.2  Cognitivism 
The cognitivist, like the behaviourists, remain focused on content delivery and 
intend to deliver the same learning experience to a large number of users but with a 
varying experience (Wild, 2007). This approach breaks learning content into smaller 
parts, where each chunk can be re-structured in different ways. In dividing the tasks and 
creating groups, some form of interaction between the students can occur. This may 
provide better understanding of the course content. The cognitive approach relies on the 
course  designer  charting  the  learning  pathway  which  would  conform  to  the  specific 
course objectives. 
2.5.3  Constructivism 
There is a wider acceptance of the constructivists learning approach in electronic 
learning.  Mason  (1998)  explains  that  the  students’  constructivist  thoughts  could  be 
encouraged  through  active  participation  in  online  discussions,  collaborative  online 
activities and online assessment. Laurillard’s (1995) conversational framework proposes 14 
 
four teaching media divisions; this consists of discussion, interaction, adaptation and 
reflection. Thus, the student and lecturer can discuss and share their views on the course 
content.  During  the  interaction  process,  the  student  can  also  receive  meaningful 
feedback.  
Laurillard’s and Mason’s view on constructivism in e-learning acknowledges the 
need  for  a  rethink;  such  that  universities  should  permit  open,  critical  and  discursive 
learning (Gulati 2004). Taking a closer look at the universities, the reverse is seemingly 
the  case  where  an  objectivist  model  is  assumed  (Hanley  1994).  In  e-learning,  the 
constructivists do not focus wholly on course content but rather on the student (Wild, 
2007). Thus, e-learning empowers the individual student so that the lecturer is no longer 
the  gatekeeper  of  knowledge  (Mason,  2002).  In  view  of  this,  active  participation  in 
online discussion may be a positive influence for some students while some may choose 
not to be involved (Williams, 2002: 267). To accommodate the constructivist’s view of a 
student-centred  approach,  lecturers  need  to  be  aware  of  some  students  who  prefer 
learning informally and silently (Gulati, 2004). 
2.6  Summary 
The  approach  to  teaching,  learning  and  assessing  may  be  largely  affected  by 
underlying learning theories. Thus, the existing learning theories include behaviourist, 
cognitive  and  constructivists’  schools  of  thought.  In  a  behaviourist  classroom,  the 
lecturer dominates the learning environment while the students take a passive role. In 
this school of thought, students’ are frequently assessed to determine if the learning 
objectives were met. However, failure means a constant repetition of the course content 
until mastery is achieved. In cognitivism, it is assumed that new information is linked to 
prior knowledge; thus, students’ can interact with information, interpret it and create a 
mental  construct  of  the  information.    In  a  cognitive  classroom,  course  content  is 
delivered in an easy way to aid retrieval. Therefore, during assessment students’ can 
retrieve information from memory and apply it to the context of the test.  Constructivists 
view knowledge as a skill that grows from the inside realm unto the outer realm. To the 
constructivist, the assessment process is viewed as a two-way process which involves 
interaction between the lecturer and the student. Failure means the student needs help 
and the lecturer needs to find out what areas need improvement.  15 
 
Scaffolding,  blended,  situated,  problem-based  and  ubiquitous  learning  are 
existing learning patterns which are implemented for pedagogy. These principles may 
have  an  influence  on  student  learning  and  assessment.  For  example,  in  the  situated 
approach, learning occurs unintentionally rather than deliberately; this in turn may breed 
authentic assessments. Electronic learning sets the stage for the gradual replacement of 
the traditional paper-based learning methods. The advantages of e-learning include, on-
demand course content, lifelong learning, social and intellectual collaboration between 
students’. Finally, the behaviourist, cognitive and constructivist schools of thought are 
integrated into the modern world of electronic learning. This depicts the roles of the 
underlying learning theories in an electronic learning environment.  16 
 
Chapter 3.  Assessment 
To  most  people  assessment  means  sitting  in  a  room  or  hall  and  answering  a 
printed  question  paper.  Assessment  does  not  generally  mean  testing  a  students’ 
competence in a subject; however, the use of examination, oral test, essays, quiz and 
projects are methods of assessing competencies (Knight, 2001). More importantly than 
testing  for  competency,  an  assessment  should  reflect  learning  objectives  and  course 
content  (Prior  &  Lister,  2004).  A  key  component  that  can  positively  or  adversely 
influence  an  assessment  is  the  application  of  learning  theories.  Thus,  the  existing 
learning theories may determine a lecturer’s style of teaching and assessing (Kelly & 
Melograno 2004).  
Recall,  in  the  preceding  chapter,  assessment  in  a  behaviourist  class  implies 
frequent student assessment until course objectives are met. Additionally, students may 
retake tests regularly until the course content is mastered. Assessment in a cognitive 
classroom takes advantage of a student’s prior knowledge on a course.  Prior knowledge 
is enhanced using graphics, visuals and key points to aid retention during assessment. A 
constructivist perceives assessment as a social collaboration of events amongst students. 
Thus, students work in small groups to construct their own meaning of a task and then 
present their findings to the lecturer. Assessment is an integral aspect of the learning 
cycle and it is crucial that the process is aligned with the intended course objectives 
(Beard, 1970).  A simple formula to depict the connection between an assessment and 
the  intended  learning  outcomes  is  presented:  “aims  and  objectives  !  content  ! 
teaching and learning activities ! assessment” (Morgan & O’reilly 1999: 47). Hence, 
this chapter describes the concepts of assessment, purposes of assessment, delivery of 
assessment and the general grading schemes employed in assessments.  
3.1  Assessment vs. Evaluation 
The process of assessment is frequently confused with the process of evaluation. 
These two concepts are expressed and defined differently in American and European 
countries. In the statements endorsed by the American Education Research Association 
(AERA); assessment improves student learning for future performances while evaluation 17 
 
judges the worth of a performance against pre-defined standards (Parker et al, 2001). In 
this  respect,  assessment  is  a  continuous  process  and  it  provides  information  for 
improving  learning  and  teaching.  This  information  is  anonymous  and  not  graded. 
Evaluation is the judgement of a student’s performance and it focuses on grades.  Table 
3-1 summarises key differences between assessment and evaluation.  
As  stated  in  Brown  et  al,  (1996),  the  Joint  Information  Systems  Committee 
(JISC) and the Scottish Qualifications Authority (SQA) in the UK; define assessment as 
“the process of collecting and interpreting evidence of a student’s performance while the 
process of evaluation is often conducted to check out teaching”. Irrespective of varying 
definitions; in a wider sense assessment and evaluation should be viewed as a feedback 
on performance in learning and teaching (Beard (1970). However, in the context of this 
research  the  assessment  process  will  be  expressed  as  providing  improvement  and 
judgment on student learning. 
Dimension of difference  Assessment  Evaluation 
Content: timing, purpose  Formative: ongoing, to 
improve learning 
Summative: final, to gauge 
quality 
Orientation: focus of 
measurement 
Process-oriented: how 
learning is going 
Product-oriented: what has 
been learned 
Findings: uses thereof  Diagnostic: identify areas 
for improvement 
Judgemental: arrive at an 
overall grade/score 
Table 3-1 Key differences in assessment and evaluation (Angelo & Cross, 1993) 
3.2  Assessment Concepts 
There are several key concepts which need to be considered when designing or 
administering  an  assessment.  Examples  of  these  assessment  characteristics  include 
reliability, validity, usability, timeliness, fairness, and security. However, in this chapter 
the reliability and validity of assessments will be considered. These two concepts are 
intertwined in their description, but more importantly they will inform the concept of 
fairness discussed in chapter 7.7. In essence, the reliability and validity of an assessment 
is compromised when there is a breach in security.  18 
 
3.2.1  Reliability 
Reliability in assessment is defined as the extent to which assessment results 
represents  an  accurate  measurement  of  the  candidate’s  demonstration  of  the  abilities 
specified by the assessment criteria (QCA, 2007). Reliability should prove consistency in 
its  criteria  for  assessment  and  repeatability  when  presented  with  the  same  assessing 
factors (Knight, 2001). Hence, an assessment is deemed reliable when a student’s score 
or  grade  does  not  vary,  regardless  of  when  the  assessment  occurred  or  who  did  the 
scoring. According to Brown et al, (1996), there should be a compelling evidence to 
show that results are consistent across examiners. For example, given a reliable test, a 
first examiner assigns a score to a student; thus, a second examiner should arrive at the 
same  approximate  score  applying  the  same  criteria.  This  is  called  the  inter-tutor 
reliability (Race, 2001). Hence, marking student tests on the same standard will foster 
reliability in assessments. 
3.2.2  Validity 
The term validity refers to a degree of accuracy of an object. An assessment is 
considered valid when it is fit for the purpose required or when it measures what it is 
planned to measure (QCA, 2007). Validity in assessment reflects the degree to which the 
programme specification and course learning outcomes are assessed (Baird, 1997). Thus, 
a valid assessment would require that the students complete a task or action that should 
reflect knowledge of the learning process. An assessment may become invalid when 
factors that are irrelevant to the learning outcomes are accommodated. An extraneous 
factor could occur when a student is graded on the quality of their writing; however, the 
writing skills may not be pertinent to the assessment (Atherton, 2005). Additionally, an 
assessment could have low validity, such that a topic taught at a certain level, would 
require performance of a higher order during the assessment. This is the problem of 
content validity. Thus it is required that the course content of an assessment should 
closely match the content of the specification it is designed to assess (CIEA, 2007). 
3.3  Grading Schemes 
Grading  can  be  described  as  ‘assigning  a  level’  or  ‘rating’.  Grading  is  an 
important phase of the assessment process, which may assist the lecturers in monitoring 19 
 
the  student’s  progress.  Two  main  grading  approaches  employed  in  the  educational 
system are the norm-referenced and criterion-referenced grading schemes. 
3.3.1  Norm Referenced Grades 
In a norm referenced scheme, the students’ performances are compared against 
each other and grades are assigned according to a student’s relative standing with other 
students on the same test.  In this approach, students’ are placed into arbitrary boundaries 
of achievements; hence, they compete for limited numbers of grades within these bands 
(Dunn et al, 2002). Thus, regardless of the actual exam score attained, the students’ 
scores are dispersed along a “grading curve” where the range is between a pass and fail 
(Aviles, 2001).  However, Lister & Leany, (2003) warned that the danger of employing a 
norm  referenced  system  is  that  one  is  likely  to  produce  average  students  who  lack 
academic substance. In addition, employing a norm referenced grading in assessments 
may be an unhealthy approach due to its emphasis on class rank between high and low 
scorers.  This  method  does  not  provide  information  about  individual  student 
performances; rather it requires students compete with each other for grades. Lastly, 
competing for grades may have many unfortunate consequences for a student’s academic 
life. For example, a student may cheat to achieve top grades in an assessment. 
3.3.2  Criterion Referenced Grades 
The  criterion-referenced  grading  scheme  measures  students’  performances 
against  a  set  of  criteria  (e.g.  score  85-100  =  A,  score  69-84  =  B);  rather  than  on 
achievement  of  other  students.  In  this  approach,  students  are  taught  and  assessed  in 
alignment to the intended learning outcomes (Wu & Kuo et al, 2006). Thus, a grade is 
assigned based on how well a student has learnt the course objectives. The benefit of 
criterion referencing is evident when the precise goals of the course and clear criteria for 
each grade are provided to the students. This approach is perceived to have a positive 
impact on the student’s performance during assessment.  In criterion referencing, grades 
are a measure of absolute levels of performance; thus, it is possible for all students to 
earn a passing score if the course material is well-understood. This implies that, for a 
given assessment all the students could attain the grade A or all students could get the D 
grade. Thus, in the defining the quality and validity of the standards required for an 
assessment, the criterion reference scheme may breed disagreement amongst educators 
(Speck, 2002). According to Knight (2001), criterion referencing is inherently complex 20 
 
as  it  is  harder  to  conceptualise  learning  goals  and  to  capture  them  in  useful  criteria 
statements.  Finally,  the  criterion  referencing  scheme  may  yield  a  fair  assessment; 
therefore it is gradually replacing the norm referencing as the preferred grading choice in 
many universities (Dunn et al, 2002).    
3.4  Purposes of Assessment 
In  higher  education,  there  exist  several  approaches  which  are  used  to  assess 
learning. The aim in choosing an assessment method is to choose the method which most 
effectively asses the purposes and learning objectives of the course (Elton, 2002). A non-
comprehensive  list  of  assessment  methods  include  multiple  choice  questions,  unseen 
examination,  portfolios,  oral  examination,  coursework,  group  assessment  and  peer 
assessment (Nightingale, 1996). In practice, there are several reasons for designing an 
assessment and these reasons may occur simultaneously.  Rowntree (1990) identifies two 
major purposes of assessing students: 
1.  To  provide  support  and  feedback  to  students  and  to  improve  their  ongoing 
learning 
2.  To report on what they have already achieved (a grade or a written assessment). 
Thus, the purpose of assessment can be categorised into assessment for learning 
and assessment for decision making (Elton, 2002) 
3.4.1  Formative Assessment  
Early work in formative assessment is attributed to leading theorists in education 
(Black & Wiliam, 1998). Formative implies a process or product which is capable of 
developing  or  shaping.  Formative  assessment  is  influenced  by  the  need  to  provide 
information to students, in a manner that will contribute to the use of their acquired 
skills.  Thus,  the  aim  of  formative  assessment  is  to  help  students’  learn  something 
(Rosbottom, 1997). As described in Morgan & O’reilly (1999: 15) traditional formative 
assessment has commonly taken the form of:  
•  Non-assessable activities and feedback in study materials 
•  Self-assessment quizzes and tests that help students monitor their own progress 
•  Feedback from assignments, or from peers, colleagues or mentors 
•  Dialogue with teachers, tutors and other students 
•  Non-assessable tests that prepare students for formal examinations 21 
 
 Formative assessment takes place while a class is ongoing and it continuously 
monitors student progress rather than at the endpoint. This type of assessment provides a 
short  term  feedback  loop  which  offers  insight  into  the  student’s  strengths  and  their 
conceptual errors (Earl, 2003). Thus, the students are presented with opportunities to 
improve. In another view, Sadler (1989) describes formative assessment as the means to 
identify the “gap” between a student’s current understanding and the desired goal. Hattie 
& Timperley, (2007), suggests that different students will have different “gaps” and the 
lecturers should design strategies to identify and close these gaps.  
3.4.2  Summative Assessment 
Summative assessments are administered to record or report an estimate of the 
students’ achievements (Morgan & O’reilly, 1999: 15). Summative assessments are also 
called high-stakes assessments when used for promotion, placement, certification, and 
accountability (Rovai, 2000). Thus, reliability is central to summative assessments; since 
the results may have an enormous impact on students’ academic future. For summative 
purposes, achievement is generally summarised in terms of grades, which aids in the 
comparison and classification between students. However, summative assessment should 
be  viewed  in  terms  of  accountability  rather  than  as  a  means  of  classifying  students. 
Therefore,  when  summative  assessments  are  focused  on  grading  or  classification, 
students  are  likely  to  do  their  best  to  obtain  good  marks  and  look  competent  in 
comparison  with  their  peers  (Cowie,  2005).  In  conclusion,  the  goal  of  a  summative 
assessment is to provide overall information on the amount and quality of the student 
learning. 
3.5  Delivery of Assessment 
The methods of presenting formative and summative assessments are integral to 
the assessment process. These approaches are described below.  
3.5.1  On-paper/Traditional Approach 
Traditional assessments are popular in the educational system and this mode of 
assessment readily comes into mind when using the term test or exam.  As defined by 
JISC (2006), an on-paper test is “an assessment delivered to the candidate on paper and 
where the candidate responds on paper”.  Thus, in the traditional approach, the test is 
presented on a paper and usually accompanied with time constraints i.e. the exams are 22 
 
done within a limited period of time. Traditional tests are often reliable as students are 
tested  through  the  same  standardised  procedure  and  at  the  same  controlled  location; 
hence, measurements are generally consistent with each other (Rovai, 2000). However, 
the disadvantages of traditional tests are evident in the inability to cater for distance 
students. This implies that students who reside in remote places need to be physically 
present  at  the  assessment  site.  Additionally,  lecturers  are  burdened  with  the 
administrative task of marking scripts which may lead to fatigue (Brown et al, 1996: 72). 
3.5.2  On-screen Approach 
The  on-screen  approach  provides  an  alternative  to  the  traditional  on-paper 
approach and offer benefits such as instant results, interactive on-screen questions and 
greater accessibility. On-screen testing simply refers to as “an assessment delivered to 
the candidate on a computer screen” (JISC, 2006). On-screen assessment is widely used 
in  academic  and  non-academic  environments.  For  example,  the  Driving  Standards 
Agency  (DSA)  in  the  UK,  offers  on-screen  tests  for  student  car  drivers  and 
motorcyclists; whilst, the Home office UK Border Agency offers the ‘Life in the UK 
tests’ on-screen to applicants for British citizenship.  In an educational setting, the on-
screen  test  involves  installing  the  assessment  software  and  running  the  test  on  the 
computers. To conduct the on-screen assessment, the test is downloaded to a Server 
(central)  computer  through  a  secure  internet  connection.  Thereafter,  the  test  can  be 
distributed to other computer which is then accessed securely. However, the test is not 
run online, i.e. there is no live internet connection whilst conducting an on-screen test. 
Thus, the test is accessed on each individual client computer from the server via the 
institution’s network.  
3.5.3  On-demand Approach 
The on-demand approach will provide the platform for assessment ‘anywhere’. 
According to JISC (2006), the on-demand testing produces “a high degree of flexibility 
in the date and time that tests can be offered to suit the student or learning programme”. 
In traditional tests, students are subjected to writing examinations in the same controlled 
location (e.g. examination hall) and within a specific time. Early advocates of on-demand 
assessment suggest that, a student may do well, (or badly) if assessed on a different day, 
or in a different place (Miller & Parlett, 1973). On-demand assessment embraces the idea 
that each student is unique and their capacity to assimilate and retain learning content 23 
 
vary between the individuals. Thus, one of its profound benefits is that, candidates’ can 
be assessed at their own intellectual and psychological convenience i.e. when learning 
content is completely comprehended. 
3.5.4  Online Approach 
The term online describes the state of ‘being connected’ via the internet. Several 
transactions  which  can  be  conducted  via  the  internet  include,  online  banking,  online 
shopping,  online  gaming  and  online  dating.  Online  assessment  refers  to  an  entirely 
automated  process  which  relies  on  the  delivery  of  tests  and  uploading  candidate 
responses  on  an  internet  connection  (JISC  2006).  One  of  the  key  benefits  of  online 
assessment is the ability to bridge the gap between distance students and the higher 
institutions. This collaboration enhances the learning experience and provides the student 
with a sense of involvement that is almost comparable with on-campus students. In a 
typical online assessment setting, tests can be offered at different locations or different 
times  and  the  test  items  can  be  randomised  to  provide  a  different  paper  (Harvey  & 
Mogey,  1999).  Thus,  after  a  test  is  completed,  the  test  responses  are  uploaded  for 
automatic  marking.  In  addition,  the  immediate  collation  of  results  and  personalised 
feedback relevant to the test performance is provided. As suggested in Johnson & Green 
(2004), taking exams online produces a private and personal experience for the student; 
as opposed to writing test responses on paper, which can potentially reveal the student’s 
errors to the public. 
3.6  The Role of Feedback in Assessment 
Feedback is a crucial component in a learning and assessment cycle. The primary 
aim of this process is to inform students on how well they have done and how to improve 
(Brown, 2001). Hence, engaging in constructive and timely feedback assists students’ in 
reflecting on their progress. In the feedback mechanism, the type of feedback given to a 
student is dependent on the purpose of assessment employed (Gibbs & Simpsons, 2002). 
Formative feedback typically occurs in an informal setting, where the goal is to 
provide information about the students’ improvement and to motivate the students. Thus, 
one benefit of the continuous, constructive formative feedback is to create a point of 
dialogue  between  lecturers’  and  students’  (Morgan  &  O’Reilly,  1999).  According  to 
Laurillard’s  (1995)  conversational  framework,  such  points  of  dialogue  foster  an 24 
 
interactive  environment  providing  meaningful  feedback  for  the  assessment  tasks. 
Summative feedback may not provide feedback to each question; however, feedback is 
given  based  on  a  student’s  competency  of  the  assessment  tasks.  The  Summative 
feedback is often found on the comments section of a response sheet; and may or may 
not be discussed with the student (Schwiebert & Bondurant, 2000). 
Generally,  it  is  recommended  that  feedback  should  be  provided  quickly  and 
without  delay.  As  described  in  Gibbs  &  Simpsons,  (2002)  a  delayed  feedback  may 
induce  the  student  into  learning  a  new  content  and  the  feedback  from  a  previous 
assessment  would  become  irrelevant  to  their  ongoing  studies.  Hence,  the  feedback 
information may be considered less interesting and it is unlikely to enhance learning.  
3.7  Summary 
Assessment is an integral part of the educational process and it should not be 
divorced from it. To promote the reliability and validity of an assessment, the assessment 
task needs to be aligned in relation to the objectives of the course. By doing this, the 
extent  to  which  a  student  has  mastered  the  syllabus  of  a  course  taken  is  assessed. 
However, assessment is influenced by the underlying learning theories of the educational 
process. This implies that a curriculum designer or an assessor’s decisions on the style of 
teaching and assessing reflects a Behaviourist, Cognitivist or Constructivist classroom. 
To  a  behaviourist,  assessment  means  a  re-take  of  tests  until  the  learning  content  is 
mastered.  A  cognitivist  enhances  the  prior  knowledge  of  a  learning  resource,  whilst 
constructivists’ view the assessment process as a point of interaction between the lecturer 
and the student. Additionally, the method employed in grading an assessment task also 
influences the assessment process.  
A norm-referenced grading scheme emphasises class ranking, where a student’s 
scores is compared against a group of other scores to determine a grade. A downside of 
this  method  is  that  the  individual  performances  are  not  revealed,  but  rather 
discrimination between high and low scorers. Hence, students are required to compete 
with  each  other  for  grades,  which  in  turn  may  produce  an  unhealthy  approach  to 
assessment. For example, candidates may want to achieve high grades through every 
means  possible;  thus,  an  increase  in  security  threats  on  the  assessment  process  is 
inevitable. A criterion referenced scheme assigns a grade by measuring a student’s score 
against a set of pre-defined criteria. This implies that a score would reveal the extent to 25 
 
which  a  learning  content  is  mastered.  Criterion  referencing  embraces  fairness  in 
assessment, where the weak and strong students can be accommodated. By doing this, 
security threats are minimised as students are inspired to improve. However, defining the 
quality and validity of the criteria required often breeds disagreement amongst educators. 
The security of assessments is discussed in the next chapters. 
Lastly, it is important to determine the purpose of designing an assessment either 
to monitor a student’s progress during the course (formative) or to classify the student’s 
performance  at  the  end  of  a  course  (summative).  The  formative  and  summative 
assessments  can  be  presented  conventionally  using  pen  and  paper  (on-paper)  or 
displayed on a computer screen without an internet connection (on-screen) or offered 
flexibly to suit varying date and times (on-demand) or delivered electronically via the 
internet (on-line). However, a major drawback of all the presentation types is the security 
of the assessment process which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4.   Electronic 
Assessment Security 
In chapter three, it is noted that the on-paper, on-screen, on-demand and online 
approaches  can  be  used  to  deliver  a  formative  or  summative  assessment.  The  on-
paper/traditional approach is highly susceptible to security challenges e.g. identity fraud 
and plagiarism; hence, the assessment system seeks solace in alternative approaches, i.e. 
on-screen, on-demand and online methods. In this thesis, the online approach and its 
security of assessment systems is considered. It should be noted that there exist security 
challenges in the on-screen and on-demand approaches; however, the discussions are 
beyond the scope of this research. 
This chapter presents a detailed overview on using the online approach for the 
delivery of assessment tasks. In this thesis, the terms ‘online’ and ‘electronic’ will be 
used interchangeably, to denote an assessment task which is delivered via an internet 
connection. Employing an online delivery of assessment tasks presents valuable gains to 
the educational process; however, the approach is susceptible to a variety of security 
challenges. According to Rowe (2004), cheating online becomes easier, since what or 
who the student brings to the assessment site cannot be seen. Furthermore, four types of 
e-assessment security which can influence summative e-assessments are discussed; this 
includes user security, data security, location security and software security. Lastly, this 
chapter  presents  the  three  types  of  user  authentication  methods  (i.e.  possession, 
knowledge and biometric methods) and their implications for e-assessment security. 
4.1  Electronic Assessment 
Electronic assessment is presented as an alternative to traditional assessments 
where  the  assessment  task  is  delivered  and  displayed  on  a  computer  screen  via  the 
internet. A formal definition refers to e-assessment as the use of ICT for the presentation 
of assessment activity and the recording of responses (JISC, 2006). Thus, in order to 
provide  an  alignment  between  the  teaching,  learning  and  assessment  processes,  it  is 27 
 
essential to employ the use of ICT in assessment (Gipps, 2003). Additionally, Brown et 
al, (1996) suggests that due to paradigm shift in educational technology, it may become 
unfair to train students online and then use pens for assessments. Adopting electronic 
assessments in a higher education environment embodies enormous benefits such as, 
automatic marking, immediate feedback to students, opportunities for lifelong learning 
and  improved  access  for  disabilities  or  geographically  dispersed  students.  The  three 
types of e-assessment which may be employed for assessing include: online formative, 
online summative and diagnostic assessment.  
4.1.1  Formative E-assessment 
Online  formative  assessment  readily  brings  to  mind  the  theory  of  Vygotsky 
(1986),  where  he  suggests  the  need  to  build  an  atmosphere  of  social  constructivism 
amongst the students and lecturers. The formative e-assessment process is supported 
through  synchronous  and  asynchronous  communication  tools  such  as  email,  bulletin 
boards, news groups, and wikis. These electronic methods allow the students to pursue 
areas of perceived weakness and to affirm areas of strength (Challis, 2005). The core of a 
successful online formative assessment is the provision of immediate online feedback to 
students  (Charman,  1999;  85).  Typically,  this  is  a  personalised  feedback  aimed  at 
addressing  the  student’s  individual  needs.  In  addition,  the  online  feedback  should 
provide explanations for wrong responses to questions or advices on approaching the 
questions differently. Thus, the quality of formative feedback received is crucial as it 
distinguishes an effective course from other courses (Gilbert & Gale, 2008).  
In online formative assessment, issues relating to security may be irrelevant as 
the priority is to improve learning and keep the students’ informed about their progress. 
Thus,  it  is  pointless  to  cheat  in  an  assessment  that  is  designed  to  gain  knowledge 
(Challis, 2005).  Additionally, adopting a high-level of security measure for formative 
assessments will be a waste of resources and can be a ‘turnoff’ for the students.  Hence, 
in this thesis, the security of formative e-assessments would not be considered. 
4.1.2  Summative E-assessment 
Online summative assessment is categorised as high-stake examinations which 
takes place at the end of a course of study. Online summative examinations enjoy the 
benefits of an internet-network environment, where student responses to questions are 
automatically  uploaded  and  marked  (Aojula  et  al,  2006).    This  online  approach 28 
 
eliminates the need to safe-guard printed questions and answers sheets. One of the key 
benefits of summative e-assessments is the ability to automatically mark tests, which can 
minimise human errors due to fatigue. 
Amidst  the  advantages,  the  summative  e-assessment  is  perceived  to  be 
susceptible  to  a  variety  of  security  issues  which  challenges  the  online  system.  For 
example, to ensure data security, the item bank should be accessed by authorised parties 
only. Additionally, to ensure user security, the assessment should be delivered and taken 
by the correct student only. Hence, due to the high-stake nature of the summative tests it 
is essential to maintain a high security level. The remaining sections of this chapter and 
the  successive  chapters  of  this  thesis  focus  on  improving  the  security  of  online 
summative assessments.  
4.1.3  Diagnostic Assessment 
Diagnostic assessment has been associated as a testing carried out by educational 
psychologists for students with learning difficulties. However, in modern education it is 
used to identify a student’s strengths and weakness or prior knowledge and skills in 
relation  to  a  course  programme  (JISC,  2006)  Diagnostic  assessment  sits  between 
summative and formative assessments and it can be used to diagnose a student’s ability 
at the beginning of a course (Boston, 2002). In formative assessment, an initial diagnosis 
aids in making decisions about a student’s skills whilst as a summative test it serves as a 
basis for making a decision about a student’s suitability for entry to a course (Ecclestone, 
1996). Traditionally, diagnostic assessment may take the form of a one-to-one session 
with  a  career  counsellor;  however,  in  an  online  mode  computerised  diagnostic  tools 
replace the physical advisor (Kutty et al, 2003).  The diagnosis may present the lecturer 
with an overview of the students’ ability, which may influence their teaching strategies.  
For  example,  in  a  work  environment,  a  job  applicant  may  be  required  to  undergo  a 
diagnostic test in order to determine the individual’s competency for a job and the extra 
skills that may be needed.  
Hence, it is futile for a student to cheat during diagnostic assessments; since the 
test is aimed at identifying strengths and weakness to aid intellectual growth. Thus, the 
students’  who  cheat  during  a  diagnostic  assessment  may  pass  the  test,  feigning 
competency in the subject area.  However, due to the lack of appropriate knowledge, the 
fraudulent students may have to continue cheating till the end of the course. Therefore, it 29 
 
is important to ensure adequate security during diagnostic assessments to avoid security 
breaches  during  high-stake  assessments.  The  security  of  diagnostic  assessment  is  a 
potential research area; however, it will not be discussed in this thesis. 
4.2  Computer Security Fundamentals 
Security is a fundamental concept which is relevant in our daily lives and a top 
priority in several applications. Computer security is the generic name for the collection 
of related components such as assets, threats, goals and preventive measures designed to 
protect the system (Stallings, 2000). An asset refers to resources in the system that might 
have  value  and  needs  to  be  protected  (ISO/IEC,  2005).  Examples  of  assets  that  are 
protected in a system include: personal information, money (tangibles) and reputation 
(intangibles). Thus, identifying the relevant assets of a system can prevent harm to the 
assets if the system is misused. In general, every computer system is required to protect 
three primary assets, i.e. the hardware, software and data assets (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 
2003).   
Computer  and  network  security  addresses  three  specific  security  goals  of  a 
computer system; these are the confidentiality (C), integrity (I) and availability (A) goals 
(Gollman 2006). The confidentiality goal ensures that only authorised users should have 
access  to  the  protected  asset.  The  integrity  goal  ensures  that  the  protected  asset  is 
unaltered by unauthorised users or in unauthorised ways. The availability goal ensures 
that the assets are operational and available to authorised users. 
A security relationship exists between the C-I-A security goals and the valuable 
assets of a computer system. Thus, a compromise of the C-I-A security goals may lead to 
a compromise of the critical assets. For example, a data asset is expected: 
•  To  be  accessed  by  only  authorised  parties;  thus,  data  must  be  restricted 
(confidentiality goal). 
•  To contain no alterations of the original data; modification should be done by 
authorised parties only (integrity goal). 
•  To  be  operational  and  accessible  whenever  it  is  needed;  except  during 
authorised downtimes (availability goal). 
A threat presents a source of danger which has the potential to cause loss or 
harm. In designing a computer system, it is important to understand the type of threats 
that can compromise the critical assets. Thus, computer security threats are grouped into 30 
 
four  classes,  i.e.  interception,  interruption,  modification  and  fabrication  (Pfleeger  & 
Pfleeger,  2003).    Interception  represents  an  attack  on  confidentiality  when  an 
unauthorised user gains access to an asset. Modification is an attack on integrity, such 
that an unauthorised user gains access and alters an asset. Interruption is an attack on 
availability  and  it  occurs  when  there  is  a  disruption  to  the  service  being  provided, 
rendering the asset unusable. Fabrication is an attack on authenticity and it occurs when 
an unauthorised user creates a counterfeit of an asset. Authenticity is an addition to the 
three primary security goals; it may or may not be included in the taxonomy (Stallings, 
2000). Thus, the authenticity goal verifies a claimed identity of a user. 
4.3  Summative E-assessment Security  
Online summative assessment is a powerful tool which embodies great benefits 
such  as  automated  marking,  immediate  feedback  and  on-demand  tests.  Online 
summative assessments are categorised as high-stake examinations which count towards 
a final course mark. In higher education, summative e-assessments can be divided into 
two classes: (1) e-assessments in supervised environments and (2) e-assessments in non-
supervised environments. Summative e-assessments which are conducted in supervised 
environments include campus based exams and authorised test centres (Rowe, 2004). In 
these  environments,  authorised  personnel  or  proctors  are  required  to  monitor  and 
supervise the examination process from start to finish.  Non-supervised environments 
include tests conducted for distance learning. In these environments, the examination 
process  may  be  supervised  remotely;  however  the  examinee  is  required  to  maintain 
academic  honesty.  This  research  focuses  on  summative  e-assessments  conducted  in 
supervised/controlled conditions and do not assume a non-supervised environment. 
Furnell  (1998)  asserts  that  higher  education  is  not  a  sector  in  which  security 
considerations feature; however, this changes when an online assessment is considered. 
Thus, for the purpose of conducting high-stake summative tests, it is important to define 
appropriate e-assessment security measures. In their work, Marais et al, (2006) identify 
two  categories  of  security  in  e-assessments  i.e.  the  web  security  and  e-assessment 
security. They suggest that web security (securing of servers and web applications) is a 
well investigated area but it is insufficient to fulfil the security needs of e-assessment. 
Hence,  the  concept  of  e-assessment  security  requires  that  certain  security  checks  be 
applied to ensure that a fair assessment is taken. The security checks identified in Marais 31 
 
et al, (2006) and also pointed out in several researches are divided into four main classes: 
user security, data security, location security and software security (Table 4-1) 
E-assessment 
Security Type 
Examples  References 
User security  •  To ensure the correct 
identity and authenticity of 
the person taking the test 
Paulsen, 2000; Aojula et 
al, 2006; Weippl, 2006 
Data security  •  The non-deniability of e-
assessment submissions  
•  The e-assessment integrity 
should deter electronic 
corruption. 
•  The privacy and 
confidentiality of 
assessment data 
Summons & Simon, 1998; 
McKeena & Bull, 2000; 
Weippl, 2005; Gonzalez-
Tablas et al, 2006 
Location security  •  The e-assessment should 
be taken in the 
correct/supervised location 
Marais et al, 2006; 
Apampa, et al 2008a; 
Walton, 2005 
Software security  •  The secure set-up of client 
and server software. 
von Solms, 2004; 
Harwood, 2005; Gilbert et 
al, 2009 
Table 4-1 E-assessment security types 
4.3.1  User Security  
Due to the high-stake nature of a summative e-assessment, it is essential that only 
a legitimate student can gain access to the online test.  A user security process consists of 
user security components, such as identification, authentication and access control, to 
determine a user’s access rights. The user security process of a summative e-assessment 
makes up a core area of ensuring the reliability and validity of the online assessment. 
Hence, a compromise to the user security process may render the assessment unreliable 
and  invalid.  However,  the  user  security  process  is  fallible  to  security  threats  which 
plague  existing  online  summative  assessment  systems  (Warren  &  Hutchinson,  2003; 
Sangi, 2008). The user security process and its security threats are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
4.3.2  Data Security  
Data  security  in  summative  e-assessment  is  the  practice  of  ensuring  that 
assessment data is administered securely without endangering the integrity of the data. 
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(QCA, 2007), it is vital that the e-assessment system have sufficient capacity to store, 
retrieve,  generate  and  share  assessment  data,  including  the  ability  to  exchange  data 
securely.  In Gilbert et al, (2009) recommendations to ensure data security in summative 
e-assessments are divided into two classes, security of test materials and results; security 
of assessment data transferred over networks. 
Security of test materials and results: 
The e-assessment database is a large pool of related components from which 
assessments can be built; including test items, scoring keys and assessment algorithms 
(Anzaldua, 2002). Therefore, it is vital that steps are taken to ensure security of the 
database. A concern during the design of the e-assessment database is the exposure of 
items and this flaw can occur through item authoring, item selection or item validation. 
A  worst  scenario  occurs  when  a  student  gains  prior  knowledge  of  such  items  and 
solutions; it can be used to their advantage during the test.   
In literature, there are proposals towards the deployment of cryptography as a 
solution for most data security issues in e-assessment. Examples of existing work in 
cryptography include: digital signatures can be used to ensure non-repudiation of test 
submissions  (Gonzalez-Tablas  et  al,  2006),  data  encryption  can  be  used  to  obtain 
confidentiality  for  test  responses  (Weippl,  2005)  and  hash  functions  can  be  used  to 
maintain the integrity of the test responses (Shafarenko & Barsky, 2000). Additionally, 
the secure storage of the assessment data is an important aspect of the e-assessment data 
security.  Therefore  to  maintain  the  reliability  and  validity  of  an  online  test,  security 
measures are required to restrict access to the results data, including backup results data. 
Security of assessment data transferred over networks 
The design of the e-assessment system should allow for secure transfer of test 
materials over the network. Thus, where a test is delivered on a network or intranet, the 
server and connections should be adequate to ensure integrity of data, secrecy of data and 
availability of service. In addition, the e-assessment system should have features that 
ensure regular and frequent backups of all collected data that allow for data recovery if 
problems occur with the network.  33 
 
4.3.3  Location Security 
Marais et al, (2006), proposes the concept of location security for e-assessments. Their 
work suggests that the electronic integrity of an e-assessment system may be threatened 
as  a  result  of  un-implemented  location  security  measures.  In  addition,  the  electronic 
integrity of an e-assessment system can be violated by electronic corruption. An example 
of electronic corruption during an online test is when a student double submits a test 
from the same location. This means that when Student A completes his test; he can use 
the knowledge of a just completed test to complete another Student B’s test if security 
measures are not in place. Thus, to deter the fraudulent act, the server should deny two 
logins originating from the same IP address (Marais et al, 2006). However, this solution 
can present further loopholes when non-static IP addresses are used and an invigilator is 
required  to  override  the  system  rules.  Thus,  the  students  can  exploit  the  flexibilities 
presented by the invigilator.  
A workaround to this solution is the use of static IP addresses tied to the student login 
ID (Apampa, et al 2008a). In our approach, a student’s login ID is associated with an 
available  static  IP  address  (Bx07r  +  192.168.10.3),  such  that  a  computer  that  is 
connected  to  the  network  will  retain  the  same  IP  address  for  the  duration  of  the 
assessment. Thus, a deliberate reboot of the computer will not produce a new IP address 
neither would the invigilator need to modify functions when a computer stalls. Figure 
4-1  shows  a  diagrammatic  illustration  of  the  proposed  solution  by  assuming  two 
characters Bob and Alice. In Figure 4-1, access is granted to Bob when he logs in on a 
computer assigned to his user ID. Likewise, access is granted to Alice by logging on to a 
computer assigned to her user ID. However, Bob is denied access when logging on to his 
assigned computer via Alice’s user ID; thus, access is granted only when Alice’s user ID 
is  used  on  her  computer.  Additionally,  to  track  the  static  IP  and  user  ID  process  a 
registration log can be printed when all available computers are occupied. The log is also 
useful to prevent student swaps during the test. Irrespective of the techniques suggested, 
location security is still an unexplored research area embedded with potential research 
opportunities. 34 
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Figure 4-1 Static IP address mapped to user ID 
4.3.4  Software / Application Security 
The availability of an e-assessment software or application is important to the 
success  of  the  e-assessment  system.  Therefore,  it  is  important  that  the  application 
software is developed from the beginning with security in mind, as this will enable the 
software to resist, tolerate and recover from attacks effectively (Allen et al, 2008). It is 
important to ensure that a malicious person or programs does not disrupt a summative e-
assessment before, during or after the test. For example, a student that failed to prepare 
for the online test may decide to launch an attack on the e-assessment server. Thus, it is 
the  responsibility  of  the  systems  administrator  to  install  OS  patches,  virus  and  mail 
scanners and this should be kept up to date (WebCT Security, 2005).  35 
 
4.4  User Authentication Techniques for E-assessment 
Security 
User authentication is a crucial procedure in existing computer security systems; 
the authentication step is used to determine the users that can gain access to a secured 
resource or asset. In literature, there are three primary classes of a user authentication 
procedure,  namely  possession,  knowledge  and  biometrics  methods  (Nanavati  et  al, 
2002). This thesis adopts the three primary classes of user authentication; these classes 
present  a  foundation  for  the  e-assessment  user  security  discussions  in  the  remaining 
chapters.  
Possession: this consists of physical objects which belong to the correct user. The object 
is required to gain access to a resource or service. Examples in this category include 
smart cards, badges and keys.  
Knowledge: this consists of information or data which is known only to the correct user 
and it is required to be kept a secret. Examples include, passwords, PINs, combination 
locks and challenge questions.   
Biometrics: this consists of the unique physiological and behavioural characteristics of a 
human  being.  Examples  include  fingerprint  technology,  iris  recognition,  facial 
recognition, voice recognition and signature recognition.  
Table  4-2  lists  examples  and  properties  of  user  authentication  methods.  For 
example, a user is able to access a requested service via the knowledge of password. 
Additionally, to achieve a higher level of security more complex systems such as two-
factor or multi-factor authentication should be implemented (Bolle et al, 2003). These 
complex systems employ more than one form of authentication to verify the identity of a 
user.  A typical example of the two-factor authentication can occur using a bank card and 
a  PIN  to  carrying  out  bank  transactions  via  an  automated  teller  machine  (ATM). 
Therefore,  a  bank  card  is  useless  without  the  knowledge  of  the  associated  PIN  in 
carrying  out  transactions.  However,  in  this  thesis,  the  two-factor  or  multi-factor 
authentication method is not considered. 
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Method    Examples    Properties 
What the user has (P)    User IDs, accounts, 
smartcards, badges, 
keys 
 
 
Can be shared 
Can be duplicated 
Can be lost or stolen 
What the user 
knows(K) 
  Password, PIN, 
Mother’s maiden 
name, Lock codes 
 
 
 
Easy to guess 
Can be shared 
Can be forgotten 
Something unique 
about the user (B) 
  Fingerprint, face, iris, 
voiceprint 
 
 
Cannot be shared  
Cannot be lost or stolen 
Not forgeable 
What you have and 
what you know (P, K) 
  ATM card + PIN    Can be shared 
PIN is a weak link 
Table 4-2 Existing user authentication methods 
4.5  Possession Methods 
Possession methods consist of physical objects which belong to the correct user 
and they are required for access. A smart card is a commonly used physical object which 
can be used to achieve user authentication. Smart cards are credit card-sized plastic cards 
with embedded memory to store and process data. The smart cards have benefits which 
can improve the security of the user authentication process, e.g. the smart card can store 
a hash function of a user login details (Yang et al, 2008). Additionally, the smart cards 
can  be  used  as  a  Single  Sign-on  (SSO)  for  logging  in  to  several  computers  in  an 
environment (Fugkeaw et al, 2007). The smart card technology is not new to higher 
education and it is typically adopted for student identification. Thus, the student ID card 
via the smart card can contain the details which could allow access to several facilities in 
the  institution  environment,  such  as  access  to  library  services,  catering  facilities, 
transportation and buildings.   
However, the use of smart cards for student authentication during summative e-
assessments  is  not  a  common  method.  Owing  to  its  hardware  and  infrastructure 
implications, smart cards may be an expensive authentication method for online tests. 
Lastly, Graf (2002) asserts that, the use of smartcards is not a viable alternative for user 37 
 
authentication in summative e-assessments. For the purpose of this study, the possession 
methods would not be considered. 
4.6  Knowledge Methods 
A user password is a popular method of authentication in accessing computer 
systems  (Oorschot  &  Thorpe,  2008).  Passwords  refer  to  mutually  agreed-upon  code 
words, which is shared between the user and the system only. Thus, a password can 
either be user-chosen (where a user chooses easy-to-remember passwords) or system-
assigned (where the password is written in a safe place). However, Argles et al, (2007) 
assert that, insisting on short and easy passwords to memorise can lead to a breach of 
security.  This  implies  that  users  are  likely  to  employ  passwords  that  can  be  broken 
through an exhaustive search of a relatively small subset from a small domain (Klein, 
1990). In a small password domain, adversaries attempt to try all possible passwords 
until the correct password is located. The password management system is an approach 
which can be used to strengthen password against adversaries. For example, a password 
system may enforce rules which require that user passwords should include a numeric 
digit and/or a capital letter. In a password operation, the user enters an identification 
detail, e.g. a username or a user ID. To verify the identity claimed, a password request is 
made  to  the  user.  Thus,  the  system  compares  the  input  password  and  the  stored 
password; a match indicates successful authentication and a mismatch would require that 
the user re-types the password. 
In a survey of identity management in higher education, Yanosky & Salaway, 
(2006),  found  out  that  91.1%  of  respondents  continue  to  rely  on  passwords  for 
authenticating students in online environments. In e-assessments, the password is the 
most popular and inexpensive method of identifying and authenticating students. The 
success of the password is attributed to its ease of use, such that a special device is not 
required for data collection. Thus, the students are able to choose short and easy-to-
remember  passwords  for  their  convenience  (Adams  &  Sasse,  1999).  However,  these 
passwords  have  inherent  weaknesses  which  make  them  easily  susceptible  to 
compromise.  For  example,  the  passwords  are  often  poorly  selected  and  infrequently 
changed.  Additionally,  due  to  the  shareable  and  transferable  nature  of  knowledge 
methods, a student’s login details can be shared with other people. Lastly in this section, 38 
 
existing password authentication implementations are presented.  The password schemes 
show the various resistance levels to intruder attacks. 
Basic Password:  
In this method, the password is transmitted in plaintext from the client to the 
server. The server compares the plaintext password with a stored version and access is 
granted when authentication is successful. However, due to the simplicity of the method, 
the  user  password  can  be  intercepted  and  used  in  a  variety  of  attacks,  such  as 
eavesdropping (Boyd & Mathuria, 2003) and man-in-the-middle attacks (Lowe, 1995).  
Hash Password: 
The hash password method is an improvement to transmitting a user’s password 
in the clear. In this technique an image of the password is computed under a one-way 
hash function and the image is stored in the password file. To verify a user’s password, 
the server compares the hash password from the client and the hash stored in the server. 
Thus,  a  match  indicates  that  the  input  user  password  is  correct.  In  a  one-way  hash 
operation, the function takes a plaintext value returns a hash value which is hard to invert 
(Menezes et al, 1996). This means that it is computationally infeasible to find the input 
from a given hash value. However, to prevent cryptanalysis, the hash functions are used 
together  with  nonce  values  (Anderson,  2001).  The  nonce  (number  used  once)  is  a 
random value used as proof of freshness or timeliness. 
Kerberos: 
Kerberos was developed at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) as a 
third party authentication service for the protection of network services (Steiner et al, 
1988).  In  traditional  authentication  schemes,  passwords  are  transmitted  either  as 
plaintext or hashed values. However, in Kerberos the encrypted keys are transmitted 
instead  of  the  passwords.  Additionally,  to  improve  security  and  reduce  man-in-the-
middle  attacks,  a  mutual  authentication  facility  between  the  client  and  server  is 
implemented. In a mutual authentication, the identity of the client and server is verified.   
One time passwords: 
Adopting  a  one-time  password  scheme,  the  computer  system  is  required  to 
generate a new password for each authentication process (Haller, 1994). This means that, 
once a password is used it cannot be re-used; thus, the computer system produces one-39 
 
time passwords by decrementing a sequence number. Additionally, one-time passwords 
can be derived from a chosen user password; however, the user will be provided with a 
long  list  of  potential  passwords  which  is  written  (Halevi  &  Krawczyk,  1999).  A 
disadvantage  of  this  method  is  the  inconvenience  incurred  in  carrying  a  long  list  of 
passwords  and  ensuring  that  the  list  is  safe  and  secret.  A  variant  of  the  one-time 
passwords  is  the  challenge-response  mechanism,  where  the  server  selects  a  random 
challenge for each new authentication instance (Liang & Wang, 2005). 
4.6.1  Password Authentication Schemes in Higher Education 
In this section, two prominent password authentication schemes employed in the 
higher  education  environment  is  discussed.  This  includes  the  Lightweight  Directory 
Access Protocol (LDAP) and the Shibboleth technology.   
4.6.1.1  The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol  
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) is a general purpose database 
management system, optimised for use as a directory server and the directory structure is 
suitable for storing user data, which can be accessed through the LDAP protocol (RFC 
1777). In higher education institutions in the UK, the LDAP is a common choice for 
providing user authentication (central user password system) and directory information 
for  individuals  throughout  the  institution.  Furthermore,  the  LDAP  can  be  used  for 
verifying users membership in a university community, retrieving an employee’s contact 
information, confirming a student’s course registration and accessing the email directory 
(of some mail clients). The LDAP is a platform-independent protocol which is integrated 
with most network operating systems.  For example, LDAP directories such as Microsoft 
Active Directory and Novel eDirectory provide a low cost method for implementing fast 
identity look-ups and authentication.  
One of the disadvantages of the traditional LDAP is the inability to support a 
single sign-on authentication for users. In a single sign-on (SSO) process, gaining access 
into one service automatically authenticates the user for all the other services. Thus, this 
reduces the amount of passwords a user is required to memorise. A SSO process may 
also  be  used  to  implement  stronger  authentication  methods.  For  example,  a  user’s 
password  may  be  employed  to  gain  access  to  a  computer;  however,  a  two-factor 
authentication  method  may  be  required  to  gain  access  to  sensitive  information  or 
applications. 40 
 
4.6.1.2  Shibboleth Technology 
In higher education institutions, the Shibboleth protocol is gradually replacing the 
LDAP as a method for user management and authentication. This protocol offers the 
account  synchronisation  capabilities  of  the  LDAP  including  the  single  sign-on 
functionality. Thus, a user logged into a Shibboleth system is provided a seamless access 
to  other  Shibboleth  protected  services,  eliminating  the  need  to  log  in  again.  The 
Shibboleth protocol improves the users' experience by eliminating the need to remember 
multiple passwords (Shibboleth, 2001). Additionally, the Shibboleth is designed to be 
used  across  institutions  to  verify  a  user's  affiliation  to  an  institution.  Hence,  web 
applications establish a trust relationship between institutions in order to allow users log 
in to services outside their institution. This relationship is provided through a federation; 
a federation represents groups of similar organisations (e.g. universities) which use the 
shibboleth technology to share and access a set of resources. 
In  Shibboleth,  the  user  authentication  process  is  delegated  to  the  user's  local 
institution or organisation which is known as the Shibboleth Identity Provider (SIP). The 
Shibboleth Identity Provider ensures that the relevant authentication detail about the user 
is up-to-date and available to the application. Lastly, the Shibboleth Service Provider 
(SSP) determines whether a user is authorised to access the resource. The decision of the 
Service Provider is influenced by the affiliation status information supplied from the 
user’s home institution. Thus, the information passed on to the Service Provider is about 
status rather than personal identity and this helps to preserves user privacy (JISC 2006). 
4.6.2  LDAP and Shibboleth in Electronic Assessments 
User authentication is one of the main purposes of an LDAP. Thus, during a 
summative e-assessment the student would simply enter a password in an entry point. 
The LDAP server (either remotely or locally) would receive the authentication requests 
and respond to the requests accordingly. Amidst its technical disadvantages, a LDAP 
authentication  is  perceived  to  be  a  more  suitable  solution  for  an  online  summative 
assessment  environment.  This  is  as  a  result  of  its  strong  user  authentication 
functionalities which is core to a summative e-assessment. The Shibboleth technology 
offers  benefits  in  providing  a  secure  channel  for  the  transfer  of  user  affiliation 
information between institutions (and publishers). However, the primary purpose of the 
Shibboleth software is not for user authentication. Hence, incorporating the Shibboleth 41 
 
software  into  the  online  assessment  may  be  unsuitable  for  high-stake  summative 
assessments.  In  Shibboleth,  the  user  authentication  process  is  not  included  in  the 
Shibboleth software, but rather devolved to be performed by the home institution. This 
implies that, Shibboleth relies on the local institution (Shibboleth Identity Provider) to 
establish  the  students’  identity  before  access  is  granted.  In  most  cases,  the  LDAP 
authentication will be deployed at the student’s institution; thus, the Shibboleth Identity 
Provider will be naturally connected to an existing identity management structure.  
However,  irrespective  of  the  potentials  apparent  in  the  LDAP-Shibboleth 
integration; a downside in adopting the protocol for summative e-assessments will be the 
SSO  services  of  the  Shibboleth  software.  A  SSO  will  improve  the  student’s  online 
experience, such that a student is required to log in once only for the duration of the test. 
It is perceived that, integrating an SSO in summative e-assessments will attract security 
threats and decrease the reliability standards of the test. For example, an external person 
may substitute a correctly authenticated student halfway through a test. However, the 
dishonest act may not be detected, since the original student is expected to sign in once 
only at the start of the test. 
4.7  Biometric Methods 
  Biometric technology is the measurement of the unique characteristics inherent 
in human beings. This distinct attributes provide an assurance about the true identity of 
an  individual.  A  biometric  system  is  a  pattern-recognition  system  that  distinguishes 
people  based  on  a  feature  vector  derived  from  the  physiological  and/or  behavioural 
characteristics (Jain et al, 2004). The physiological characteristics are derived from the 
direct measurements of a human body part (e.g. finger and face); whilst, the behavioural 
characteristics  are  indirectly  measured  (e.g.  keystroke  analysis).  The  behavioural 
biometric  data  is  derived  over  a  period  of  time  and  the  temporal  variation  of  the 
characteristics contains the required identity information. However, a biometric system 
which  adopts  physiological  characteristics  is  often  more  reliable  than  a  behavioural-
based biometric system (Delac & Grgic, 2004).  
A biometric architecture consists of two simple stages depicted in Figure 4-2. 
During  the  enrolment  phase,  a  user’s  biometric  image  is  acquired  and  a  biometric 
template is created. The templates may be stored in a database or on a portable storage 
device (Davida et al, 1998). During the authentication phase, a user’s raw biometric data 42 
 
is compared with the stored template. A match between the input data and the stored 
template signifies that the user is successfully authenticated. 
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Figure 4-2 Biometric architecture (Jain & Panakanti, 2000) 
To characterise a biometric human identifier it is important to employ a set of 
criteria.  The  suitability  of  a  chosen  biometric  identifier  can  be  evaluated  using  the 
following seven guidelines (Jain et al, 2004). 
•  Universality:  All  human  beings  should  be  endowed  with  the  same  physical 
characteristics, e.g. fingers, face and iris 
•  Uniqueness: For each person these physical characteristics should be distinct. 
•  Permanence: These characteristics should remain largely unchanged over time  
•  Collectability: A person’s unique physical characteristics need to be measureable and 
collected in a reasonable easy manner.  
•  Performance: The degree of accuracy of identification must be quite high before the 
system can be operational.  
•  Acceptability: The user population and the public in general should have no (strong) 
objections to the measuring/collection of the biometric 
•  Resistance to Circumvention: In order to provide added security, the system needs to 
be robust to withstand fraudulent methods 
4.7.1  Biometric Methodologies  
In biometric literature, there exists a progressing list of biometric technologies 
implemented in applications. According to Prabhakar et al, (2003), there is no single 
biometric which is the ‘ultimate’ recognition tool and the methodology chosen depends 43 
 
on the application. In this section, examples of commonly used biometric methods are 
presented (see Figure 4-3). 
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Figure 4-3 Examples of biometric characteristics 
Fingerprint: 
The fingerprint biometric is an automated digital version of the old ink and paper 
method used for identification (Maio et al, 2004). A fingerprint is made up of ridges and 
furrows  located  on  the  fingertips;  hence,  the  uniqueness  of  a  fingerprint  can  be 
determined  by  the  pattern  of  ridges,  furrows  and  the  minutiae  points.  In  fingerprint 
recognition operation, the input image is acquired through a direct contact of the finger 
on the fingerprint scanner. The acquired images are then sent to a feature extraction 
module, where the feature values corresponding to the position of the minutiae points are 
computed. Finally, the minutiae patterns extracted from the fingerprints are compared 
with the stored template.  
The biometric fingerprint is a mature technology and it enjoys a wide public 
acceptance (Jain et al, 1997). Additionally, the biometric fingerprint is proposed as a 
suitable authentication method for summative e-assessments (Marais et al, 2006; Levy & 
Ramim, 2007). A biometric fingerprint is an active authentication/verification method; 
thus,  a  level  of  user  involvement  is  required  during  the  verification  process.  Hence, 
adopting  the  fingerprints  for  presence  verification  in  summative  e-assessments  can 
become interruptive and distracting to the students test.  44 
 
Face: 
Facial images are probably the most common biometric characteristic used by 
humans to make a personal recognition. The biometric face recognition is an automated 
method which is used to record the spatial geometry of distinguishing features of the 
face. The facial features can be based on the spatial relationship of facial attributes (e.g. 
eyes, eyebrows, nose and lips) or on the overall analysis of the face image (Jain et al, 
2004). During the verification process, a two-dimensional image of the user’s face is 
obtained and a feature set is extracted.  The facial features extracted are then matched 
with  the  stored  templates.  The  biometric  face  recognition  is  a  non-intrusive  method, 
which is suitable for covert recognition applications i.e. applications were the image is 
taken without the knowledge of the individual.  
The  non-intrusive  ability  of  the  face  biometric  is  well  suited  for  achieving 
presence verification in summative e-assessments. The face is a passive biometric which 
does not require active user participation during the authentication; hence, it is unlikely 
to interrupt user’s activities during the process (Jain et al, 2004). However, a potential 
challenge to adopting the face biometric for presence verification is the inability of the 
face recognition system to authenticate/verify non-frontal poses (Zhang & Gao, 2009). In 
a  test  environment,  it  is  unlikely  for  a  student  to  consistently  focus  on  the  camera 
throughout the test session. However, it is likely that the student will focus on the camera 
at non-calculated times during the test. Thus, there will be an increase in false negatives 
due to the inability of the face authentication system to accurately verify the student’s 
non-frontal poses. This implies that the face biometric may be unsuitable for presence 
verification in summative e-assessments. 
Retina Scan: 
The retina recognition creates an ‘eye signature’ by measuring the blood vessel 
patterns in the back of the eyes. The blood vessel patterns are a unique characteristic of 
each individual (Jain et al, 2002). During the image acquisition process, the individual is 
required  to  look  through  a  lens  at  an  alignment  target;  thus,  the  concentration  and 
cooperation of the user is essential to capture a useful image. Replicating the retinal 
vasculature  is  a  non-trivial  task  and  this  makes  the  retina  one  of  the  most  secure 
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As a secure biometric, the retina scan will be suitable for presence verification in 
summative e-assessments environments; this is because the stored biometric templates 
cannot be easily compromised. In addition, the deception of the system is very unlikely 
(Newman, 2009). This implies that, the method will provide a proof that the student 
presenting  the  raw  biometric  image  is  the  original  student.  However,  a  challenge  to 
adopting the retina scan method is that, an individual’s retina can change as a result of 
medical conditions such as pregnancy or high blood pressure. Thus, the variations or 
changes to a student’s retina can increase the risk of false positives and false negatives 
during a presence verification process.  
Iris Scan: 
The iris contains many distinctive features such as arching ligaments, furrows, 
ridges, crypts, rings, corona, freckles and zigzag collarette (Daugman, 2004). Daugman, 
(1993) asserts that, the unique nature of the iris shows that a person’s left and right eyes 
have different iris patterns and even irises of identical twins are different.  
Adopting the iris-scan for presence verification in summative e-assessments will 
produce a less intrusive and more user friendly method for students. Additionally, the 
iris-scan method offers a highly accurate method which will reduce the risk of false 
positives (Ashbourn, 2005). However, the iris can be difficult to capture as it is easily 
obscured by eyelashes, eyelids and reflection from the cornea. The difficulties presented 
in  capturing  the  iris  for  verification,  can  pose  a  challenge  when  used  for  presence 
verification in a test environment.  
Signature Verification: 
Signature verification (Ohishi et al, 2000) is an automated method, which can be 
used  to  determine  the  pattern  that  a  name  is  signed.  In  this  technology,  a  person’s 
signature is collected using a stylus (pen) and a sensor pad; thus, dynamics such as 
speed,  direction,  pressure  of  writing  and  total  time  of  signature  is  examined  for 
uniqueness.  
A signature verification method is non-intrusive; thus, it is suitable for presence 
verification as it is unlikely to interrupt a user during the process. However, a signature 
is a behavioural biometric that is unstable and may vary over a period time. Additionally, 
the technology is perceived susceptible to fraud and imitation (Fairhurst, 1997). In a test 46 
 
environment, the signature method may increases the risk of impersonation challenges in 
and will become less-efficient for presence verification. 
Hand Geometry: 
Hand  geometry  recognition  relies  on  measuring  the  structure  of  the  hand,  by 
using the distinctive aspects of an individual’s hand, such as the dimension of fingers, 
location of joints, shape and size of the palm (Zunkel, 1998).  
The hand geometry is one of the earliest and well-developed technologies. The 
simple, inexpensive and easy to use nature of the technique makes it a suitable candidate 
for  presence  verification  in  summative  e-assessments.  However,  the  hand  geometry 
biometric  has  a  low-level  of  uniqueness  which  is  unsuitable  for 
authentication/verification processes; hence, this method is better suited for identification 
purposes (Sanchez-Reillo et al, 2000). 
Keystroke Dynamics: 
In keystroke dynamics it is perceived that each person types on a keyboard in a 
distinct way (Monrose & Rubin, 2000). This technology examines dynamics such as 
typing speed, pressure, total time of typing a password and the time taken to hit certain 
keys. The combination of these features creates a template and forms a statistical profile 
of the person’s behavioural characteristics.  
The keystroke dynamics does not require extra additional hardware and minimal 
training is required for enrolment. Additionally, the technique is easy to implement in 
real  time  applications  and  a  person’s  keystrokes  can  be  monitored  unobtrusively. 
However, the keystroke dynamics is less-suited for presence verification in e-assessment; 
this is due to the changes in typing patterns and the variations in keyboard layout. Lastly, 
the  technology  is  still  in  its  infancy  and  has  not  been  tested  on  a  wide  scale  for 
authentication/verification purposes (Levy & Ramim, 2007).   
4.8  Biometric Authentication Systems 
In  current  security  systems,  biometrics  can  operate  in  two  modes:  as  an 
identification or authentication mechanism. A biometric identification system performs a 
one-to-many  match,  such  that  the  system  establishes  a  subject’s  identity  without  the 
subject having to claim an identity (Jain et al, 1997). For example, using fingerprints, a 
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enrolled fingerprints in order to find a match. Thus, the matcher is only required to return 
the  most  similar  template.  However,  in  a  biometric  authentication  system,  a  person 
desired to be identified submits an identity claim to the system (e.g. username, smart 
card) and the security system either rejects or accepts the claimed identity (Wayman, 
2001). For example, in a biometric authentication system, a fingerprint scan is matched 
against only one possible user i.e. a one-to-one match. Hence, a biometric authentication 
system  is  required  to  match  a  fingerprint  to  its  owner;  rather  than  to  any  subject’s 
fingerprint (most similar template).  
In educational environments, the quest to implement advanced security measures, 
suggests  biometrics  as  the  ultimate  solution  for  authentication  in  summative  e-
assessments  (Marais  et  al,  2006).  Thus,  in  summative  e-assessment  security,  the 
fingerprint  biometrics  is  gradually  accepted  and  adopted  as  a  method  for  student 
authentication (Williams, 2002; Hernandez et al, 2008). Fingerprint solutions are the less 
expensive and are more convenient compared to other biometric methods. Employing the 
fingerprints for identification does not require a username i.e. the matcher compares the 
input biometric against all the templates in the database. However, using the fingerprints 
as a method for student authentication requires a claimed identity i.e. a username should 
be  associated  with  the  fingerprint.  In  the  real-world  e-assessment  environment,  a 
biometric authentication system is more commonly used than a biometric identification 
system. 
4.8.1  Biometric Template Security in Authentication Systems 
Biometric data is unchangeable and not forgettable; thus, it is useful for ensuring user 
authentication (Ashbourn, 2000). However, incorporating biometrics as an authentication 
method presents privacy concerns derived from storage of the template data (Jain et al, 
2007).  According to Ratha et al, (2007) “if a biometric identifier is compromised it is 
lost forever and possibly for every application where the biometric is used”. This is 
particularly significant, as a biometric factor loses its uniqueness when a users’ raw 
biometric is exposed. Thus, it is the responsibility of a system which adopts biometrics 
for authentication to ensure that the biometric templates are kept private.  
One potential means of safe-guarding stored templates is encryption. However, 
Braithwaite et al, (2002) asserts that, since the biometric templates require decryption 
prior  to  matching;  there  is  a  risk  of  exposing  the  biometric  data  to  potential  hacker 48 
 
attacks. In a review article, Jain et al, (2007) also suggests that biometric templates 
cannot be stored in an encrypted form. In literature, several methods have been suggested 
to protect the biometric templates during the matching process. A popular method is the 
cancellable  transforms  proposed  by  Ratha  et  al,  (2001)  to  minimise  the  exposure  of 
biometric data. In their work, the raw biometric data are uniquely distorted such that the 
original raw biometric is transformed using a one-way function. Thus, the transformed 
biometric and the transformation are stored instead of the raw biometric. This method 
aims to preserve privacy since the transformations are intended to be non-reversible; 
therefore it is computationally hard to recover the original biometric identifier from the 
transformed  version.  However,  (in  some  cases)  it  may  be  necessary  to  revert  the 
transformation prior to the matching process; again, this would expose the raw biometric 
data and make it susceptible to hacking (Braithwaite et al, 2002). 
Recently, Argles et al, (2007) suggested a method to ensure privacy of the user’s 
biometric even when the biometric database is compromised. In their work, a split and 
merge technique is used to ensure privacy of the biometric factors; and this is done by 
splitting the authentication factor into multiple components. One half of the encrypted 
template is stored on an electronic media and the other is retained inside the secure 
biometric database. An advantage of storing the encrypted data in two separate locations 
is such that, it becomes harder for an attacker to compromise the system. Therefore, 
without  the  decryption  key  the  attacker  will  be  required  to  break  the  encryption 
algorithm. However, once the key generator is exposed the information leakage reduces 
the difficulty of guessing the template; thus, it is essential that the key generator is kept 
private (Apampa et al, 2008b). The method introduced in Apampa et al, (2008b) to 
preserve the privacy of user biometrics is discussed in the next chapter. Other solutions 
for protecting biometric templates include the Steganography principles (Jain & Uludag, 
2003) and the Secure Sketch Scheme (Sutcu et al, 2007). 
4.9  Summary 
Electronic  assessment  is  a  valuable  addition  to  higher  education.  The  e-
assessment process embodies great benefits such as delivery of online tests, automatic 
marking, immediate feedback, improved access and opportunities for lifelong learning. 
The three types of e-assessment employed for assessing include the online formative, 
diagnostic  assessment  and  online  summative.    Online  formative  assessments  are 49 
 
designed to improve the student’s learning and give information about their progress. 
The diagnostic assessments are used identify a student’s strengths and weaknesses to 
determine  a  suitable  course  programme;  whilst  the  online  summative  assessment  is 
categorised as a high-stake examination which takes place at the end of a course of 
study. In this thesis, security issues for formative and diagnostic e-assessments are not 
considered since these tests are designed to improve the student’s learning experience. 
However,  the  high-stake  nature  of  the  summative  e-assessments  makes  these  tests  a 
target for fraudulent activities. This chapter introduced the user security process of the 
summative e-assessment as a challenge in the academic community. Thus, user security 
of online summative assessments is discussed extensively in the next chapters. 
User authentication is an essential procedure in securing the users of computer 
systems;  this  procedure  consists  of  possession,  knowledge  and  biometrics  methods. 
Additionally, these methods present a foundation for the summative e-assessment user 
security  discussions  in  the  remaining  chapters.  The  smart  card  is  an  example  of  the 
possession  methods  which  are  suitable  for  student  identification;  however,  the 
smartcards are not viable for user authentication summative e-assessments. A password 
is a popularly employed knowledge method to authenticate students in e-assessments; 
this method is simple and easy to use. Biometric technologies are gradually gaining 
acceptance in e-assessment environments and commonly proposed methodologies for 
user authentication include fingerprint scan, face recognition and keyboard dynamics. In 
biometric  technology,  adopting  biometrics  for  authentication  (as  opposed  to 
identification) requires a match between the biometric identifier and only one possible 
user.  This  implies  that  an  identity  (e.g.  a  username)  should  be  associated  with  the 
biometric  identifier  prior  to  authentication;  this  is  particularly  suitable  for  an  e-
assessment  environment.    However,  one  of  the  challenges  in  adopting  a  biometric 
authentication system is the issue of preserving the privacy of the raw biometrics during 
the matching process. The next chapter describes an inexpensive method which does not 
expose raw biometric data and which is suitable for an e-assessment environment. 50 
 
Chapter 5.  Identity-
Authentication (I-A) User 
Security Model 
Recall in chapter four, the data security and software security of a summative e-
assessment are well-researched areas. The location security is in its early stages, but it is 
a  promising  area  of  research.  However,  the  user  security  process  is  susceptible  to 
security  threats  which  threaten  the  overall  security  of  the  summative  e-assessment 
environment.  Due  to  the  positioning  of  the  user  security  process  in  e-assessment,  it 
becomes  expedient  to  determine  the  type  of  security  challenges  facing  the  security 
model. Thus, this chapter presents a review of the Identity-Authentication user security 
model which is commonly adopted for the user security of summative e-assessments. 
Lastly, the capability of the I-A user security model to provide a secure environment 
void of impersonation threats is discussed. Overall, this chapter lays a foundation for the 
first research objective of this thesis. A complete exploration is presented in the next 
chapter. 
5.1  Identity-Authentication (I-A) User Security 
One of the characteristics of an e-assessment system is the ability to securely 
deliver a test, at the right time and to the correct student. Thus, the user security model 
plays a vital role in e-assessments; as it ensures that only the correct students write an 
online test at any particular time. To fulfil this role, the user security model poses two 
questions  in  the  form  of  a  challenge  to  the  students.  Hence,  the  receipt  of  correct 
responses to the questions will assure the security system that the correct students are 
taking the test. In this section, the questions provided by the security system and the 
common types of responses are explored. Figure 5-1 depicts the questions posed to the 
student during an online assessment.  51 
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Figure 5-1 Identity-Authentication User Security Model 
5.1.1  Identity 
Identity  is  a  term  that  cuts  across  several  disciplines,  sectors,  cultures  and 
industries; thus the term is defined differently, yet similar in perception. For example, in 
the field of Mathematics, identity refers to an equality that is true irrespective of the 
values of its variables (Biggs, 2002); whilst in Social Sciences, identity is a term used to 
describe a person’s comprehension of him or herself as a discrete entity (Padilla & Perez, 
2003) and in Computer Science (object-oriented programming) it is described as the 
property of objects that makes them different from other objects (Turner & Eden, 2008). 
Irrespective of the diversity in definition, it is observed from the above examples that 
identity reflects uniqueness, sameness and distinctness. Hence, when an e-assessment 
security system solicits an answer to the “who are you?” question, it simply requires that 
the student provides a unique response which distinguishes him/her from every other 
student. The responses provided by a student are typically in form of a username, student 
name,  student  number  and  email  address.  The  method  of  student  response  is  often 
decided by the e-assessment personnel; however, a commonly used form of identity in e-
assessment is the username.  
A username in the context of this thesis refers to a unique log-in name that can be 
a fictitious name, a combination of the student’s name and/or student number or the 52 
 
student’s email address. It is important that the security system recognises the username 
supplied and associates it with a particular student. Hence, the username is stored on the 
security system and retrieved for comparison when access is needed. A username is not 
secret information and it can be shared or stolen for fraudulent purposes. In addition, 
providing  a  username  only  method  makes  the  e-assessment  security  system  an  easy 
hurdle for the students to scale through. In an identity only system, the students are 
required to provide one answer; however, this response does not ensure correctness of 
the student. In order to ensure correctness, the e-assessment security system solicits an 
additional response to confirm the claimed identity.  It should be noted that there are no 
known examples of an identity only system in existing summative e-assessment security 
systems.  
5.1.2  Authentication 
In e-assessment, it is insufficient to assume correctness of a student based on 
corresponding identities (i.e. claimed and stored identity); however, more is required to 
prove that the identity claimed actually belongs to the owner who stored the information. 
As described in section above, the e-assessment security requires an additional security 
layer to ensure that the identity presented is correct. Hence, when the security system 
solicits an answer to the “is it really you?” question; it simply requests a confirmation or 
evidence of the claimed identity. Authentication data is often a secret which should be 
known  to  the  student  and  the  security  system  alone.  Thus,  a  student  chooses  an 
authentication data and stores it on the security system, in order to gain access to the 
online test during authentication.  
User authentication is a widely discussed subject both in assessment and non-
assessment  online  environments  and  it  is  well-documented  (Clarke  &  Furnell,  2007; 
Furnell et al, 2008). Recall in chapter four a detailed overview on user authentication 
categories  was  presented.  In  general,  user  authentication  is  classified  into  three 
categories: something the user has (possession), something the user knows (knowledge) 
and something the user is (biometrics). Possession based methods, such as smart cards 
are  widely  used  in  e-learning  environments.  Example  applications  include,  access  to 
building  and  transportation  facilities.  However,  these  solutions  are  more  suited  for 
identification purposes and are not a viable alternative for  user authentication (Graf, 
2002). Additionally, it is not common to find smart cards as an authentication technique 53 
 
for summative e-assessments; hence, the use of smart cards is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
In knowledge based methods, the password is commonly used to authenticate 
students,  whilst  in  biometric  methods  the  biometric  identifier  (e.g.  fingerprints)  is 
employed for authentication. Figure 5-2 shows the cycle of a username/password pair 
and  Figure  5-3  depicts  the  login  procedure  using  biometric  fingerprints.  During  a 
summative e-assessment, the login procedure is initiated when a student requests access 
to  an  online  test.  Thus,  at  the  system  prompt,  the  students  are  required  to  provide 
responses to the “who are you” and “is it really you” challenge questions. The evaluation 
process  validates  the  identity  and  authentication  responses  by  comparing  the  details 
provided with the stored details. A decision is made at this point and the authenticated 
students  are  allowed  access  to  the  online  test.  At  this  point,  the  non-authenticated 
students may be required to re-type their passwords or re-scan their fingerprints to enable 
access.  
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Figure 5-3 Login process via biometrics 
5.1.3  A Multi-factor Authentication Method for Biometric Privacy 
Biometric authentication poses some non-trivial security challenges because of 
the inherent features of the biometric data itself. The usable biometric features in humans 
are  limited  in  number  and  they  must  be  kept  secret.  As  described  in  chapter  four, 
biometric systems are gradually replacing the conventional password systems for student 
authentication. For example, employing biometric fingerprints is becoming a common 
feature. In summative e-assessments, the fingerprints are considered as an authentication 
factor; hence, it is essential that the biometric templates are not exposed to potential 
attacks. Conducting a summative online assessment is a capital intensive task; thus, it is 
vital to shield the system against security compromises without the additional costs of 
securing the student’s biometrics. 
The use of hash functions would be an ideal solution to protect the student’s raw 
biometrics without incurring additional cost. However, a biometric authentication system 
cannot  perform  a  one-way  hash  function  on  the  user  input  (the  hash  functions  are 55 
 
common to some password systems). This is because the stored hashed template and the 
input  raw  biometric  would  have  different  hash  values  (Bhargav-Spantzel  et  al, 
2006).Thus, the inability to match the input template with the stored template will lead to 
unacceptably high false rejection rates (Prabhakar et al, 2003). 
Hence, in this section an inexpensive method that preserves the privacy of user 
biometrics in summative e-assessment is described (Apampa et al, 2008b). Our work 
shows that the resilience of a multi-factor authentication system could be improved by 
combining factors to preserve the privacy of a user’s biometric. By using an elastic 
matching algorithm we construct a digest from the biometric and physical factors. The 
digest is used in place of the raw biometrics during the authentication phase; thus, the 
raw biometric is never exposed. One of the benefits of using the digest is its ability for 
trivial sorting and indexing, making the system scalable. Additionally, by obtaining a 
digest of the biometric template, it will be computationally infeasible for an attacker to 
recover the template. In our system, the biometric factors consists of biometric reader 
and a transformer (software on the client), whilst the physical factor is made up of a 
token and a portable storage device (smartcard or modified USB storage). Figure 5-4 
shows  the  components  of  the  proposed  multi-factor  authentication  method.  The 
operation of system is simplified into the following steps: 
•  The  biometric  reader  provides  input  to  the  transformer  (e.g.  an  image  of  the 
fingerprint). The transformer then provides an invariant digest of the input. 
•  The physical factor attempts to assert the given identity by means of the security 
token component. The system relies on the security token component for protection 
against forgery. 
•  The  storage  component  could  be  made  public  without  affecting  the  security  of 
system as it is used to produce the biometric digest 
•  The  authentication  server  hosts  a  lookup  table  of  all  biometric  digest  and  their 
corresponding security tokens. 56 
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Figure 5-4 Components of a biometric privacy system 
5.2  Threat on Identity-Authentication User Security Model 
A summative e-assessment system is perceived as secure, when a student satisfies 
the identity and authentication security goals. In Figure 5-5 the Identity-Authentication 
(I-A) user security model, is made up of two user security questions and the respective 
methods that provide responses. It is assumed that each response method (e.g. password 
is a member of the goal set) contain an individual level of security. Hence an intersection 
of the goal sets (identity and authentication) is sufficient to ensure the security of the 
summative  e-assessments;  this  is  based  on  the  cumulative  security  of  the  response 
methods.  In  some  e-assessment  user  security  models,  a  human  invigilator  may  be 
required  to  check  a  photo  ID  card  to  ensure  the  correctness  of  a  student.  Thus,  the 
invigilator resides in the e-assessment environment and not included in the goal sets. 
This is because an invigilator provides an added layer of security alongside the identity 
and authentication methods.   
To  a  large  extent,  the  overall  security  of  a  system  depends  on  its  ability  to 
securely allow only correct users access to the system. Therefore, it is essential that the 
steps to attain user security are carefully designed, as it can easily become a weak point 
to be exploited. More so, user security is located at the entry point of the system; making 
it more appealing to intruders. According to Pflegeer & Pfleeger (2003), “any system is 
most vulnerable at its weakest point”; this implies that the harm to a security system can 57 
 
be linked to a weakness in the procedures, design or implementation of that system.  For 
example, given data stored in a computer system, it is required that the contents should 
be protected in some way. Thus, the data security system should ensure that data is not 
disclosed  to  unauthorised  parties,  neither  should  the  data  be  modified  in  illegitimate 
ways; however, it is required that the data can be accessed by legitimate users. Based on 
the example described, it is assumed that the data security system may be susceptible to 
unauthorised  data  modification;  which  could  occur  due  to  lack  of  user  identification 
before allowing data access. Hence, a weakness in the system can be identified as the 
lack of user identification.  
In summative e-assessment, the user security model should ensure that illegal 
students are restricted from taking an online test. Furthermore, the process should ensure 
that only correct students are accessing the test for the duration of the assessment.  
Identity
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Figure 5-5 Is the I-A user security model secure? 
5.3  Background Literature on Impersonation Challenges  
The code of practice for the Assurance of Academic Quality and Standards in 
Higher Education (QAA) for the UK suggests that, an academic misconduct with respect 
to  e-assessment  would  include  plagiarism,  collusion,  impersonation  and  the  use  of 
inadmissible material (Quality Assurance Agency, 2006). In higher education, security 58 
 
considerations  do  not  feature  prominently;  however,  this  changes  when  an  online 
environment  is  considered  (Furnell  et  al,  1998).  Due  to  the  increased  influence  of 
technology in assessments, it is often easier to cheat online (Rowe, 2004). Similarly, the 
results of a recent study by King et al, (2009), suggests that 73.6% of the students (in the 
sample  population)  held  the  perception  that  it  is  easier  to  cheat  in  an  online  course 
compared to its traditional counterpart. Thus, there exists an increased risk of academic 
fraud in online assessments versus the traditional assessments. The higher educational 
sector has constantly focused on plagiarism as a major academic misconduct (Naude & 
Horne, 2006) and there exists an extensive knowledge of plagiarism detectors to curb 
plagiarism  (McLafferty  &  Foust,  2004).  However,  other  dishonest  acts  in  online 
assessments have gained little attention. 
In  generic  (non-assessments)  online  environments,  one  of  the  major  security 
challenges to user security is the act of impersonation. Impersonation is a fraudulent 
action with the aim of imitating a legitimate user and defrauding the security system. For 
example, in online banking, customers refrain from divulging their assigned login details 
to prevent others from accessing their bank account. However, there is a possibility that 
the  customer’s  login  details  can  be  stolen,  eavesdropped  or  hijacked  without  the 
knowledge of the customer. Thus, when a service is requested, the system grants access 
to the impersonator believing the details presented originates from the customer. In an 
approach to minimise impersonation in online environments, the banking industry invest 
in a second layer of protection to ensure risks are minimised (Bailie & Jortberg, 2009). 
In e-assessments, the issue of impersonation is considered as a major concern and 
it is perceived as an even greater risk by the academic community (Kerka & Wonacott, 
2000). Weippl (2005) asserts that, students who want to cheat willingly reveal their login 
details to another person for the purpose of impersonation. Hence, this shows a striking 
departure  from  other  online  environments  (e.g.  e-banking)  where  people  will  not 
knowingly cooperate with someone who tries to steal money out of their bank account 
(Weippl, 2005). According to Stoner (1996), a student cannot ‘accidentally’ impersonate 
another during an online assessment. In traditional (pen and paper) exams, the need to 
correctly  identify  a  student  is  well  understood  and  the  requirement  is  to  produce  a 
student ID card which includes a photograph. The traditional approach of using a photo 
ID card and matching it with a student’s login details in online environments is generally 59 
 
adopted (Vollans, 2008). This approach provides an added security layer, whereby a 
human invigilator ensures the correctness of the student taking the test.  
5.4  Summary 
The  user  security  model  of  a  summative  e-assessment  ensures  that  only  the 
correct student takes the summative test. Thus, a summative e-assessment user security 
model poses two challenge questions to a student, i.e. ‘who are you?’ and ‘is it really 
you?’  The ‘who are you?’ question is posed to solicit a response to student’s identity, 
whilst the ‘is it really you?’ question solicits a response to confirm the claimed identity. 
A commonly used response is the combination of a username and password. Another 
example of a response is a username and a biometric fingerprint. It is important to note 
that,  adopting  biometrics  for  authentication  simultaneously  requires  that  the  raw 
biometrics data is never exposed during the matching process. Hence, in this chapter an 
inexpensive multifactor authentication method was introduced to preserve the biometric 
data.  This  method  constructs  and  stores  a  digest  of  the  biometric  template  using  an 
elastic matching algorithm. Thus, during the matching process the digest is used in place 
of the raw biometrics. 
The  Identity-Authentication  user  security  model  is  simple,  easy-to-use  and 
provides a satisfactory level of security for the e-assessment environment. To a large 
extent, the overall security of a system depends on its ability to securely allow only 
correct users access to the system. Therefore, it is essential that the user security model is 
designed to resist security challenges.  In summative e-assessment, the security model 
should ensure that only correct students are accessing the test for the duration of the 
assessment and without any external assistance.  However, the Identity-Authentication 
user security model is fallible to security threats that are ignited through user fraudulent 
actions,  e.g.  impersonation.    The  susceptibility  of  the  Identity-Authentication  user 
security  model  to  impersonation  challenges  questions  the  ability  of  the  model  to 
sufficiently  ensure  and  maintain  security  during  summative  e-assessments.    The  I-A 
model represents a typical user security model adopted for summative e-assessments; 
however, the inability of the model to resist impersonation threats presents a gap in e-
assessment security. The next chapter provides a detailed overview of the impersonation 
challenges in the I-A user security model and a novel solution is proposed. 60 
 
Chapter 6.  Presence-
Identity-Authentication 
(P-I-A) User Security 
Model 
In chapter five, an overview of the Identity-Authentication (I-A) user security 
model was discussed; however, the model is susceptible to impersonation challenges 
which  are  a  major  concern  in  summative  e-assessments.  In  this  chapter,  a  further 
exploration of the impersonation challenges and its influences on the I-A user security 
model is presented.  Hence, to address the shortcomings of the I-A model; assets, threats 
and security goals specific to e-assessment user security are identified. Furthermore, the 
Presence-Identity-Authentication  (P-I-A)  user  security  model  is  presented  as  an 
improvement of the I-A user security model. Overall, this chapter fulfils the intent of the 
first research goal stated in chapter one. 
6.1  Types of Impersonation threats 
In  this  section  the  impersonation  challenges  introduced  in  section  5.3  are 
classified  into  three  types,  namely  Type  A,  B  and  C  impersonation  threats.  The 
impersonation threats described below reflect a supervised online test environment. A 
scenario-based method is used for illustration. 
6.1.1  Type A impersonation Threat 
A  tutor/invigilator  is  assumed  trustworthy  for  the  purpose  of  the  online  test; 
however,  there  exists  the  possibility  of  a  connived  impersonation  (a.k.a.  Type  A 
impersonation  threat).  A  connived  impersonation  is  the  ability  of  an  invigilator  to 
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may  originate  from  a  sympathetic  feeling  towards  the  student  and  it  should  not  be 
overlooked  especially  when  the  assessment  counts  towards  a  student’s  degree  or 
qualification.  For  example,  if  a  student  has  continually  failed  a  certain  test,  the 
tutor/invigilator  may  respond  to  human  emotions  and  allow  another  student  take  the 
online test on behalf of the initial student. This type of impersonation can easily go 
undetected.  A  successful  connived  impersonation  hinders  a  fair  assessment  and  it 
extenuates  the  reliability  of  the  test  (Heinrich  et  al,  2009).  Additionally,  there  is  a 
possibility  of  a  connived  impersonation  for  monetary  purposes.  In  this  situation,  the 
fraudulent students can influence the invigilator to receiving a large sum of money to 
help perpetrate the act. Irrespective of the motives for a connived impersonation, it is 
essential to find methods to minimise such threats in a summative e-assessment system. 
This thesis does not eliminate totally the use of a human invigilator; however, measures 
should  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  correctness  of  a  student  is  independent  of  an 
invigilator. 
6.1.2  Type B Impersonation Threat 
The following example introduces a scenario which will be used to illustrate the 
Type  B  impersonation  threat.  This  impersonation  threat  poses  the  question  “is  the 
student really who they say they are?” 
Example 1: Consider that Alice has initially registered for the COMP101 online 
test.  Thus,  Alice  has  an  account  on  the  e-assessment  system  which  includes  a  user 
profile. Alice’s user profile on the database includes her name, date of birth, year of 
study, registered courses and login details. The online test is scheduled to commence at 
10am for the duration of 60mins in the departments’ computer laboratory. At 10am on 
the assessment day, Eva walks into the test room with the knowledge of Alice’s login 
details and other information required. Eva satisfies the identity and authentication goals 
by inputting Alice’s login details. The online security system believes that Alice has 
requested to gain access to the online test; as a result of a match between the stored login 
details and the login details presented. However, the security system is oblivious to the 
swap between Alice and Eva; hence, Eva is not really who she claims to be for the 
purpose of the online test. 
In the scenario illustrated above, it is directly observed that Alice is absent for the 
online test; however, Eva has the ability to produce Alice’s login details when requested 62 
 
by the security system. In order to analyse the scenario, the identity and authentication 
paradigms in chapter five are recalled. A username and password is classified under the 
knowledge methods in which a user has; thus, it can be easily shared amongst users. This 
academic misconduct can be undetected, especially when the requirement for accessing 
an online test is a student’s username and password alone. However, in past and recent 
times employing the username and password alone has proven to be the most convenient 
and popular method in the e-assessment (Oorschot & Thorpe, 2008). In exploiting this 
weakness, students can perpetrate a Type B impersonation threat by not showing up for 
the test; but sharing their details with another student (see example scenario). It can be 
argued that, using a tutor/invigilator can curb a Type B impersonation; however, a Type 
A threat readily comes into mind. By employing a tutor/invigilator in the scenario above, 
the occurrence of a connived impersonation cannot be totally eliminated. Additionally, a 
tutor/invigilator can be tricked when the student’s password details is shared with the 
student’s look-alike, e.g. identical twins. 
In  order  to  minimise  a  Type  B  impersonation  threat  it  is  observed  that  the 
problem is peculiar to the strength of the authentication method.  Employing a username 
and password paradigm for an online test makes a Type B threat more appealing to 
impersonators. It is observed that due to the inherent attributes of a password scheme 
(shareable), it is unable to resist an impersonation threat. In addition, a student’s access is 
authenticated once at the login for the duration of the test session; however, the repeated 
authentication  is  performed  based  on  the  password  cached  in  the  browser  (Levy  & 
Ramim,  2007).  Hence,  a  method  which  would  increase  the  difficulty  of  responses 
solicited by the security system is required.  
Authentication   Registration  Login  Evaluation  Implication  
Password  Alice  Eva  Eva  Impersonation  
Table 6-1 Type B Impersonation: password 
6.1.3  Type C Impersonation Threat 
In  a  continuing  description  from  the  example  above,  example  2  illustrates  a 
scenario  to  depict  one  approach  that  can  be  employed  to  minimise  the  Type  B 
impersonation threat. However, the solution presents a potential security challenge which 63 
 
is explained in example 3. Thus, the Type C impersonation threat poses the question 
“who is there?”  
Example  2:  Consider  that  a  biometric  fingerprint  authentication  method  is 
employed for a student login; thus Alice is required to scan her fingerprint on a capture 
device and await a positive confirmation before continuing with the online test. This 
implies that Alice needs to be present to carry out the login procedure.  
In  summative  e-assessment,  a  biometric  fingerprint  authentication  method  is 
suggested as the ultimate solution to minimise a Type B impersonation threat (Hugl, 
2005). An advantage of a biometric scheme as opposed to a password scheme is its non-
shareable attributes. Using the scenario above and given a biometric fingerprint method 
for login, it is impossible for Alice to provide Eva with a finger to gain access to the test. 
This implies that, during enrolment Alice has enrolled her fingerprint and a template is 
stored in the database alongside her user profile. Thus, access to the online test can only 
be granted when there is a match between the raw biometric fingerprint presented and 
the  stored  template.  The  use  of  biometric  fingerprint  method  for  authentication  is 
gradually becoming popular in summative e-assessments (Levy & Ramim, 2007). It is 
suggested that adopting this method will deter the impersonators and the impersonated 
students from the act. Hence, using a biometric method, Alice will be obliged to take the 
online test herself instead of employing Eva. 
Authentication  Registration  Login  Evaluation  Implication  
Fingerprint  Alice  Alice  Alice  Correct 
representation  
Table 6-2 Type B Impersonation: fingerprint 
Example 3: It is assumed that Alice, successfully gains access to the online test; 
hence, the security system believes that Alice has initiated the request due to a match 
between the scanned fingerprint and the stored template. At a certain time t during the 
duration  time  T  of  the  online  test,  Eva  takes  over  Alice’s  test.  However,  at  these 
particular times the security system is unaware of the academic misconduct; hence Eva is 
the one there instead of Alice.   
In example 3 above, it is observed that there is an increase in the difficulty of the 
authentication challenge; thus, Alice’s physical presence is required to carry out the login 
procedure. Additionally, it is observed that there exists a possibility for Eva to take over 64 
 
Alice’s test after the login procedure. Hence, the responsibility of the e-assessment user 
security does not terminate at ensuring the correctness of the student; rather, it extends to 
verifying that the correct student is there taking the test for the period of time. As pointed 
out in recent researches (Wisher et al, 2005; Aojula et al, 2006; Levy & Ramim, 2007; 
Hernandez et al, 2008), a major problem when conducting summative e-assessments is 
the inability to know who is there taking the exam i.e. to know if the correct student is 
there taking the exam or someone else has taken over the test on their behalf.  
6.2  Assets, Threats and Security Goals 
One  aim  of  this  research  is  to  investigate  the  sufficiency  of  the  Identity-
Authentication user security model in ensuring that only correct students take an online 
test  for  the  allocated  duration  of  the  test.  Based  on  a  qualitative  review  of  existing 
literature on e-assessment user security, it is observed that impersonation threats are a 
major challenge in summative e-assessment systems (Aojula et al, 2006; Hernandez et 
al,  2008).  The  existing  user  security  model  requires  that  a  student  identity  and 
authentication goals only are satisfied prior to accessing the online test; thus, this implies 
that the student accessing the test is the correct student. However, in this thesis it is 
suggested that the authenticated student is sometimes not the expected student or the 
expected student begins a test but does not complete it. Hence, it is concluded that the 
existing  Identity-Authentication  e-assessment  user  security  model  is  insufficient  to 
ensure that only the correct students take an online test for the allocated duration of the 
test (see Figure 6-1).  
Identity
Who are you?
Authentication
Is it really you? Impersonation 
threat 
User Security
= username
= password
= biometric (fingerprint)
Human Invigilator
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In an attempt to address this issue, this thesis suggests that satisfying the identity 
and  authentication  security  goals  only  is  not  enough  to  assure  user  security  during 
summative e-assessments. Much more is required to ensure that the authenticated student 
is the expected student and that the correctly authenticated student is taking the online 
test un-assisted for the duration of the test time. Thus, there is a need for an improved e-
assessment  user  security  model  which  is  sufficient  to  ensure  that  only  the  correct 
students take an online test for the allocated duration of the test. Thus, it is proposed that 
one of the ways to ensure correct user security during online tests is to combine the 
presence goals with the existing identity and authentication security goals. This implies 
that a student will be required to satisfy the presence (P), identity (I) and authentication 
(A) security goals prior to and during the online tests.  
Finally,  a  goal-oriented  approach  is  adopted  to  propose  a  summative  e-
assessment asset, security threats and security goals. 
6.2.1  E-Assessment Security Assets 
An  asset  refers  to  something  that  is  valuable  which  needs  to  be  protected 
(ISO/IEC, 2005) and this suggests that the valuable assets of a summative e-assessment 
system extend beyond the hardware, software and data needs. It should be noted that the 
importance of the above computer assets are not discarded; however, assets specific to 
user security are considered. In chapter two, a constructivists’ perspective of e-learning 
was discussed. In a constructivist’s mind, the student plays the centre role in the learning 
process; hence, they need to be correctly assessed and securely authenticated in the e-
assessment  environment.  In  addition,  a  summative  e-assessment  system  is  perceived 
busy when delivering an online test and a student taking a test signifies the occurrence of 
an activity on the system.  Thus, it may be pointless to develop an online summative 
assessment system if the students’ participation is excluded. A student taking a test is an 
indispensable component of the e-assessment system; hence, it is proposed that a student 
is a valuable asset of the e-assessment user security (Apampa et al, 2009a).  
6.2.2  E-assessment Security Threats  
A threat is the potential for misuse/abuse of an asset that will cause harm in the 
context of the system (Haley et al, 2004). The level of harm that can occur depends on 
the asset type; thus, it is appropriate to identify the relevant threats that may apply to 
each asset type. For example, the storage of assessment data in a university may be under 66 
 
threats from unauthorised exposure and unauthorised alteration. A major threat to the 
summative  e-assessment  user  security  process  is  the  threat  of  impersonation.  As 
described  in  section  6.1.1,  the  Type  A  impersonation  threat  can  be  minimised  by 
ensuring that the correctness of a student is independent of an invigilator; similarly, the 
Type B impersonation threat is overcome by employing a strong authentication method. 
However,  it  is  noted  that  a  Type  C  impersonation  threat  presents  a  greater  security 
challenge than its counterparts.  
One  aim  of  the  Type  C  impersonation  threat  is  to  subtly  permit  an  incorrect 
student  to  take  an  online  test  on  behalf  of  the  correct  student.  Thus,  a  successful 
impersonation (threat) launched on a student (asset) will reduce the credibility of the 
online test (harm) in an e-assessment context. Hence, the security system is required to 
set security goals which can be used to protect the students from impersonation threats. 
Simultaneously, the e-assessment system is also secure from the fraudulent act. In the C-
I-A  security  model  (see  section  4.2),  the  interception  threat  is  an  attack  on 
confidentiality; the modification threat is an attack on integrity and the interruption threat 
attacks availability. Similarly, the threat of unauthorised exposure is converted to the 
goal  of  protection  from  unauthorised  exposure,  commonly  known  as  confidentiality 
(Haley  et  al,  2006).  Hence,  the  threat  of  impersonation  is  converted  to  the  goal  of 
protection from impersonation, known as presence, i.e. an impersonation threat is an 
attack on presence. It is concluded that the exclusion of the presence security goal in 
online summative tests will increase impersonation threats in e-assessment user security. 
6.2.3  E-assessment Security Goals 
A goal is something people interpret differently depending on the nature of job 
they  are  doing.  For  example,  a  goal  would  mean  different  things  to  a  footballer, 
psychologist, engineer etc. In general, a goal expresses what is desired. It can also refer 
to a specific, measureable occurrence that any business or system plans or intends to 
achieve or avoid. According to Haley et al, (2008) security goals are presented in form of 
a desire and they aim to protect the assets from harm (threats). In computer system 
security,  the  confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability  security  goals  ensure  that  the 
hardware, software and data assets of a system are not compromised (see section 4.2). 
This implies that a compromise in the C-I-A security goals may lead to a compromise of 
the critical assets.  67 
 
During a summative e-assessment, the C-I-A security goals can be employed to 
protect the e-assessment system’s hardware (PC), software (assessment application) and 
data (item bank) from potential interception, modification, interruption and fabrication 
threats. However, it is proposed that the C-I-A security goals are unsuitable to protect the 
e-assessment security asset from its potential threat (Apampa et al, 2009b). In generic 
computer  security,  the  people  who  use  or  maintain  particular  applications  on  a 
computing  system  are  examples  of  the  valuable  assets  to  the  organisational  system 
(Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2003). These key people are carefully selected because of their 
skills and potential value to the organisation. For example, a problem would occur if one 
of the key people decides to leave the organisation (taking away the knowledge) and no 
other person can fill the position. Based on this description, it is observed that the key 
people  do  not  depend  directly  on  the  C-I-A  security  goals;  instead  they  would  be 
required to satisfy other goals, e.g. trustworthiness. Hence, it is suggested that the C-I-A 
security  goals  are  not  entirely  suited  for  human  assets  due  to  their  unpredictable 
attributes. 
 In another perspective, it is impractical for a student to satisfy the C-I-A security 
goals. For example in computer security systems, it is commonplace to apply the C-I-A 
goals  to  the  data  asset;  thus,  producing  data  confidentiality,  data  integrity  and  data 
availability.  In  particular,  confidentiality  protects  the  data  item  from  interception, 
integrity  protects  from  modification  and  availability  protects  from  interruption. 
However,  applying  the  C-I-A  goals  to  the  student  (asset)  produces  student 
confidentiality,  student  integrity  and  student  availability.  These  terms  are  defined 
respectively: student confidentiality refers to privacy of a student’s personal information, 
health records or educational records, which an institution is not required to disclose 
without  prior  consent  of  the  student.  Student  integrity  describes  an  honourable  and 
ethical conduct which is expected from every student during an online test. The student 
integrity  can  be  written  as  a  set  of  policies  and  sanctions  relating  to  the  student’s 
academic conduct during an assessment. Finally, student availability requires that the 
student is there when needed to take an online test. This thesis does not disregard the 
importance of the C-I-A security goals; however, security goals specific to e-assessment 
user security is defined. Hence three security goals of a summative e-assessment user 
security are proposed (see Figure 6-2) 68 
 
Presence: 
This reflects a state of a student being at a specific space or place. Only correct 
and legal students are required to be present for an online test. Continuous authenticated 
presence ensures that only correctly authenticated students are continually present (from 
start to finish) for the duration of the test and taking the test un-assisted.  
Identity: 
This is a distinct attribute which differentiates a student from other students in a 
given population (e.g. a student’s username in a database) 
Authentication: 
This provides a proof of the identity claimed by a student. 
Identity
Who are you?
Authentication
Is it really you?
User Security
Presence
Are you there?
are you the 
expected 
person there all 
the time?
who is the 
person 
there?
are you the 
person 
there?
are you 
really the 
expected 
person?
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6.3  Presence, Identity and Authentication (P-I-A) Security 
Goals 
As discussed in chapter five the existing user security model is made up of the 
identity and authentication security goals only. The easiest technique employed to fulfil 
the requirements of security goals is the username and password. The model is simple, 
easy to use and expected to provide the robust security for summative e-assessments. 
However, as shown in section 6.1, the e-assessment user security model is fallible to 
impersonation threats. Initially, this vulnerability can be traced to the strength of the 
authentication methods adopted. Hence, a review of the password authentication method 
translates  to  a  Type  B  impersonation  threat.  Additionally,  a  human  invigilator  is  an 
example  of  a  secondary  authentication  method  which  can  be  used  to  ensure  correct 
student authentication. Nevertheless, student authentication that is dependent on a human 
invigilator  is  susceptible  to  a  connived  impersonation  threat  a.k.a.  Type  A 
impersonation.  
Thus, in a bid to eliminate the aforementioned impersonation threat types, the 
biometric technology is perceived as an ultimate solution. Employing biometrics as an 
authentication  method  can  improve  the  user  security  model  by  ensuring  the 
authentication of only the ‘right’ students. However, this solution introduces a third type 
of vulnerability i.e. the Type C impersonation threat. One of the theoretical propositions 
made  in  this  thesis  suggests  that,  the  fallibility  of  the  Identity-Authentication  user 
security model to impersonation threats is as a result of a flaw in the model itself; rather 
than  the  authentication  methods  adopted.  This  implies  that,  irrespective  of  the 
authentication method applied, either a single biometric or multiple biometrics, there 
exist a probability to perpetrate a Type C impersonation threat.  
In this thesis, it is proposed that one of the solutions to improve the I-A user 
security model is the ability to fulfil the presence security goal along with the identity 
and  authentication  security  goals.  The  presence  security  goal  ensures  that,  an 
authenticated student at the start of a test is the same student at the end of the test and has 
taken the test without external assistance. Thus, integrating the presence security goal 
ensures  the  presence  of  the  correct  student  beyond  the  initial  login;  however,  it  is 
suggested  that  the  exclusion  of  presence  verification  will  increase  impersonation 
challenges. 70 
 
6.4  Potential Approaches to Presence Verification  
Traditionally,  authentication  systems  are  required  to  verify  a  claimed  identity 
only  one  time  at  the  initial  login  or  sign-on.  This  process  is  secure  for  one-time 
applications  such  as  accessing  a  protected  file.  However,  in  highly  sensitive 
environments  e.g.  an  e-assessment  environment,  a  one-time  authentication  session  is 
insufficient  to  guarantee  security  (Sim  et  al,  2007).  Hence,  the  security  of  online 
summative assessments goes beyond ensuring that the ‘right’ student is authenticated at 
the initial login. More is required to ensure that the same authenticated student is present 
throughout the test session. Thus, in section 6.2.3 the presence security goal (hereafter 
known as presence verification) aims to ensure the presence of a correctly authenticated 
student for the duration of the online test. 
The  high-stake  nature  of  a  summative  e-assessment  is  perceived  to  attract 
impersonation threats to the environment. Hence, there is a need to verify the presence of 
an authenticated student beyond the initial presence verification. This section explores 
the  potential  approaches  to  realising  presence  verification  in  an  e-assessment 
environment. Table 6-3 shows a summary of advantages and disadvantages of existing 
methods. 
6.4.1  Face-to-Face Monitoring 
The approach refers to a physical supervision of the e-assessment environment, 
whilst the participants (i.e. students and invigilators) are within each other’s presence.  
6.4.1.1  Human Invigilation 
In  summative  e-assessment  environments,  an  invigilator/proctor  is  required  to 
provide extra security alongside the identity and authentication goals. One of the major 
goals  of  an  invigilator  is  to  supervise  or  monitor  the  activities  occurring  in  a  test 
environment. The advocates of human invigilators in online environments, (Cizek, 1999; 
Rowe, 2004) describe the method as a low technology means of promoting both identity 
and  academic  honesty.  Thus,  by  employing  the  invigilation  technique,  security  is 
enhanced and the student’s presence is correctly verified throughout the test session. 
 However, using an invigilation only technique in a test environment exposes the 
possibility of a connived impersonation, a.k.a. Type A impersonation threat (see section 
6.1.2).    A  connived  impersonation  refers  to  a  fraudulent  act  where  the  invigilator 71 
 
willingly  colludes  with  students  to  perpetrate  an  impersonation.  Thus,  a  connived 
impersonation  can  expose  the  e-assessment  system  to  other  types  of  impersonation 
threats.    A  connived  impersonation  may  occur  for  monetary  purposes  or  feeling  of 
sympathy towards the student; hence, its likelihood should not be overlooked. This thesis 
does not eliminate the use of an invigilator for summative e-assessments; however, an 
invigilation only approach may have limitations for verifying student’s presence. 
6.4.2  Continuous User Authentication 
In this approach, a user in the e-assessment environment is verified continuously 
for the duration of the test via an authentication method. Usually, the authentication 
method used during the initial login procedure is adopted for the continuous process. 
6.4.2.1  Knowledge-based Solutions 
A low-cost method for achieving presence verification is the use of knowledge-
based authentication solutions. An example is the password authentication method which 
is  simple  and  easy-to-use.  However,  adopting  passwords  for  presence  verification 
promotes  the  chances  of  impersonation  threats,  due  to  its  shareable  attributes.  This 
means that, a student can make available their passwords to another student for dishonest 
purposes. Employing a password to verify presence throughout test requires that the 
student continuously re-types his/her password following a fixed or random pattern. For 
example, a student may be required to re-type the password every 10minutes within a 60-
minute test session. Hence, the student’s concentration will be diverted from the test task 
at six different times during the test. This method is perceived to be inconveniencing and 
distracting to the student’s concentration. 
6.4.2.2  Unimodal Biometric Solutions (active) 
An  alternative  to  conventional  password  based  methods  is  the  biometric 
solutions. In summative e-assessments, biometric solutions such as fingerprint and face 
recognition methods are suggested to enhance security (Agulla et al, 2008). Thus, it is 
expected that only correct students can perform a successful login, due to the unique 
attributes of a biometric. In biometric technology, the biometric traits can be categorised 
based on their data acquisition techniques i.e. active and passive biometrics (Jain et al, 
2004). Active biometrics requires a level of user involvement during the authentication 
process; whilst passive biometrics does not require the user’s active participation.  72 
 
The fingerprint is one of the most accepted biometric methods in e-assessments; 
however, it is requires the user’s active participation during the authentication process. 
This  implies  that,  for  presence  verification  a  continuous  re-scan  of  the  student’s 
fingerprint  throughout  the  test  session  is  required.  For  example,  a  student  may  be 
required  to  re-scan  the  fingerprint  every  10minutes  within  a  60-minute  test  session. 
Hence, the student’s concentration will be diverted from the test task at six different 
times during the test. Additionally, the use of biometric data is not always accurate, such 
that the threshold for authentication may produce a false reject (Klosterman & Ganger, 
2000). This can be due to the variation in placing a finger on a scanner surface. Using the 
example above, a student may be required to re-authenticate for the fifth time during the 
test and suddenly the fingerprint scanner rejects the fingerprint due to errors. At this 
point, the student’s test is disrupted, since the re-authentication process is unsuccessful.  
Thus, this method is perceived interruptive and distracting to the student’s concentration. 
In the context of this thesis, the term ‘interruptive’ refers to the ability of an event to 
interfere with and alter a sequence of normal activities. 
6.4.2.3  Unimodal Biometric Solutions (passive) 
In  biometric  systems,  adopting  passive  biometrics  is  desirable  to  achieve 
continuous authentication. This means that the biometric employed should not require 
active  user  participation  and  be  unlikely  to  interrupt  the  user’s  activities.  The  face 
recognition is an example of a passive biometric method that can be used for continuous 
authentication.  An  example  of  a  continuous  video-based  face  recognition  method  to 
enhance user authentication in desktop systems is presented in Klosterman & Ganger 
(2000). In their work, authenticated faces are tracked and authentication is performed 
periodically  for  active  consoles.  The  face  tracking  process  exploits  the  temporal 
correspondence between the observed faces in the different frames i.e. detecting and 
tracking the faces over time. Subsequently, the tracked faces are authenticated for the 
entire  video  sequence.  In  summative  e-assessments,  employing  the  face  biometric 
method  will  enhance  security  and  deter  potential  impersonators.  Additionally,  in  e-
assessment security, face recognition is perceived non-interruptive as it possesses non-
intrusive capabilities. Thus, the student’s face image is continuously authenticated to 
verify presence throughout the test session.  73 
 
One  of  the  challenges  in  a  continuous  authentication  is  the  large  processing 
power consumed to compare the biometrics during the authentication process (Stallkamp 
et al, 2007).  In their work, Klosterman & Ganger (2000) reports the high computational 
costs of performing the biometric evaluation algorithms; thus, their proposed system was 
implemented in two separate systems. Xiao and Yang (2009) proposed a facial presence 
monitoring system to monitor an authenticated user. An objective of their system is to 
lock the screen or log out a user when the authenticated user’s face disappears from 
visibility.  The  CAMSHIFT  algorithm  was  used  to  perform  face  tracking.  However, 
during face authentication processing the system skipped a number of frames to save 
computational resources. In a one-time authentication, the computation latency would 
not be a concern; however, this becomes a challenge during presence verification. In e-
assessment environments, rendering of test questions with minimum delay is essential; 
thus, overloading the processor with high computational tasks may be unrealistic. Thus, 
the  literature  suggests  that  continuously  authenticating  a  student’s  face  for  the  test 
duration will be impractical and expensive. 
Additionally,  one  of  the  prominent  problems  encountered  in  face  recognition 
technology, is the difficulties in handling varying poses i.e. intolerance to pose variations 
(Zhang & Gao, 2009). According to Blanz et al, (2005), most face recognition systems 
are optimised for frontal views only and their performance drops due to non-frontal pose 
from the input image. This implies that, when a subject does not look directly at the 
camera,  a  user  authentication  attempt  may  fail.  In  a  continuous  face  authentication 
experiment, Altinok & Turk (2003) reports that a non-frontal pose throughout the entire 
video sequence led to a poor face recognition rate. Hence, the selection of frames which 
contain frontal face images is important for successful face authentication. 
In summative e-assessments, it is possible that a student would not maintain an 
acceptable frontal pose required for the re-authentication process at all times. This could 
be as a result of varying poses caused by student activities. For example, a student’s face 
may be partially occluded from the camera’s view due to tilting of the head. Thus, if this 
occurs  during  a  re-authentication  process  the  biometric  system  will  be  unable  to 
authenticate  the  student’s  face.  Hence,  the  consequence  will  be  an  interruptive  re-
authentication  request  or  an  automatic  log  out.  As  suggested  in  Cass  &  Riezenman 
(2002), a face recognition system with a low pose tolerance level is perceived to require 
cooperative subjects. Thus, an increase in pose variations, leading to non-frontal poses 74 
 
will result in false re-authentication alarms which may be costly in test environments. In 
our context, the high sensitivity of the face recognition method will make it interruptive 
and distracting for verifying presence. There exist promising techniques to achieve pose 
invariance (Xu et al, 2007); however, this thesis is not focused on pose detection in face 
recognition. Additionally, the pose invariance techniques will be an expensive overhead 
in summative e-assessment environments. 
Other  passive  biometric  methods  proposed  in  e-assessments  include  the 
keystroke analysis (Asha & Chellappan, 2008) and mouse dynamics (Ahmed & Traore, 
2007);  however,  as  behavioural  biometric  traits  they  are  yet  to  find  their  way  into 
commercial use (Levy & Ramim, 2007). Thus, the use of keystroke and mouse dynamics 
for presence verification is a potential research area. 
6.4.2.4  Multimodal Biometric Solutions 
Multimodal biometrics is the integration of two or more biometric methods (Jain 
et al, 2004). A recent trend in biometric technology is the adoption of multi-biometrics to 
enhance security in applications. Continuous authentication using multimodal biometrics 
has been explored using face with fingerprint (Sim et al, 2007) and the combination of 
voice, face and fingerprint (Altinok & Turk, 2003). Sim et al, 2007, experimented with 
using  a  face  and  fingerprint  biometrics  to  continuously  verify  the  presence  of  an 
authenticated user. They used a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) in Bayesian framework 
to  form  a  holistic  fusion  method  for  combining  the  biometric  modalities  and  time 
synchronously.  Their  system  was  integrated  into  an  operating  system,  to  allow  the 
operating system take action on the presence/absence of a legitimate user.  
In  e-assessments,  Rabuzin  et  al,  (2006)  suggest  that  to  implement  absolute 
security,  it  is  essential  to  combine  different  biometric  traits.  However,  multimodal 
biometrics is new to e-assessment; and there exist few proposals in adopting the concept. 
Levy & Ramim, (2009) propose a model for the integration of a fingerprint and web-
camera head geometry scanner. The focus in their paper was a survey on the intentions 
of using multi-biometrics, but there was no implementation of the actual system. Another 
multi-biometric  approach  worth  mentioning  is  the  use  of  a  mouse  embedded  with  a 
fingerprint sensor (Levy & Ramim, 2007). In this method, the sensor is located on the 
thumb area to continuously monitor a student over time without interfering with the 
activities  of  the  student.  Adopting  multi-biometric  solutions  in  an  e-assessment 75 
 
environment will improve user security, beyond the initial login procedure. However, a 
multi-biometric solution is as effective as the individual biometrics integrated. Thus, a 
multi-biometric system employed to verify presence may be reduced to an interruptive 
and distracting solution. In addition, continuous authentication of the multi-biometric 
traits will incur a high computational cost. 
6.4.3  Continuous User Monitoring  
In  this  approach,  a  test  environment  is  continuously  monitored  whilst  the 
participants  (i.e.  students  and  invigilators)  are  not  necessarily  within  each  other’s 
presence. 
6.4.3.1  Video/Webcam Solutions 
The aim of continuous user monitoring is to ensure the presence of a user both in 
time and space, without any form of interruption. This solution monitors user activities 
by recording the visual and audible signals in the environment.  A typical example is the 
use of video cameras for surveillance applications (Au et al, 2006).  
In e-assessment environments, Lin et al, (2004) suggested that the monitoring of 
student’s  interaction  via  video  images  is  a  promising  approach  to  ensure  security  in 
online tests. Thus, Ko & Cheng (2004) propose a secure internet examination system 
based on random video monitoring. In their work, passwords were used as a method for 
authentication; whilst monitoring involved the random capture and transmission of a 
student’s face during the test. An initial limitation of their system is the use of passwords 
which can be easily compromised. Secondly, a human invigilator is required to perform 
a manual monitoring process by watching a video of the environment throughout the test 
session. In video surveillance environments, Collins et al, (2000) asserts that finding 
extra available human resources to sit and watch the video images may incur a high-cost 
for organisations. Similarly in summative e-assessments, it is suggested that a higher 
institution will require extra invigilators to watch the video sequences in order to detect 
anomalous activities. This is perceived to increase the fees paid for the invigilation. A 
workaround to minimising cost, is to record the activities in the test environment, such 
that  the  video  can  be  viewed  at  a  later  time.  This  solution  will  gradually  become 
overwhelming  and  an  administrative  overhead,  due  to  the  amount  of  data  watched. 
Additionally, invigilators are human beings and watching a video for a long period will 
be prone to errors. This may be due to fatigue and distraction; thus, there is a chance of 76 
 
‘missing’  certain  events.  There  is  also  a  possibility  of  connived  impersonation,  as 
presence verification partly depends on the invigilator. 
In  another  work,  Hernandez  et  al,  (2008)  used  the  biometric  fingerprint  for 
authentication and a webcam for monitoring the students in real-time throughout the test. 
A webcam (miniature video camera) is an inexpensive device that is used to visually 
monitor an area and capture video images which can be viewed or stored. The miniature 
size of the webcam is useful in test environments as it can be mounted or in-built on a 
PC or laptop. However, the solution shares the limitations associated with using video 
monitoring.  Hence,  it  is  concluded  that  whilst  these  solutions  are  useful  for  user 
monitoring, they are unsuitable for presence verification. 
Approach  Method  Advantages  Disadvantages 
 
Face-to-face 
Monitoring 
 
Invigilation  
i. Provide extra security in 
online test environments 
i. Possibility of 
connived 
impersonation threats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Continuous User 
Authentication 
 
 
Passwords 
i. Simple and easy to use  i. High chances of 
impersonation threats 
ii. Interruptive and 
distracting 
 
 
Fingerprint 
biometric 
i. Accepted in e-
assessments 
ii. Minimise 
impersonation threats 
iii. Enhances security 
i. Interruptive and 
distracting 
ii. Potential for false 
rejects during e-
assessment 
 
 
Face biometric 
i. Accepted in e-
assessments 
ii. Minimise 
impersonation threats 
iii. Enhances security 
iv. Non-intrusive 
i. Computationally 
expensive 
ii. Potential to be 
interruptive and 
distracting  
 
Multimodal 
biometric 
i. Potential to provide 
high-level security  
i. Computationally 
expensive 
 
 
Continuous User 
Monitoring 
 
 
Video/Webcam 
i. Provides continuous 
monitoring, that is void of 
interruption 
i. Non- automatic 
ii. Dependent on 
human resources 
iii. Potential for 
administrative 
overhead 
Table 6-3 Advantages and disadvantages of existing methods 77 
 
6.5  A Conceptual Architecture for Presence Verification 
From Table 6-3 it is observed that a connived impersonation is possible when 
presence verification is completely reliant on a human invigilator. A user password can 
be  easily  compromised  and  it  possesses  interruptive  traits.  The  susceptibility  of  the 
invigilation and password methods to impersonation threats would defeat the purpose of 
presence  verification;  since,  there  exists  a  possibility  that  the  presence  of  an  illegal 
student may be verified instead! Adopting biometric solutions have a potential to become 
interruptive  and  distracting  when  a  re-authentication  process  is  initiated  constantly. 
Additionally,  the  biometric  solutions  can  become  frustrating  when  presumptuous  re-
authentication requests are constantly initiated. This type of request may be triggered due 
to the high sensitivity of a biometric identifier to the environment e.g. face biometrics.  
For example, a face recognition process can become over-sensitive to the activities in the 
test  environment;  this  may  lead  to  constant  presumptuous  re-authentication  requests 
which can ruin a student’s test. In addition, it is computationally expensive to perform 
biometric authentication constantly in a summative e-assessment environment. Lastly, 
the video/webcam solutions would still depend on human resources to verify presence. 
The  discussion  above  emphasises  on  the  disadvantages  of  the  potential 
approaches; nevertheless, these solutions also possess benefits that are useful to the test 
environment. From Table 6-3 (see page 76), it is observed that one of the important 
advantages to the test environment is the deterrence of potential impersonators at the 
login phase. Recall in the earlier chapters, biometrics solutions have been described as a 
stronger  authentication  method  which  can  be  used  to  preserve  the  user  security  of 
summative e-assessments. Thus, the goal of the e-assessment user security is to ensure 
that the ‘right’ student is correctly authenticated at the initial login and that the student’s 
presence is accurately verified for the duration of the test. Hence, this research does not 
disregard the relevance of the biometric solutions in summative e-assessments; rather a 
solution to achieve the presence verification process is proposed.  
Figure  6-3  shows  a  conceptual  design  of  the  proposed  presence  verification 
system, where the biometric solutions are included for (re)authentication purposes. From 
the high-level diagram, it is observed that the first step in a summative e-assessment 
environment is to ensure correctness of the student via an authentication method. In this 
case, a fingerprint biometric authentication system is employed. Therefore, provided a 78 
 
successful authentication outcome is achieved the student is allowed to proceed with the 
test and the presence verification module is initialised. The novelty of this research is 
embedded in the presence verification module; this module will be discussed in later 
chapters.  However,  a  potential  (futuristic)  operation  of  the  biometric  authentication 
systems  and  the  presence  verification  module  within  a  test  environment  is  briefly 
described.  
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Figure 6-3 High-level design of a presence verification system 
For  the  purpose  of  this  description,  a  genuine  student  is  assumed  and  the 
monitoring  process  is  initiated.  It  is  suggested  that  at  a  low-risk  state,  the  student’s 
presence does not pose any risk to the test environment; thus, the monitoring process is 
continued in a loop and no biometric processing is required. At the elevated-risk state, 
the  student’s  presence  becomes  suspicious  in  the  test  environment;  thus,  a 
reclassification process is initiated to re-assign the student’s presence to a low-risk or a 
high-risk state. In this process, the biometric face authenticator is required to re-confirm 79 
 
a student’s face within a specified time in a non-interruptive fashion. A high-risk state 
occurs  when  a  student’s  presence  poses  a  significant  risk  to  the  test  environment. 
Additionally,  a  high-risk  class  can  be  assigned  during  the  reclassification  when  a 
student’s face is not detected within the specified time or a face cannot be re-confirmed. 
Hence, at this stage the student would be required to re-authenticate. It should be noted 
that, until the high-risk state is assigned, the student would be oblivious to the presence 
verification process. 
As explained, the brief description provided above is a futuristic operation of the 
proposed  presence  verification  system;  however,  the  components  of  the  presence 
verification  module  (detect,  verify,  classify  and  risk  states)  are  investigated  and 
demonstrated  in  later  chapters.  In  the  next  section  a  novel  non-biometric  presence 
verification solution is described. 
6.6  Object Tracking Approach: A Blob Analysis Solution 
This section proposes a novel blob analysis solution which follows an object 
tracking approach. In this method, significant blob statistics from the detected object are 
extracted and the blob statistics information is analysed. Thus, the analysis of the blobs 
can be used to track an object, detect the object’s presence and estimate the object’s 
activity in the video sequence. In this context, an activity is described as acceptable or 
unacceptable  incidents  which  occur  in  a  video  sequence.  For  example,  in  a  test 
environment, the presence of an object is acceptable whilst the absence of the same 
object is unacceptable. The motivation for acceptable and unacceptable activities will be 
discussed in the next chapters. Hence, one of the goals of this research is to investigate 
the  feasibility  of  using  geometric  blob  statistics  to  detect  a  variety  of  activities  in  a 
summative e-assessment environment. To accomplish this, a blob analysis operation will 
be used to detect the blobs and extract the significant blob statistics such as perimeter, 
diameter, area and centre of mass.  
Furthermore, the extracted blob statistics values will be calculated and classified 
into three output threat classes to infer the student’s presence in the test environment. As 
will be discussed in the next section, existing blob analysis applications exploit blob 
statistics for object tracking and people or vehicle counting purposes. Additionally, the 
blob statistics can also be used for classification purposes, such that the goal is to classify 
the  moving  object  into  single  person,  people  group  or  a  vehicle.    In  literature, 80 
 
classification  algorithms  employed  for  blob  analysis  applications  include:  nearest 
neighbour  classifier  (Zhou  &  Aggarwal,  2001),  neural  network  (Sacchi  et  al,  2001), 
support  vector  machines  (Wu  et  al,  2005),  and  Bayesian  classifier  (Cucchiara  et  al, 
2005). However, these machine techniques are not suitable for the proposed blob system 
due to requirements for prior training sets. Moreover, it is impractical to provide training 
samples to suit an e-assessment application, because proving that the training set is a 
representation of the population is non-trivial. Hence, a fuzzy logic system (FLS) is 
chosen as it allows an easy representation of human decision-making particularly in a 
human-dominated environment such as the summative test environment. 
One  of  the  key  benefits  of  the  blob  analysis  method  is  its  low-resource 
consumption  i.e.  the  process  is  computationally  inexpensive.  The  low-resource 
advantage  is  attributed  to  the  connected  pixels  which  are  represented  in  a  single 
dimensional binary image. The blob analysis method produces valuable gains as opposed 
to  employing  biometric  methods  which  are  computationally  expensive.  Additionally, 
blob-based  techniques  are  known  to  be  successful  and  time  efficient,  especially  in 
environments with low numbers of moving objects within the cameras field of view 
(Zang & Klette, 2003). Thus, in a summative test environment the cameras field of view 
is limited to only one student at a time, as the students are expected to individually 
concentrate on the test task. This implies that, for x number of students, there would be x 
number of cameras and the blob operation is carried out individually.  
Another interesting advantage of the proposed blob analysis solution is the ability 
to achieve presence verification with minimal distraction to the student (Apampa et al, 
2010b). This task is accomplished through a novel blob classifier fuzzy engine which 
would  initiate  change-driven  re-authentication  request  as  opposed  to  the  frequent  re-
authentication requests of password and biometric methods. This dynamic classification 
method would be implemented using a fuzzy logic system (FLS). The final sections in 
this chapter, presents a brief background of blob analysis techniques and an overview of 
fuzzy logic systems.  
6.7  Existing Applications of Blob Analysis Techniques 
Blob analysis techniques have been widely used for a variety of applications such 
as tracking, event detection, video surveillance, people counting and vehicle counting. 
Typically, these applications exploit the versatility of the blob statistics embedded in the 81 
 
blob analysis process.  For example in a vehicle tracking system, Bas et al (2007) used 
the bounding boxes to detect the blob and the centroid statistics to mark the vehicle’s 
position.  In  another  work,  Javed  &  Shah  (2002)  classified  objects  into  categories  of 
humans and vehicles using the centroid and bounding box statistics. These statistics are 
useful in detecting a blob and estimating the position of the blob over a sequence of 
frames; however, they provide insufficient information in a case where two blobs merge. 
Several related works adopt blob analysis for people counting systems, where the blob 
area significantly reflects the size of the blob. Velipasalar et al, (2006) proposes a people 
counting system that learns automatically the size interval for a single person and uses 
the blob area to determine the number of people forming the blob.  
Automatic video surveillance is useful in detecting and preventing unauthorised 
human activities in monitored environments (Collins et al, 2000).  Thus, employing blob 
analysis can determine whether a person is standing in a forbidden area, running or 
hiding (Fuentes & Velastin, 2006). Commonly used blob statistics in video surveillance 
application include the area, centroid and bounding boxes; however, a combination of 
this statistics can improve the video monitoring process (Ali et al, 2006).  An important 
parameter infused with the blob statistics is the colour feature, where the RGB colour 
values  are  collected  from  each  blob  and  they  are  typically  extracted  for  similarity 
comparison during tracking (Lipton et al, 1998).   
Video surveillance applications which involve monitoring humans make use of 
the skin colour or hair colour (Zhang et al, 2009) whilst other applications target the 
object’s colour (Chen & Yang, 2005). The colour feature is useful in monitoring objects 
as it is independent of the object size and it remains invariant to geometric information 
(Birchfield, 1998). However, the colour feature may become unreliable due to variation 
in lighting or when the object and background have similar colour distributions (Zhou & 
Aggarwal, 2001). Additionally, tracking a blob becomes difficult when the object is at a 
far distance from the camera, change in direction or occlusion. Thus, for this research the 
colour feature such as facial complexion, hair colour, and shirt colour would not be 
considered, as the challenge is to investigate the potentials in adopting the geometric 
attributes of binary images.  
Lastly, it is worth mentioning applications which employ elliptic fitting methods 
to extract the geometric information of blobs. Ellipse fitting is one of the classic issues of 
pattern  recognition  area  and  it  has  received  considerable  attention  in  a  variety  of 82 
 
applications. In a head tracking application, Zhang et al, (2005) applied the direct least-
square technique (Fitzgibbon et al, 1999) to fit the ellipse on a head blob. By doing this, 
the position, orientation and shape parameters of the head are explicitly represented in 
preparation for the head tracker. Amidst the adaptation of blob techniques in a variety of 
applications; this thesis presents the first research in using blob analysis for e-assessment 
applications. Thus, this research seeks to investigate and demonstrate the feasibility of 
adopting  blob  geometric  statistics  for  improving  the  user  security  of  summative  e-
assessments. 
6.8  An Overview of Fuzzy Logic Systems (FLS) 
This section presents an overview of the fuzzy logic systems; however, in-depth 
discussions on FLS can be found in Klir & Yuan, (1995). Fuzzy logic is a problem-
solving methodology which is widely adopted in applications due to its simplicity and 
flexibility in handling complex processes and drawing definite conclusions from vague 
or incomplete information. Examples include automatic control (Nemoto et al, 1999) and 
expert systems (Macian et al, 2006). In conventional (i.e. crisp) set theory, an element 
either belongs to a set or it does not. This implies that crisp sets contain elements that 
satisfy  precise  properties  required  for  membership  i.e.  full  membership  or  no 
membership. For example, in a crisp set, membership or non-membership of element x in 
set A is described by the function: 
( ) A x µ , where  ( ) A x µ  = 1 if  xA and  ( ) A x µ  = 0 ifxA .   (6.1) 
Thus, A µ   maps  all  real  numbers  xA onto  the  two  points  (0,  1),  crisp  sets 
represent a two-valued logic: on or off, black or white, 1 or 0.  Thus, the characteristic 
(or membership) function of a crisp set assigns a value of either 1 or 0 to each element in 
a universal set, thereby discriminating between members and non-members of the set 
under  consideration.  The  fuzzy  set  theory  introduced  by  Lotfi  Zadeh  (1965)  is  a 
generalisation of the classical set theory, characterised by a membership function and 
expresses  the  degree  to  which  an  element  belongs  to  a  set.  A  membership  function 
provides a measure of the degree of an element to a given set and it is not restricted to 
the integers 0 and 1, but may take on any value between 0 and 1 i.e. [0, 1]. For example, 
given a universal set X , and it is elements be denoted asx, the fuzzy set  Aof X has a 
characteristics function associated to it: 83 
 
[ ] :0 , 1 A X µ               (6.2) 
such that,  for any xA , the fuzzy membership function ( ) A x µ indicate the degree of 
belonging of element x belongs to the universe of discourse X . For example,  
( ) :0 . 8 young alice µ =               (6.3) 
is read as “Alice belongs to the set of young people to the degree 0.8”. The membership 
function maps each element of  X to a membership grade which can take on values 
between 0 and 1.  
Traditional  classical  or  Boolean  logic  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  every 
proposition is either 1 (true) or 0 (false). In crisp logic, rules are a form of proposition 
usually denoted as an IF-THEN rule, where the IF part of the rule is called the antecedent 
or premise and the THEN part is the consequent or conclusion. Thus, the concepts in 
crisp  logic  can  be  extended  to  fuzzy  logic  by  replacing  0  or  1  values  with  fuzzy 
membership values. An example of a fuzzy logic rule assume the form “IF x is A, THEN 
y  is  B”,  where  xU and yV ,  and  has  a  membership  function,  ( ) , ABxy µ  
where ( ) [ ] ,0 , 1 ABxy µ .  To  interpret  the  if-then  rule,  firstly  evaluate  the  antecedent 
which involves ‘fuzzifying’ the input. Secondly, apply the result of the antecedent (i.e. 
implication) to the consequent, which evaluates the membership function ( ) , ABxy µ . 
Hence, in the fuzzy logic, a rule is fired as long as there is a non-zero degree of similarity 
between the premise and the antecedent of the rule. Additionally, an object can belong to 
a fuzzy set to different degrees and the set can overlap. Thus, the concept of fuzzy rule-
based systems is built on fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic. Non-fuzzy rules (e.g. crisp logic) 
deal with precise, crisp situations and assertions; however, fuzzy rules address imprecise 
fuzzy sets. In the next chapter, a detailed implementation of FLS as employed in this 
thesis is presented. 
6.9  Summary  
In  this  chapter,  the  impersonation  challenges  threatening  the  Identity-
Authentication user security model are classified into three types namely, Type A, Type 
B and Type C impersonation threats. The type A or ‘connived impersonation’ threat can 
occur when an invigilator willingly colludes with fraudulent students to perpetrate an 84 
 
impersonation. The Type B impersonation threats can occur as a result the strength or 
weakness of the authentication method adopted; whilst, the Type C impersonation threat 
occurs, when an external person substitutes a correctly authenticated student during the 
test  session.  The  Type  A,  B  and  C  impersonation  threats  are  known  to  be  a  major 
challenge when conducting summative e-assessments. In this chapter, it is suggested that 
the  vulnerability  of  the  Identity-Authentication  user  security  model  is  linked  to  a 
weakness in the model itself; thus, making the model fallible to the Type A, B and C 
impersonation  threats.  Thus,  to  address  this  limitation  the  Presence-Identity-
Authentication user security model is proposed. In this context, satisfying the presence 
security goal ensures that the correctly authenticated student at the beginning of a test is 
the same student that completes the test whist taking the test void of external assistance.  
In order to adopt the P-I-A user security model, it is essential to employ a suitable 
method to achieve the presence security goal. The potential approaches reviewed in this 
chapter, were unsuitable to achieve presence verification in summative e-assessments. 
Hence, an object tracking approach using a blob analysis method was suggested. The 
blob  analysis  solution  is  a  video  processing  technique  that  attempts  to  verify  the 
student’s presence in a non-distracting fashion throughout the test session. In the next 
chapter, the system design of the blob-based presence verification system is described. 
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Chapter 7.  Blob-based 
Presence Verification 
(BlobPV) System 
Recall in chapter six, potential approaches to achieving presence verification and 
their limitations were discussed. Additionally, due to these disadvantages a blob analysis 
solution which follows an object tracking approach was suggested. In this chapter, the 
concept  is  developed  into  a  novel  blob-based  presence  verification  system  and  this 
satisfies the second research objective of this thesis. 
The blob-based presence verification system (hereafter known as BlobPV) uses 
the geometric statistics of blobs to make inferences about an object’s presence in the 
video frame. In the BlobPV system, an object refers to an entity of interest detected in a 
video  sequence  and  can  be  characterised  using  blobs,  whilst  a  blob  (Binary  Large 
OBject) is defined as a group of connected pixels with the same properties within a 
binary image. In order to exploit the potentials embedded in the connected components, 
various blob statistics can be calculated using a blob analysis operation. Blob analysis is 
a process that allows the identification of blobs and the calculation of the statistical 
information  of  the  blobs  within  a  binary  image.  The  analysis  is  concluded  by 
summarising the information extracted from each image in a report which can be further 
analysed. Examples of the blob statistics discussed in this chapter include: area, centroid, 
major axis, minor axis orientation, bounding box and eccentricity. This chapter presents 
the  system  design  for  the  BlobPV  system,  which  includes  modules  such  as  pre-
processing, blob operation, methods and risk classification.  
7.1  Blob Statistics in BlobPV System 
This section describes the blob geometric attributes that can be extracted from a 
binary image. The blob statistics described include: centroid, area, bounding box, extent, 86 
 
major axis, minor axis, orientation, eccentricity, diameter, perimeter and count. Amongst 
the statistics listed above, the orientation, eccentricity, major and minor axes are derived 
from  ellipse  geometric  properties.  In  literature  (Sheu  et  al,  1997)  the  ellipse  is 
characterised with a five dimensional parameter space {x0, y0, a, b, "), where (x0, y0) is 
the centre coordinates, (a, b) represents the length of the major and minor axis and (") is 
the orientation angle of the major axis. It should be noted that, the other blob statistics 
are not derived from the ellipses; however, the ellipse is used for illustrative purposes. 
The following describes the blob statistics with implication for this research. 
Centroid 
The  centroid  represents  the  centre  of  mass  of  a  blob  in  an  image  which  is 
measured by the x- and y-coordinate values. Typically, the centriod can be used to report 
an object’s position in a video frame; thus, providing the location information of the 
blob. This is particularly useful as the current position of the blob within the region is 
known.  However,  when  two  blobs  merge,  the  centroid  statistics  are  incapable  of 
reporting the information. In this case, the coordinates of the centre of gravity of the 
merged blob is computed without suggesting the appearance of a new blob. For the 
purpose of this research, the event where two blobs are merged is important as it depicts 
an external object in the video frame. Hence, due to this limitation the centroid statistics 
would not be considered in this thesis.  Figure 7-1 shows the ( ) 00 , xy coordinates of the 
centroid. 
Area 
The area statistics represents the actual number of connected pixels that make up 
a blob, i.e. the total number of pixels which fills up a blob. A pixel is the smallest 
physical unit in the video image. The blob area provides a quick access to the overall 
blob size; thus, a change in the size of a blob will result in re-calculation of the area of 
the blob. Hence, the blob area is useful when determining the variations of the blob size. 
For example, the area of a merged blob will vary significantly from the area of a single 
blob;  consequently,  the  sizes  will  reflect  the  changes.  Thus,  for  the  purpose  of  this 
research the area statistics can be used to estimate the changes to an initial known area 
value. Figure 7-1 illustrates the area of the blob, i.e. is the shaded region. 
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Bounding box 
The bounding box represents the smallest rectangle that encloses the detected 
blob in an image. This information can be used to precisely identify the object in order to 
compute various parameters. Typically blobs in an image are determined by their centre 
coordinate  (i.e.  centroid)  and  the  bounding  box  encompasses  all  the  blobs  found.  
Bounding boxes are also useful in determining the current location of a blob which is 
tracked over time. Additionally, bounding boxes offer useful statistics in determining the 
relative sizes of the blobs; thus, a merged blob will depict an increase in the size of the 
bounding box. Although robust, the bounding box does not provide sufficient statistics 
that can be used independently. Due to this limitation, the bounding box will not be 
considered for this research. In Figure 7-1 the bounding box is illustrated. 
Extent 
The extent statistics represents the proportion of the pixels in the bounding box 
that are also in the blob, i.e. the area of the blob divided by the area of the bounding box 
surrounding it (both in pixels). An increase or decrease in the blob area will determine an 
increase  or  decrease  in  the  size  of  its  bounding  box.    For  example,  a  blob  with  an 
increased area will occupy a larger percentage of its bounding box (see Figure 7-1). The 
result from this is a decrease in the extent ratio which simultaneously reveals a change in 
the area of the blob. In the BlobPV system, the extent statistics are exploited to detect 
occlusion and to provide information about the objects distance from the camera. The 
extent ratio is computed by:  
 
  
blob area
extent
bounding box area
=
              (7.1) 88 
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Figure 7-1 Centriod, Area, Bounding box and Extent properties 
Major and Minor axes 
The major axis represents the long axis of an ellipse, whilst the minor axis is the 
line perpendicular to the major axis and it represents the shorter axis. Traditionally, the 
length of the major axis is indicated by 2a and the minor axis by 2b, where the two axes 
are distinguished by a # b (Note: where a = b, the ellipse is a circle). Figure 7-2 and 
Figure 7-3 shows an ellipse in two of its standard forms where the major axis is parallel 
to the x-axis and y-axis respectively. The position of the major and minor axis in an 
ellipse suggests that the shape of the blob can be derived.  This implies that the value of 
the aspect ratio (ratio of major to minor axis) of an ellipse can be used to estimate the 
current shape of a blob in the image. It is assumed that the blob in Figure 7-3 has a 
vertical direction, whilst the same blob in Figure 7-2 depicts a varying or near-horizontal 
direction.  Visual  observation  of  the  two  blobs  reveals  different  shapes  and  different 
positioning of the major and minor axis. Additionally, an increase in the length of the 
major axis will produce an elongation of the ellipse towards a particular direction; thus, 
showing a deviation from the initial shape.  Hence, the more elongated the ellipse in a 
particular direction, the larger the ratio reflecting a change in shape.  The BlobPVS 
proposes that the ratio of the major to minor axis of a blob can estimate the varying 
activities of a moving object in a video frame to estimate the shape of the blob. The ratio 
of the major axis of the ellipse to its minor axis is given by: 89 
 
  
 min  
ellipse major axis a
ellipse or axis b
=
              (7.2) 
Orientation 
The orientation represents the angle formed between the x-axis of reference and 
the major axis of the ellipse (see Figure 7-2). The direction is calculated in radian (-$/2 
and  $/2)  counter-clockwise  from  the  x-axis.  The  blob  orientation  can  provide  the 
information to determine an object’s pose within a video frame. For example, an object 
with a vertical direction relative to the camera (i.e. major axis parallel to the y-axis) will 
obtain an orientation value of 90
o or 1.57radians. Similarly an object with a horizontal 
direction relative to the camera will obtain an orientation value of 0
o or 0.0radians. In the 
BlobPV system, it is proposed that the orientation statistics would accurately estimate a 
moving object’s pose or direction in the video frame. 
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Figure 7-2 Major Axis Parallel to the x-axis 90 
 
a
b
!
"#$%
#$%
x
y
&!'()"'*
+,-./)01,2
+03./)01,2
 
Figure 7-3 Major Axis Parallel to the y-axis 
Eccentricity 
The shape of an ellipse (i.e. the fatness or thinness) is typically expressed by the 
eccentricity statistics. The eccentricity value ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 means a=b 
(i.e.  major  and  minor  axis  are  equal  in  length),  in  which  the  ellipse  is  a  circle.  
Consequently, a value of 1 depicts a straight line where the minor axis does not exist. 
The eccentricity of an ellipse is the ratio of the distance between the foci to the length of 
the  major  axis  length  of  an  ellipse.  In  this  research,  the  eccentricity  statistics  is  not 
considered, as the major and minor axes provide sufficient information about the shape 
of a blob. 
Equivalent Diameter Squared 
This diameter statistics represents the size of the largest blob and it is computed 
by  taking  the  square  root  of  the  pixel  area  of  the  blob.  The  calculation  is  roughly 
equivalent to the diameter of the blob and this would be the length of the side of the 
blob, assuming the blob is a square. Irrespective of the object activities in a video frame, 
the diameter statistics value varies minimally from a known initial value. Thus, for the 
purpose the BlobPV system a significant change to a known value will be useful in 
detecting changes in the object. 91 
 
Perimeter 
The perimeter statistic is represented as the total length of the outside edges of a 
blob (in pixels). That is the number of pixels that surround the blob and it is calculated 
by the distance between each adjoining pair of pixels around the border of the blob. 
Hence, the perimeter value of an object performing an activity will vary to another object 
performing a similar activity. Irrespective of the object activities in a video frame, the 
perimeter statistics value would vary insignificantly from a known initial value. Thus, for 
the purpose the BlobPV system a significant change to a known value will be useful in 
detecting changes in the object. 
Count  
The count statistics is introduced to determine the number of blobs found in a 
binary  image.  In  the  BlobPV  system,  the  count  statistics  is  useful  to  determine  the 
number of objects in a video frame. 
7.2  Presence Verification using Blob Statistics 
From section 7.1 it is observed that the proposed blob analysis technique would 
exploit an object’s blob statistics to determine the object’s current activity in a video 
frame. For example, using the blob orientation statistics, an object gazing directly at a 
camera  can  be  accurately  estimated.  Similarly,  the  blob  extent  statistics  can  provide 
information about an object’s distance from the camera, whilst the count statistics can 
detect multi-presence in the video frame. Thus, based on these simple instances it is 
suggested that a variety of activities can be precisely deduced from the blob statistics. 
However,  it  is  assumed  that  there  exist  other  activities  which  cannot  be  accurately 
determined using a single blob statistics. For example, relying on the changes in the area 
statistics only would produce insufficient information to determine an object’s activity 
from frame-to-frame in a video sequence. However, combining the area statistics with 
the orientation or extent statistics may reveal an object moving away from the camera or 
the direction of movement. Figure 7-4(a – d) illustrates the examples described above 
Figure 7-4a depicts an object’s frontal pose with the orientation approximately 
90
0. It is assumed that the same object shown in Figure 7-4a is depicted in Figure 7-4b; 
however, the blob in Figure 7-4b shows a reduction in area which would effectively 
produce an increase in the extent statistics. For example, a decrease in blob area may be 92 
 
due  to  the  object’s  distance  from  the  camera.  In  Figure  7-4c  and  Figure  7-4d,  it  is 
assumed the object’s area and extent statistics remain unchanged from the initial values 
in Figure 7-4a (provided there is insignificant change in the object’s distance to the 
camera). However, it is observed that the Figure 7-4c and Figure 7-4d suggest a change 
in the object’s pose which results in the change of polarity from a negative orientation to 
a positive orientation. This suggests that the object has turned in an opposite direction 
from its initial position. Additionally, the Figure 7-4c and Figure 7-4d show a change in 
the direction of the major and minor axis, which would affect the shape of the object. 
This illustration demonstrates that whilst some blob statistics can sufficiently estimate an 
object’s activity; the correct detection of other activities will require a combination of 
different blob statistics. 
Thus, based on the above discussions two approaches to implement the BlobPV 
system is proposed. The first approach is based on estimating an object’s pose directly 
from the blob statistics, i.e. mapping an object’s activity to a blob statistic. This approach 
would  rely  on  discriminative  blob  statistics  such  as  count,  orientation  and  extent  to 
accurately determine an object’s activity. Hence, the pose estimation approach would 
attempt to make inferences about an object’s presence directly from the video frames. 
The second approach is an activity risk classification, which is based on aggregating the 
changes in the blob statistics between successive video frames. This implies that the 
activity risk classification approach would make inferences about an object’s presence by 
analysing  and  classifying  the  changes  in  the  blob  statistics.  Figure  7-5  shows  a 
conceptual diagram of the two approaches. From the diagram, it is observed that an 
object is tracked via continuous video signal and the first step is to detect and extract the 
object  from  the  background.  The  foreground  object  is  segmented  and  the  connected 
pixels are grouped to form a blob. Additionally, the relevant geometric attributes of the 
blob  is  extracted.  Thereafter,  the  pose  estimation  and  activity  risk  classification 
approaches would be implemented. The suitability of these approaches is discussed in 
the  next  chapter.  Table  7-1  show  the  proposed  blob  statistics  and  their  relevance  in 
example object activities. 
 
 93 
 
!"#$%&
'#()*+#$%&
",+
-,+
'%.)*+#$%&
 
a: Frontal Pose 
!"#$%&
'#()*+#$%&
",+
-,+
'%.)*+#$%&
 
b: Area and Extent 
!"#$%&
'#()*+#$%&
",+
-,+
'%.)*+#$%&
 
c: Negative Orientation 
!"#$%&
'#()*+#$%&
",+
-,+
'%.)*+#$%&
 
d: Positive Orientation 
Figure 7-4 Blob statistics example illustrations 
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Activity examples  Blob description  Relevant statistics 
External person behind student  A new blob appears  Area 
Count (> 1) 
External person  
beside student 
Blob has merged with another blob  Area 
Count (> 1) 
External person substitute student  Old blob disappears  Area 
Major/minor axes 
Face close to camera  Blob moving towards camera  Extent 
Area 
Hand blocking camera  Blob moving towards camera  Extent 
Area 
Head blocking camera  Blob moving towards camera  Extent 
Area 
Head/face distant from camera  Blob moving away from camera  Area 
Major/minor axes 
Extent 
Lean on table  Blob moving in different direction  Area 
Extent 
Orientation 
Look down  Blob change in form  Area 
Extent 
Look forward  Blob is stationary  Orientation 
Look left/right   Blob change in form and move in 
different direction 
Area 
Orientation 
Look up  Blob change in form  Area 
Orientation 
Hand on cheek  Blob expands  Area 
Major/minor axes 
Orientation 
Cover face  Blob expands  Area 
Major/axes 
Table 7-1 Identifying blob statistics in activity examples 95 
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Figure 7-5 A conceptual diagram for the presence verification approaches 
7.3  BlobPV System Design 
This  research  investigates  the  feasibility  of  using  blob  analysis  for  presence 
verification  in  a  summative  e-assessment  environment.  Figure  7-6,  shows  the 
architecture of the proposed system. The system architecture is divided into four stages, 
namely: object pre-processing, blob operation, methods and activity classification. These 
stages  are  further  discussed  in  this  section.  The  system  is  developed  using  the 
MATLAB/Simulink  Video  and  Image  processing  Blockset.  The  MATLAB/Simulink 
modelling environment is employed due to its simple and easy-to-use graphical user 
interface for performing simulations. 
7.3.1  Frame Pre-processing 
The pre-processing stage starts with converting from a multi-dimensional (RGB, 
HSV or any other) colour space to a matrix of intensity values between 0 and 255.  In 
this study, an RGB colour space is converted to an intensity image and the conversion 
from an RGB image to an intensity image takes place on-the-fly. Intensity (greyscale) 
images refer to normalised images, since each pixel value is expressed within a given 
range between the minimum and maximum values. The resulting intensity image is used 
for object detection in the next stage. 96 
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Figure 7-6 The BlobPV system architecture97 
 
7.3.1.1  Object Detection 
The first stage in object tracking applications is the detection and segmentation of 
the  moving  objects  in  the  images.  Three  conventional  approaches  include  temporal 
differencing, background subtraction and optical flow. The background subtraction is a 
commonly used technique due to its simple implementation and low computational costs 
(McIvor, 2000).  In an e-assessment environment the assumption is that the camera is 
fixed such that only the object of interest is captured in the cameras field of view. This 
implies  that  a  stationary  background  is  recommended.  To  improve  the  detection 
accuracy,  the  background  image  should  be  provided  in  advance.  The  background 
subtraction approach was adopted for the BlobPV system and a 100% object detection 
rate was achieved. The results of the background subtraction process are background-
removed images, which are forwarded to the thresholding subsystem. 
The thresholding operation aims to segment the background subtracted image, to 
extract the object of interest from other features in the frame. To accomplish this, a 
threshold value to determine the inclusion or exclusion of a pixel as a background or 
foreground  object  is  required.  Thus,  the  input  to  a  thresholding  process  is  intensity 
(greyscale) or a colour image and the output is a binary image. The challenge of manual 
thresholding lies in the choice of threshold value to use. A suitable threshold value can 
be determined by looking at the histogram plot of the background subtracted image. In 
this case, the pixel values of the foreground object are manually separated from the 
pixels within the background. However, due to variations in lighting, object features and 
object motion, this thresholding technique does not produce good results.  
7.3.1.2  Autothresholding 
The autothreshold operation, automatically converts intensity images to a binary image 
using  the  Otsu  threshold  selection  method  (Otsu,  1979).  This  method  automatically 
selects an optimal threshold by minimising the intra-class variance of black and white 
pixels in the binary image; thus, eliminating the manual process of choosing threshold 
values.  Hence,  irrespective  of  the  object  variations  in  the  intensity  images,  the 
autothreshold  method  allows  on  the  on–the-fly-thresholding.  This  approach  is 
implemented  in  the  Simulink  Autothreshold  block  and  it  is  adopted  for  the  system 
design. 98 
 
7.3.2  Blob Operation 
At this stage, the idea is to segment the foreground pixels, find blobs and extract 
the relevant statistics for further analysis. To select the blobs, a connected component 
analysis process is used to identify and label sets of connected pixels. Two commonly 
used methods which defines a connected neighbourhood for a 2D image is 4-connected 
neighbourhood and 8-connected neighbourhood (Haralick & Shapiro, 1992; Rosenfeld, 
1970).  These  techniques  can  be  distinguished  based  on  their  pixel  connectivity  (see 
Figure 7-7). In the 4-connected neighbourhood, the four connected pixels share an edge 
i.e.  pixels  on  the  same  row  or  column,  whilst  in  an  8-connected  neighbourhood, 
connected pixels share edges or vertices i.e. pixels on the same row or column and the 
diagonal pixels. Thus, the effectiveness of a blob analysis technique relies on the type of 
pixel  connectivity  chosen.  Due  to  undesirable  configuration  anomalies,  a  common 
pattern is to use a different pixel connectivity for the foreground and background i.e. 
either using 4-connectivity for the foreground with 8-connectivity for the background or 
using 8-connectivity for the foreground with 4-connectivity for the background. Thus, 
once all groups have been determined, each pixel is either on or off, black or white 
depending on the chosen method. 
In the BlobPV system, the 8-connectivity method is chosen due to the sensitivity 
of the shape from the input image, i.e. it is assumed that each initial blob contains one 
object.    For  the  purpose  of  this  research,  the  pixels  that  are  set  to  binary  ‘1’  are 
considered the blobs and appear white in the image; whilst, the background pixels are set 
to binary ‘0’ and appear black in the binary image. Other forms of pixel connectivity 
include the 6, 18, and 26–connected neighbourhood; however, they are suited for three 
dimensional (3D) images and will not be considered. 
 
Figure 7-7 4-connected neighbour and 8-connected neighbour 
 99 
 
7.3.3  Methods 
Recall  in  section  7.2,  the  pose  estimation  and  activity  risk  classification 
approaches were proposed as suitable techniques to implement the BlobPV system. For 
the pose estimation approach, it is suggested that an object’s activity can be determined 
directly by mapping each activity to the extracted blob statistics. However, the activity 
risk classification approach suggests that analysing the changes of the blob statistics 
would infer an object’s activity in the video frame.  The two approaches would receive 
as input the proposed blob statistics in Table 7-2. The feasibility of these approaches is 
demonstrated in the next chapter. 
Blob Statistics  Description  Study Expectations 
Area  Area of blob   The  area  statistics  would  vary 
insignificantly  through  the  different 
activities,  provided  the  same  detectable 
feature  (e.g.  face)  is  presented  to  the 
camera 
Extent  Percentage occupancy of 
blob in the bounding box 
The  extent  statistics  would  indicate  the 
obstruction of a cameras field of view. In 
addition,  the  dissimilarity  in  extent 
statistics  for  the  same  object  would 
indicate a change in the object’s pose. 
Major axis  Long length of an ellipse  The  major  and  minor  axes  would 
indicate a change in the object’s shape.   Minor axis  Short length of an ellipse 
Orientation  Angle between the major 
axis of an ellipse and x-
axis of the image plane 
The orientation statistics will indicate an 
object’s  direction  through  the  different 
activities. For example an object looking 
straight would be approximately 90
o. 
Count  Number  of  blobs  in  an 
image 
The  count  statistics  would  indicate  the 
number of objects present in a cameras 
field of view 
Perimeter  Length of blob  The  perimeter  and  diameter  statistics 
values  would  not  change  significantly 
through  the  different  activities.  This 
statistics would indicate the sameness of 
an  object  during  the  re-classification 
process.   
Diameter  Size of blob  
Table 7-2 Proposed Blob Statistics for Presence Verification 
7.3.4  Risk Classification  
The  risk  classification  is  the  final  stage  of  the  system  architecture.  The 
components in this phase are the novel blob classifier engine implemented using a fuzzy 100 
 
logic system and the threat classification scheme. The threat classification scheme is 
made up of three risk decisions (Apampa et al, 2010a). Thus, the blob classifier engine 
receives as input the blob statistics values and it outputs a threat class assigned to each 
object detected. The threat classification scheme is described in this section whilst the 
blob classifier engine is discussed in the next section. A schematic diagram of the threat 
classification scheme is shown in Figure 7-8. 
Low-risk
Elevated-risk
High-risk
acceptable region
re-class region
unacceptable region
 
Figure 7-8 Threat classification scheme 
7.3.4.1  Low-risk Threat Class 
A low-risk threat class is assigned when the detected object’s presence does not 
pose a security threat. This implies that the blob statistics values extracted from the 
object  vary  insignificantly  when  compared  to  an  initial  frontal  statistics.  In  practical 
terms, a low-risk implies that the student’s presence is within an acceptable range and 
does not reflect the likelihood of dishonest activities in the environment. Hence, the 
summative e-assessment environment is not at risk of the student’s presence.  
7.3.4.2  Elevated-risk Threat Class 
An  elevated-risk  threat  class  is  assigned  when  the  detected  object’s  presence 
reveal suspicious actions that may lead to a security threat. At this stage, the extracted 
blob  statistics  values  show  significant  variations  from  an  acceptable  range;  thus,  the 
values reflect the likelihood of suspicious activities in the environment. However, in an 
elevated-risk class there exists an opportunity for a reclassification. Thus, an object’s 101 
 
presence would be re-classed as a low-risk or a high-risk. In practical terms, an elevated-
risk  class  attempts  to  reconfirm  a  student’s  presence  in  a  non-interruptive  and  non-
distracting approach. However, the summative e-assessment environment is still at risk 
of the suspected student’s presence until a new threat class is assigned.   
7.3.4.3  High-risk Threat Class 
A high-risk threat class is assigned when the detected object’s presence pose a 
security threat to the environment. In the high-risk class, the extracted blob statistics 
values lie within an un-acceptable range; thus, the values reflect the occurrence of user 
security  threat  activities.  The  high-risk  class  can  be  assigned  directly  or  from  the 
elevated-risk  class.  In  practice,  the  high-risk  class  suggests  that  the  summative  e-
assessment environment is at risk of user security threats or suspicious activities that 
could lead to a security threat. Hence, it is required that the student’s presence is re-
confirmed to ensure that the authenticated student at the beginning of a test is the same 
student at that point. Thus, the student is requested to re-authenticate. Interestingly, this 
is the only stage where the student is aware of the presence verification process. 
7.4  Blob Classifier Engine Operation 
  The blob classifier engine is embedded in the activity risk classification 
approach (see Methods in 7.3.3) and the process is executed using two fuzzy rule engines 
namely the frontal class engine and the risk class engine. The frontal class engine is the 
initial state of the process and its goal is to test for frontalness of the detected blob. In 
this thesis, ‘frontalness’ refers to the satisfactory frontal pose of an object. Thus, when an 
object’s  frontal  pose  meets  the  pre-defined  requirements  the  frontal  class  engine 
initialises the risk class engine. The risk class engine is responsible for classifying the 
detected object’s blob statistics in accordance with the threat classification scheme, i.e. 
low, elevated or high risk (see Section 7.3.4). Figure 7-9 shows the blob classifier engine 
within the activity risk classification and its operation is described below. Given an input 
video sequence, the activity risk classification process requests a frontal pose from the 
object  detected.  A  satisfactory  frontal  pose  is  recorded  when  the  object  achieves  an 
orientation statistics value of +/-90
o. Thus, achieving a satisfactory frontal pose would 
imply that the object’s blob statistics is extracted and stored as frontal pose statistics.  
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Figure 7-9 Blob classifier engine in activity risk classification approach 103 
 
The frontal pose statistics is composed of initial blob statistics (such as area, extent, 
perimeter, count, major axis, minor axis, and diameter) extracted from a blob. The values 
of the area, extent, orientation, major axis and minor axis statistics (hereafter known as 
current activity statistics) are extracted as long as the object is detected in the video 
sequence. This statistics are then fed into the risk class engine. However, the values of 
the  perimeter  and  diameter  statistics  are  stored  for  use  during  the  re-classification 
process. Thus, for every video frame received (after the frontal pose) the object’s current 
activity statistics would be passed on to the risk class engine; whilst the perimeter and 
diameter statistics is employed for re-classification.  
At this stage, the fuzzy risk class engine takes over the process and the engine is 
required to extract, analyse and classify all the video frames where an object is detected. 
The output risk is determined using the threat classification scheme (i.e. low, elevated or 
high)  and  the  risk  class  is  assigned  based  on  the  significant  changes  in  the  object’s 
current activity statistics. A re-classification of an output class occurs when an initial 
output class is set to an elevated-risk. At this stage, the perimeter and diameter statistics 
of the current activity is compared to a pre-defined constant value. Hence, the outcome 
of the comparison would lead to a low-risk or high-risk reclassification. The activity risk 
classification approach is demonstrated in the next chapter. 
7.5  BlobPV Software Design 
This section describes the design of the software system that was used for the 
BlobPV experiments demonstrated in the next chapter. The system is developed using 
the MATLAB/Simulink Video and Image processing Blockset. The BlobPV software 
design is divided into two parts namely the frontal activity model and the after frontal 
activity  model.  The  two  models  are  made  up  of  subsystems  which  are  discussed  in 
greater detail below. 
7.5.1  Frontal Activity Model 
The Frontal activity model in Figure 7-10 consists of the following subsystems: 
image pre-processing, frontal pose detection and frontal pose classification. This model 
also contains the frontal class fuzzy engine (see section 7.4), which is used to test for 
‘frontalness’ of the detected blob.  The value of an object’s blob orientation statistics will 
then be displayed to indicate a satisfactory/unsatisfactory frontal pose.104 
 
 
Figure 7-10 Frontal activity model 105 
 
In addition, the object’s blob statistic values is stored in a Matlab file (M-file) 
which is fed into the After Frontal activity model discussed in the next section. This 
action is required to ensure that the object’s current activity statistics will be calculated 
as a function of the object’s satisfactory frontal pose statistics.  
7.5.1.1  Image pre-processing subsystem 
In the image pre-processing subsystem (see Figure 7-11) two images are loaded 
on to the modelling environment, that is the object’s background image and the object’s 
frontal image. Thereafter, the frame pre-processing activities discussed in section 7-3 are 
applied on the two images; examples of these activities include colour conversion, object 
detection  and  autothresholding.  Lastly,  a  blob  operation  is  applied  on  the  threshold 
image, where the blob orientation statistics value is used to test for ‘frontalness’. 
7.5.1.2  Frontal pose detection subsystem 
The input to the frontal pose detection subsystem (see Figure 7-12) will be the 
image that is output from the image pre-processing subsystem. Thus, this subsystem is 
responsible for detecting a frontal pose activity from the received image. If a frontal pose 
activity is detected, the image is forwarded for a frontal classification; otherwise the 
system requests for a satisfactory frontal pose.  
If Action subsystem 
This subsystem contains the “if-then-rule” which is used to compare the blob orientation 
statistic values. 
7.5.1.3  Frontal pose classification subsystem 
The input to the frontal pose classification subsystem (see Figure 7-13) will be 
the blob orientation statistics value obtained from the frontal pose detection subsystem. 
This  subsystem  determines  the  satisfactory  qualities  of  an  object’s  frontal  pose  by 
comparing the object’s blob orientation statistics against a set of criteria (Constants). 
Hence,  an  acceptable  or  unacceptable  frontal  classification  is  assigned.  Lastly,  the 
object’s blob frontal pose statistics are stored in an M- file. 
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Figure 7-11 Image pre-processing subsystem 107 
 
 
Figure 7-12 Frontal pose detection subsystem 108 
 
 
Figure 7-13 Frontal pose classification subsystem 109 
 
 
 
Figure 7-14 If Action subsystem 110 
 
7.5.2  After Frontal Activity Model 
The  After  Frontal  activity  model  in  Figure  7-15  consists  of  the  following 
subsystems:  image  pre-processing,  operations,  conversion,  activity  statistics,  threat 
classification and threat re-classification. This model also contains the risk class fuzzy 
engine (see section 7.4), which is responsible for classifying the detected object’s blob 
statistics  in  accordance  with  the  threat  classification  scheme.  The  M-file  containing 
information about the object’s frontal pose statistics (i.e. values for orientation, area, 
major axis, minor axis, extent and count) is fed into the After Frontal activity model. 
Recall that, the M-file was compiled in the Frontal activity model; thus, the object’s 
current activity statistics are calculated with respect to the object’s frontal pose statistics. 
7.5.2.1  Image pre-processing subsystem 
The image pre-processing subsystem (see Figure 7-16) consists of two images 
which are loaded on to the modelling environment, this are the object’s background 
image and the object’s non-frontal activity, e.g. “left hand on cheek”. It should be noted 
that, several images of the object performing diverse activities can be loaded; however, it 
is important that the background image is constant. Thereafter, the frame pre-processing 
activities discussed in section 7-3 are applied on the two images; examples of these 
activities include colour conversion, object detection and autothresholding. 
7.5.2.2  Operations subsystem 
The M-file (contains object’s frontal pose statistics) stored in the frontal pose 
classification  subsystem  (from  the  Frontal  activity  model),  is  fed  into  the  operations 
subsystem (see Figure 7-17). This ensures that the changes to the object’s current blob 
statistics are calculated with respect to the frontal pose activities retrieved from the file. 
The mathematical and relational operators shown in the subsystem perform numerical 
operations to reflect the changes in the object’s blob statistics. The Constant values and 
relational  operators  for  threat  re-classification  are  also  defined  in  the  operations 
subsystem. For threat re-classification purposes the object’s diameter and perimeter blob 
statistics are extracted and stored.  111 
 
 
 
Figure 7-15 After frontal activity model 112 
 
 
Figure 7-16 Image pre-processing subsystem 113 
 
 
Figure 7-17 Operations subsystem 114 
 
7.5.2.3  Conversion subsystem 
The  conversion  subsystem  (see  Figure  7-18)  work  alongside  the  operations 
subsystem to ensure that the object’s current blob statistics are calculated relative to the 
frontal  pose  statistics.  Additionally,  the  subsystem  ensures  that  the  blob  statistics 
changes are correctly fed to the risk class fuzzy engine. Lastly, the blob statistics changes 
are concatenated to produce a single fuzzy result. 
7.5.2.4  Activity statistics subsystem 
In the activity statistics subsystem (see Figure 7-19), the changes to the object’s 
blob statistics values are recorded and displayed on the image. This action is performed 
on  all  the  images  received  via  the  video  sequence.  The  activity  statistics  subsystem 
functions  alongside  the  operation  and  conversion  subsystems  to  ensure  that  a  single 
result is achieved. 
7.5.2.5  Threat class subsystem 
The  input  to  the  threat  class  subsystem  (see  Figure  7-20)  is  the  single  result 
produced by the operation, conversion and activity statistics subsystems. The result is 
interpreted  using  predefined  Fuzzy  logic  rules  and  then  classified  using  the  threat 
classification  scheme  proposed  section  7.3.4.  These  classes  are  the  low-risk  threat, 
elevated-risk threat and high-risk threat. 
If Action subsystem 
This subsystem contains the “if-then-rule” which assigns the appropriate threat 
classes to the single result obtained from the blob statistics. 
7.5.2.6  Threat re-class subsystem 
The threat re-class subsystem (see Figure 7-21) receives as input the single result 
which is assigned an elevated-risk threat. This subsystem is responsible for re-classing 
an elevated-risk threat to low-risk threat or high risk threat. The reclassification process 
is performed by comparing the object’s perimeter and diameter statistics values with a 
Constant value which is defined in the Operations subsystem (see section 7.5.2.2). The 
outcome of comparison would determine the threat re-classification status, i.e. either a 
low-risk or high-risk threat. 115 
 
 
Figure 7-18 Conversion subsystem 116 
 
 
 
Figure 7-19 Activity statistics subsystem 117 
 
 
Figure 7-20 Threat class subsystem 118 
 
 
Figure 7-21 Threat re-class subsystem 119 
 
 
Figure 7-22 If Action subsystem 120 
 
7.6  Blob Classifier Engine via Fuzzy Logic System  
A fuzzy logic system (see section 6.8) refers to a nonlinear mapping from an 
input to the output space, i.e. maps crisp inputs to crisp outputs. The operation in a fuzzy 
logic system (FLS) starts with an input (crisp number) which is converted into a fuzzy 
set (fuzzification) Thereafter, an inference engine maps input fuzzy sets to output fuzzy 
sets and the FLS calculates crisp values from the fuzzy values (defuzzification). Figure 
7-23 shows a block diagram of a FLS using four basic components.  
7.6.1  Fuzzifier 
The aim of this component is to map the degree of each input (i.e. crisp number) 
into  appropriate  fuzzy  sets  via  membership  functions.    The  fuzzifier  is  required  to 
activate rules formulated in terms of linguistic variables and associated with fuzzy sets. 
According to Zadeh (1975) “linguistic variables imply variables whose values are not 
numbers but words or sentences in a natural or artificial language”. Thus, the ability to 
present  linguistic  variables  is  one  of  the  strengths  of  the  fuzzy  logic  system;  since 
numeric values can be converted to the linguistic variables which are easily understood.  
In the ARC approach, a fuzzy set  F  is defined on a universe of discourse  X  and is 
characterised by a degree of membership ( ) x µ . Additionally, a multi-input single-output 
fuzzy  system  which  performs  a  mapping  from 
m UR   to  VR is  considered.  The 
mapping function is defined as: 
:
m fU R V R         (7.3) 
where  123 , , ,....,
m
n UU U U U R = !  is the input space and VR is the output space. A 
single-input, single-output fuzzy system is also considered; however, the input space is 
reduced. 121 
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Figure 7-23 A general block diagram of a fuzzy logic system 
7.6.2  Fuzzy rule base 
By  using  the  linguistic  variables,  fuzzy  if-then-rules  are  formulated.  Two 
approaches  to  determining  rules  are  either  through  human  experts  or  extracts  from 
numeric data (Jantzen, 1998) and these rules are expressed as a collection of IF-THEN 
statements. Thus, for a given rule the following is required: select meaningful linguistic 
variables; quantify the linguistic variables, provide logical connections for the variables 
(e.g. “and”, “or”) and provide implications. In the ARC approach, a linguistic variable u  
is used to represent the numerical value x, where  x is an element of X . The linguistic 
variable is characterised by  ( ) Tuwhich denotes the set of names of linguistic values 
of x. Membership functions  ( ) x µ  come in various shapes such as triangular (trimf), 
trapezoidal (zmf) or Gaussian (gbellmf).  Membership functions take values between 0 
and 1 and define the fuzzy set. The linguistic variables and the membership functions 
used in the ARC approach are demonstrated in the next chapter. 
7.6.3  Inference engine 
This step is analogous to the way human beings use different types of inferential 
procedures  to  understand  things  or  to  make  decisions.  Thus,  the  inference  engine 
combines the measurements of input variables with relevant fuzzy IF-THEN rules to 
make inferences regarding the output variable. This implies that the engine maps from 
input fuzzy sets into output fuzzy sets, determining the degree to which the antecedent is 
satisfied for each rule. 122 
 
For the inference engine in the ARC approach, it is assumed that there are N rules 
for the fuzzy system expressed as: 
12 12 : IF   is   and   is   and....and   is   THEN   is  ,  1,2,...,
n ix x n x i Rx T x T x T y C i N = , 
where  ( )  1 , 2 , . . . . ,   a n d   i xi n y = are the input and output variables,   and 
i xi i TU C V are 
fuzzy sets characterised by the membership functions  ( ) ( )  and 
xi i TC xy µµ respectively. 
Each rule can be viewed as a fuzzy implication
123 , , ,.....,
in xx x x x i TT T T T C = ! , which is a 
fuzzy set in  12  X  , ,....,  X  n UV U U U V = given by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
12 12 ,* * . . . . . * *
ix x x i n RT T T n C xy x x x y µµ µ µ µ =
    (7.4)
 
where (*) is the T-norm (Zimmerman, 1996) with  [ ] 12 ,, . . . . n xx x xU = !  and yV . 
7.6.4   Defuzzifier 
The defuzzification represents the final component of a fuzzy system, where the 
output of the fuzzy sets for each rule is combined into a single fuzzy set to make a 
decision. Thus, the process of combining output fuzzy sets into a single set is called 
aggregation (Yager, 1992). The input of the defuzzifier is the aggregate output of the 
fuzzy set. The goal of defuzzification is to convert the fuzzy set and output a single a real 
number (i.e. crisp number). The defuzzification method used in the ARC approach is the 
centroid defuzzifier, which converts a single fuzzy set to a crisp output value. In this 
method, the defuzzifier determines the centre of gravity and uses the value as the output 
of the fuzzy logic system (Mendel, 1995). 
7.7  Justifying BlobPV in Summative E-assessment  
A justification for adopting BlobPVS in summative test environments is reflected 
in fairness which is a key principle in the design and administration of assessments. As 
defined by the Scottish Qualifications Authority in UK, fairness in an assessment refers 
to the true measurement of the candidate’s ability or achievement (SQA, 2007). Thus, an 
unfair assessment may result in an unfair outcome. An unfair disadvantage may occur 
when the student’s test is interrupted leading to a low performance. Thus, the high-stake 
nature  of  summative  e-assessments  requires  total  student  concentration  and  minimal 
external  interruption  for  the  duration  of  the  test.  Additionally,  traditional  assessment 
regulations from higher institutions are typically framed in such a way as to prescribe 123 
 
practices to maintain minimal interruption to the students test, e.g. the invigilators should 
avoid wearing noisy shoes in the examination room. Thus, it is expected that by adopting 
information  technology  (IT)  in  assessments,  the  risk  of  an  unfair  outcome  induced 
through interruption would be minimised. Hence, section 7 of the Qualifications and 
Curriculum  in  UK,  emphasises  that  “the  use  of  technology  should  not  inhibit  a 
candidate’s performance” (QCA, 2007). This implies that, for summative e-assessments, 
it is essential that the technologies employed do not become interruptive or distracting to 
the students test. 
Interestingly,  one  of  the  benefits  of  adopting  the  BlobPVS  is  that  presence 
verification would be achieved in a non-interruptive and non-distracting pattern. Recall 
in chapter six, one of the limitations peculiar to password and biometric solutions is the 
frequent re-authentication requests which gradually become interruptive and distracting 
to a student. However, the novelty of BlobPVS lies in the ability of the fuzzy risk class 
engine to initiate change-driven re-authentication requests; thus, reducing the amount of 
requests during a test session. The flexibility of BlobPVS is also reflected within the 
elevated-risk threat class, such that the verification system offers a ‘second chance’ to 
confirm the student’s presence without interruption. However, a student is interrupted 
when a high-risk threat class is assigned. A high-risk threat class implies that, the current 
activity statistics vary significantly with respect to the frontal statistics. Thus, the blob-
based technique will only attempt to interrupt a student when a significant change in 
statistics is observed (and that is a good reason!). 
7.8  Summary 
This chapter presents a novel blob-based verification (BlobPV) system which can 
be used for presence verification in a non-interruptive and non-distracting manner.  The 
BlobPV system employs the geometric statistics of the binary images to make inferences 
about an object’s presence in the video frame.  The system architecture of the BlobPV 
system is made up of four modules: the pre-processing and blob operation modules are 
usually the first steps in video processing applications. In the methods module, the pose 
estimation  and  activity  risk  classification  approaches  are  proposed.  The  risk 
classification module forms a part of the activity risk classification and it is made up of 
the blob classifier engine and the threat classification scheme. In the next chapter, the 
pose estimation and activity risk classification approaches would be experimented using 124 
 
video sequences that contain example activities. The aim of the experiments would be to 
(1) investigate the feasibility of using blob analysis for presence verification and (2) to 
decide on a suitable approach which can be adopted for the BlobPV system. 125 
 
Chapter 8.  BlobPV 
System Experiments 
and Results 
In chapter six, it was suggested that the exclusion of presence verification from 
the e-assessment user security model would attract impersonation threats; thus, a novel 
presence verification system was proposed. The system design of the proposed blob-
based  system  was  shown  in  chapter  seven  and  two  approaches  were  introduced  to 
evaluate the feasibility of the presence verification system.  This chapter outlines the 
experiments that were carried out to investigate the suitability of the pose estimation and 
activity risk classification approaches for the BlobPV system. For each approach, the 
methods and experimental results are described. Hence, in this chapter the feasibility and 
stability of the BlobPV system is evaluated and this satisfies the third research goal of 
this thesis. 
8.1  Experimental Design 
The aim of these experiments was to determine which of the two approaches 
discussed in chapter seven would be suitable for carrying out presence verification in a 
simple  and  accurate  way.  The  first  two  experiments  focus  on  the  pose  estimation 
approach, whilst the third and evaluation experiments were focused on the activity risk 
classification  approach.  The  three  experiments  and  evaluation  experiments  were 
implemented in Matlab/Simulink R2008b running on a 64-bit operating system with a 
2.40GHz processor speed and a 4GB memory. The following sections below describe the 
experimental setup. 126 
 
8.1.1  Activity examples 
Recall  in  chapter  seven,  a  list  of  possible  student  activities  was  introduced 
alongside  the  relevant  blob  statistics  proposed  for  the  BlobPV  system.  Thus,  to 
investigate the validity of the activities suggested in Table 7-1, informal interviews were 
conducted with students from the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the 
University  of  Southampton.  The  informal  interviews  were  also  aimed  at  eliciting 
possible acceptable and unacceptable student activities during an online test. Many of the 
interviewees  agreed  with  the  activities  in  Table  7-1  and  a  few  more  activities  were 
suggested to buttress the previous examples. It should be noted that, possible student 
activities  in  a  test  environment  would  vary  from  individual  to  individual;  thus,  it  is 
impossible to cover all the possible cases that may occur. However, the list of activities 
used in the experiments was compiled using excerpts from the interviews. 
8.1.2  Datasets 
To demonstrate the efficacy of the BlobPV system for e-assessment presence 
verification the proposed approaches for detecting and deducing correctly a student’s 
presence status have been evaluated on newly recorded video sequences which contain a 
variety of activities and scenarios. The choice of collecting fresh video sequences was as 
a result of unavailable public data which contained the activities and scenarios required 
for the experiments. The experiments were applied on a set of five video sequences 
involving  two  undergraduate  and  three  postgraduate  students  at  the  University  of 
Southampton. The datasets were filmed in an indoor environment with the five people 
(one person in each) simulating the activities in a natural test environment; thus, the 
students were not constrained to a fixed position.   
The videos were recorded at a real time frame rate (25 frames / second) for a 
video frame size of 640 X 480 pixels using a laptop integrated webcam. However, using 
an inexpensive webcam mounted on a PC would produce similar results. The videos 
were recorded in an AVI format and converted to a JPEG format in order to extract video 
frames that precisely illustrated the student’s activities.  For example, converting a 2mins 
and  30secs  video  sequence  produced  approximately  14,600  video  frames;  thus, 
extracting the required video frames for analysis was useful. In reality, a video sequence 
is a series of video frames and each frame can be considered as an image. Thus, when 127 
 
analysing a continuous video sequence, it is important to use discrete video frames to 
initially model the video. 
Additionally,  calculating  a  sample  size  for  the  experiments  did  not  require 
analytical methods, as it was determined that a widespread testing of many volunteers is 
unnecessary  since  the  experiments  is  aimed  at  testing  the  two  presence  verification 
approaches from a system’s perspective. Thus, the human-role in the experiments is to 
simulate specific activities and scenarios which would serve as an input for analysing the 
suitability of the approaches and the feasibility of implementing the BlobPV system. 
Hence, the sample size n=5, was chosen randomly where two of the video sequences 
were used as trial data and the remaining three videos for testing/evaluation. This implies 
that a sample size of n=4 or n=10 would produce similar results. More importantly, it 
should be noted that, the datasets were collected independent of variables such as hat 
size, skin colour, lighting, gender, age or race. This is quite useful since the research 
exploits the geometric properties of binary images (i.e. 0s or 1s); thus, these variables are 
considered extraneous for these experiments.  
8.2  Pose Estimation Approach 
The  pose  estimation  approach  has  been  evaluated  on  two  video  sequences 
represented as Object A and Object B. These datasets are used for trial purposes. 
8.2.1  Pose estimation from blob orientation: Experiment 1 
The first stage in an object tracking application is the detection of moving objects 
from the background via the background subtraction method. In this technique, moving 
objects are detected by taking the difference between the current image and the static 
background image in a pixel-by-pixel manner: 
( ) ( ) ,, tt Ix y Bx y T ! >           (8.1) 
An autothreshold operation was employed to convert the intensity image to a binary 
image and an 8-connected component analysis method is used to extract the blob from 
the binary image. Figure 8-1 shows the results of the background subtraction followed by 
the blob extraction. In addition, it is observed that the background subtraction and blob 
extraction processes was not affected by the conspicuous sharp edge reflected in the 128 
 
background image. The sharp edge was left intentional in order to observe the effect of 
an unclear background on the experiments 
       
 
 
         
Background image 
Video frame 
Background subtraction 
Blob extraction  
 
Figure 8-1 Object detection and Blob extraction 
Having detected moving objects using object segmentation algorithm, the next 
step is to extract and verify the relevant blob statistics over a sequence of frames. Recall 
in chapter six, the blob orientation measures the angle between the major axes of the 
ellipses and the x-axis. Thus, it is assumed that when an object is looking forward, an 
orientation of approximately 90
0 (1.57 radians) would be obtained. Thus, it is suggested 
that  an  object’s  frontal  pose  can  be  estimated  from  the  blob  orientation  value.  A 
diagrammatic illustration of an object’s frontal pose orientation value range is shown in 
Figure 8-2. Additionally, Figure 8-3 shows the same object tilting towards the left and 
right respectively. Hence, it was suggested that by relying on the orientation statistic 
values there exists a possibility to estimate the object’s direction. Therefore based on this 
suggestion, the first experiment was aimed at comparing an object’s frontal blob area 
statistics with its current pose area statistics to demonstrate whether an initially detected 129 
 
object  is  the  same  object  with  a  different  pose/direction  or  to  determine  whether  an 
external object is within the camera’s view. That is: 
012 AAA ==           (8.2) 
where  0 A is the blob area statistic value for frontal pose in Figure 8-2,  1 A  and  2 A  are the 
blob area statistic value for left and right tilt direction in Figure 8-3. The first experiment 
is  evaluated  on  the  video  sequence  which  contain  Object  A  only.  Thus,  Object  A’s 
current pose blob statistics which is pooled from seven different activities is compared 
relative to Object’s A initial frontal pose blob statistics. Table 8-1 shows Object A’s blob 
statistics from the following: the frontal, right hand on cheek, left hand on cheek, lean on 
right,  lean  on  left,  tilt  head,  look  right  and  look  left  activities.  Additionally,  the 
percentage changes in the area and perimeter blob statistics relative to the frontal area 
and perimeter statistics are also recorded.  
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Figure 8-2 Object frontal pose estimation from ellipse (blob) orientation 130 
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Figure 8-3 Orientation suggests object is tilting (a) left and (b) right 
Frame 
Activity  Area 
 
 
% change 
in area 
Perimeter 
 
% change 
in 
perimeter 
Orientation 
(rad/deg) 
Frontal pose  34486  0  778.9848  0.00  1.52  87.16 
Right hand on 
cheek  54992  59.46  1220.365  56.66  -1.23  -70.51 
left hand on 
cheek  41288  19.72  1231.578  58.10  1.12  64.16 
Lean on right  28228  -18.15  1694.823  117.57  -1.57  -89.7 
Lean on left  59275  71.88  1132.926  45.44  1.35  77.38 
Tilt head  10293  -70.15  411.7645  -47.14  -0.03  -1.52 
Look right  31982  -7.26  744.1148  -4.48  -0.34  -19.49 
Look left  48990  42.06  1182.749  51.83  0.24  13.83 
Table 8-1 Object A blob statistics 
The visual inspection of Table 8-1 and Figure 8-4 shows that the orientation 
statistics reflects the object’s position in the frame. For instance, it is noticed that the 131 
 
orientation statistics of “lean on right and look right” activities produce negative values 
i.e. -89.7deg & -19.49deg. Similarly, in the “tilt head” activity, it is observed that Object 
A  is almost  at  a  horizontal  position,  i.e.  -1.52deg  as  opposed  to  the  normal  vertical 
position expected. Thus, the above observation shows that it is feasible to estimate an 
object’s position from the blob orientation statistics. 
 
Frontal pose Object  A 
 
Lean on right Object A 
 
Look right Object A 
 
Tilt head Object A 
 
Right hand on cheek Object A 
 
Left hand on cheek Object A 
Figure 8-4 Object A frame activities 
From Table 8-1 a significant variation in the percentage changes of the area and 
perimeter statistics with respect to the frontal area and perimeter statistics is observed. 
This  suggests  that,  the  dissimilar  statistics  is  attributed  to  the  inconsistency  of  the 
detectable features on the object. Detectable features refer to the features that are capable 
of being detected as a result of the object’s pose. For example, it is noticed that the “right 
and left hand on cheek” activities (Figure 8-4), show a significant increase in the area 
and perimeter statistics. Thus, it is suggested that the increase in the area and perimeter 132 
 
statistics  is  as  a  result  of  the  additional  “right  and  left  hand”  placed  on  the  cheek. 
Additionally,  the  decrease  in  the  area  statistics  for  the  lean  on  right  and  tilt  head 
activities is be linked to a reduction of the noticeable features on the object (Figure 8-4). 
Furthermore, the dissimilar blob statistics can occur as a result of the distance (in metres) 
of the detectable features from the camera’s view; however, the distance of the features 
depends  on  the  distance  (metres)  of  the  object  from  the  camera.  For  example,  it  is 
observed that the there is a ~72% increase in area statistics on the “lean on left” activity, 
whilst the “lean on right” activity show a ~18% reduction in area statistics. Hence, the 
dissimilarity in the percentage changes suggests an inconsistency in the object’s distance 
to the camera; thus, affecting the distance of the detectable features. 
8.2.2  Stability of blob statistics: Experiment 2 
Table  8-1  above  shows  that  an  object’s  area,  perimeter  and  orientation  blob 
statistics is likely to change due to varying activities which can influence an object’s 
pose. Thus, the second experiment was designed to investigate the relative stability of 
the blob statistics across two different objects performing similar activities. Additionally, 
the percentage changes in the blob statistics relative to the frontal statistics for the two 
objects are compared to determine stability. This is illustrated in the equation below: 
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ % % B X B F A X A F P P P P        (8.3) 
where % is the percentage change,  ] [A F P  is the blob statistics for object A’s frontal pose 
and ] [A X P  is the blob statistics for object A’s current pose. Similarly,  ] [B F P  is the blob 
statistics for object B’s frontal pose and ] [B X P  is the blob statistics for Object B’s current 
pose. Thus, it is assumed that suppose the relationship in Equation 8.2 exists, then it 
would be feasible to estimate the poses of tracked objects using blob analysis. Hence, for 
a summative e-assessment the existence of Equation 8.2 would allow continuous real-
time tracking and pose detection of the student during the test. For this experiment, 
Object A and Object B video sequences are analysed and the percentage changes in blob 
statistics with respect to the frontal pose statistics is compared. Table 8-2 shows the blob 
statistics obtained for the two Objects and in Table 8-3, the percentage changes for the 
blob statistics are shown. 133 
 
 
Table 8-2 Object A and Object B blob statistics 
Frame Activity  Object  Area  Major axis  Minor axis  Extent  Perimeter  Diameter 
Frontal pose 
A  34486  253.37  189.37  0.74  778.99  43908.90 
B  48433  313.54  209.35  0.62  1863.25  61666.80 
Right hand on cheek 
A  54992  382.38  266.75  0.53  1220.36  70018.00 
B  35719  353.14  209.35  0.62  2361.93  45478.80 
left hand on cheek 
A  28228  336.26  169.98  0.53  1694.82  35941.00 
B  31156  251.83  170.29  0.78  771.563  39669.10 
Lean on right 
A  28228  336.26  169.98  0.53  1694.82  35941.00 
B  44837  300.66  210.30  0.77  915.26  57088.20 
Lean on left 
A  59275  320.82  253.86  0.79  1132.93  75471.30 
B  35113  251.94  202.63  0.74  975.49  44707.30 
Cover face 
A  39216  296.46  230.55  0.70  898.30  49931.40 
B  36523  294.65  246.84  0.55  2140.61  46502.5 
Touch head 
A  36106  241.70  220.95  0.75  1350.15  45971.60 
B  43485  265.12  249.55  0.51  1347.50  55366.80 
Look right 
A  31982  211.98  196.52  0.83  744.12  40720.70 
B  48467  266.45  245.30  0.76  958.68  61710.10 
Look left 
A  48990  299.86  229.92  0.70  1182.75  62376.00 
B  49977  274.77  248.63  0.74  1089.80  63632.70 
Head on table 
A  20082  226.35  133.02  0.50  769.65  25569.20 
B  97329  458.29  292.48  0.78  1812.15  123923.00 134 
 
Frame Activity  Object  % change 
in area 
% change 
in major 
axis 
% change 
in minor 
axis 
Extent 
% change 
in 
Perimeter 
% change 
in 
Diameter 
Frontal pose 
A  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.74  0.0  0.0 
B  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.62  0.0  0.0 
Right hand on cheek 
A  59.5  50.9  40.9  0.53  56.7  59.5 
B  -26.3  12.6  -17.2  0.62  26.8  -26.3 
left hand on cheek 
A  -18.1  44.1  39.8  0.53  58.1  19.7 
B  -35.7  -19.7  -32.6  0.78  -58.6  -35.7 
Lean on right 
A  -18.1  32.7  -10.2  0.53  117.6  -18.1 
B  -7.4  -4.1  -16.8  0.77  -50.9  -7.4 
Lean on left 
A  71.9  26.6  34.1  0.79  45.4  71.9 
B  -27.5  -19.6  -19.8  0.74  -47.6  -27.5 
Cover face 
A  13.7  17.0  21.7  0.70  15.3  13.7 
B  -24.6  -6.0  -2.4  0.55  14.9  -24.6 
Touch head 
A  4.7  -4.6  16.7  0.75  73.3  4.7 
B  -10.2  -15.4  -1.3  0.51  -27.7  -10.2 
Look right 
A  -7.3  -16.3  3.8  0.83  -4.5  -7.3 
B  0.1  -15.0  -3.0  0.76  -48.5  0.1 
Look left 
A  42.1  18.3  21.4  0.70  51.8  42.1 
B  3.2  -12.4  -1.6  0.74  -41.5  3.2 
Head on table 
A  -41.8  -10.7  -29.8  0.50  -1.2  -41.8 
B  101.0  46.2  15.7  0.78  -2.7  101.0 
Table 8-3 Percentage changes of Object A and Object B blob statistics 135 
 
The  visual  inspection  of  Table  8-3  reveals  a  trend  in  the  dissimilar  change 
statistics for Objects A and B performing similar activities. To illustrate this, Figure 8-5 
show the initial frontal poses of Objects A and B; the frontal poses represents a reference 
which is used to estimate the change in blob statistics. 
 
Reference Object A 
 
Reference Object B 
Figure 8-5 Reference poses: Object A and B 
Figure  8-6  show  the  “right  hand  on  cheek”  activity  for  Objects  A  and  B 
respectively. A visual inspection shows that ~59.5% increase in Object A’s blob area 
statistics values whilst the area statistics of Object B was reduced ~26.3% for the same 
activity. The increase in Object A’s blob area is explained by the change in the object’s 
position  from  the  initial  pose  (Figure  8-5)  relative  to  the  cameras  field  of  view.  In 
addition, the increase is also reflected by Object A’s hand to the image detected.  
 
Object A 
 
Object B 
 
Figure 8-6 Right hand on cheek: Object A and B 
In Figure 8-4b the “look left” activity shows ~42% increase in the blob area for 
Object A whilst a 3.2% increase is recorded for Object B. By comparing the reference 
images (Figure 8-5) with the activity look left images (Figure 8-7), it is suggested that 
the increase in blob area is as a result of the camera capturing a larger object size when 
an  object  looks  left  (or  right)  as  opposed  to  when  the  object  is  looking  straight.  136 
 
Additionally, it is required that the object’s position in reference to the cameras field of 
view is constant; otherwise, the inconsistency would produce an increase (or decrease) in 
blob area. 
 
Object A 
 
Object B 
Figure 8-7 Look left: Object A and B 
In a similar trend, the “head on table” activity shows a 41% reduction in blob 
area for Object A and a 101% increase for Object B (Figure 8-8). This is as a result of 
decrease (Object A) and increase (Object B) in the object’s size within the camera’s field 
of view. 
 
Object A 
 
Object B 
Figure 8-8 Head on table: Object A and B 
From the above experiment, it is seen that the change in the blob statistics does 
not reveal the exact activities which is performed in the video frame. However, it is 
observed that by comparing an object’s reference pose and current pose, the changes in 
the object’s position and size relative to the camera’s field of view can influence the 
similarity of the two poses. Hence, to adopt the pose estimation approach the object’s 
activities must be controlled, such that an object’s pose in a reference image and current 
image  is  similar.  It  should  be  noted  that,  this  requirement  is  impractical  for  a  test 137 
 
environment  as  the  student  will  be  required  to  ‘look  and  act’  in  a  predetermined  or 
constrained manner.   
Therefore, to eliminate the constraints on the student’s activity and allow for 
passive  student  monitoring,  the  deterministic  pose  estimation  approach  is  relaxed  to 
accommodate an activity risk classification. Additionally, from the initial experiments it 
is noticed that the blob statistics reveal significant information relating to an object’s 
position, size, shape and extent. Thus, this information can be exploited to classify the 
potential  risk  of  an  object’s  activity;  rather  than,  determining  the  object’s  actual 
pose/activity in a video frame. An experiment to determine the feasibility and suitability 
of the activity risk classification approach is reported later in the chapter. 
8.2.3  Summary of initial results 
One of the lessons learned from experiment 1 is the feasibility of detecting an 
objects frontal pose from the blob orientation. The orientation statistics is advantageous, 
as an object’s frontal pose statistic values is used as a reference point to estimate the 
changes in statistic values from other activities. However, the two limitations of adopting 
pose estimation approach are the inability to determine the sameness property of the 
object irrespective of varying activities and the instability of the blob statistics values 
across two or more objects performing a similar activity.  
In this context, the sameness attribute refers to the ability of a verification system 
to determine that the object detected in the first frame is the same object detected in the 
current frame. Establishing the sameness attribute using the pose estimation approach 
shows that the direct estimation of an object’s pose/activity from the video frame is non-
trivial. From the experiments, it is observed that this limitation occurs as a result of the 
inconsistencies in the blob statistic values, influenced by an object’s varying positions 
and sizes relative to the cameras field of view. Additionally, a second experiment was 
carried  out  to  investigate  the  stability  of  the  blob  statistics  across  different  objects 
performing similar activities. The results from this experiment also revealed dissimilar 
blob statistic values across the two objects as a result of varying positions and sizes of 
the objects to the cameras field of view. Hence, findings from the initial experiments 
reveal inconsistencies in an object’s blob statistics due to varying positions and size in 
the environment.  138 
 
8.3  Activity Risk Classification (ARC) Approach 
The ARC approach does not aim to detect an object’s exact activity from the 
video frames, e.g. “right hand on cheek” or a “tilt head”; rather, the approach uses a 
combination  of  blob  statistics  to  determine  the  likelihood  of  an  acceptable  or 
unacceptable activity in the environment. Thus, individual blob statistics (such as area, 
orientation, major axis, minor axis and extent) are collated and analysed to achieve a 
relationship between the object’s frontal pose statistics and the changes in the object’s 
current activity statistics. This means that the change in the blob statistics of the current 
activity is a function of the frontal pose of the same object and this is illustrated in 
equation 8.3: 
( ) ] [ ] [ A F A X P f P !
              (8.4) 
where, ! is the change in blob statistics for Object A’s current activity, ] [A X P  is the blob 
statistics for object A’s current activity and  ] [A F P  is the blob statistics for object A’s 
frontal pose. The blob statistics used in the ARC approach also represents the five input 
variables required for the fuzzy blob classifier engine described in section 7.6.  These 
variables are size (area), shape (major axis/minor axis), position (orientation), extent 
and count. 
8.3.1  Deriving Numeric Range Values via Heuristics 
The ARC fuzzy logic system was built with five input variables (size, shape, 
position,  extent  and  count)  and  one  output  variable.  Recall  the  proposed  threat 
classification  scheme  in  section  7.3.4,  i.e.  the  low-risk  threat  class,  the  elevated-risk 
threat class and the high-risk threat class. Thus, the output variable forms the conclusion 
about the potential threat risk of the object’s presence to the environment. This implies 
that,  for  a  given  video  frame  the  output  variable  will  represent  one  of  the  threat 
classification schemes. Firstly, it is important to derive the numeric values  xof the input 
variables X ,  where  the  valuex  is  an  element  of  the  variable X and  the  linguistic 
variables  ( ) Tuare defined for each input variable X .The numeric range values of the 
input variables ‘size’ and ‘shape’ are derived heuristically from the blob statistics of 139 
 
Object  A  and  B  performing  similar  acceptable  and  unacceptable  activities  in  the 
environment.  
Table 8-4 show the initial values of Object A and B’s blob size & shape and the 
percentage  changes  in  the  blob  size  &  shape.  Additionally,  Table  8-4  shows  the 
percentage changes when Object B’s blob statistics is analysed with respect to Object 
A’s frontal statistics and vice versa. Similarly, the swap is also applied to percentage 
change in the shape values. In the columns which represent the % change in size and % 
change in shape, it is observed that the percentage changes recorded for the frontal pose 
activities of Object A and B is ‘0.0’ and’0.0’ respectively. This shows that Object A and 
Object B’s blob size and shape produce no-change which can infer the sameness of the 
object. However, in the columns which represent the % change in size (swap) and % 
change in shape (swap) there is a significant change which reveals the swap in the frontal 
pose blob statistics.  
For  example,  given  Object  A’s  frontal  pose  statistics  as  a  reference;  the 
percentage change in blob size for the “face to camera” activity relative to the frontal 
pose statistics is calculated as: 
100
A object    of   pose   frontal   size
A object    camera    to face   size   - A  object    of   pose   frontal  
x
Size
      (8.5) 
The % change in size statistics derived as shown in Equation 8.5 is recorded. Similarly, 
the  percentage  change  in  size  (swap)  when  using  Object  B’s  ‘face  to  camera’  blob 
statistics with reference to Object’s A frontal pose statistics is shown in Equation 8.6 is 
recorded. 
100
A object    of   pose   frontal   size
B object    camera    to face   size   - A  object    of   pose   frontal  
x
Size
      (8.6) 140 
 
Frame Activity  Object  Size 
% 
change 
in size 
% 
change 
in size 
(swap) 
Shape 
% 
change 
in shape 
% 
change 
in shape 
(swap) 
Frontal pose 
A  34486  0.0  28.80  1.337963  0.00  10.66 
B  48433  0.0  -40.44  1.497683  0.00  -11.94 
External person behind Object 
A  31617  -8.32  34.72  1.180338  11.78  21.19 
B  37403  -22.77  -8.46  1.231152  17.80  7.98 
External person beside Object 
A  71456  107.2  -47.54  1.759964  -31.54  -17.51 
B  90805  87.49  -163.31  1.313292  12.31  1.84 
Face to camera 
A  70746  105.14  -46.07  1.693476  -26.57  -13.07 
B  66457  37.21  -92.71  1.464312  2.23  -9.44 
Cover face 
A  39216  13.72  19.03  1.285882  3.89  14.14 
B  36523  -24.59  -5.91  1.193688  20.30  10.78 
Touch head 
A  36106  4.69  25.45  1.093913  18.24  26.96 
B  43485  -10.22  -26.09  1.062392  29.06  20.60 
Look right 
A  31982  -7.26  33.97  1.078669  19.38  27.98 
B  48467  0.07  -40.54  1.086221  27.47  18.82 
Look left 
A  48990  42.06  -1.15  1.304193  2.52  12.92 
B  49977  3.18  -44.92  1.105136  26.21  17.40 
Head on table 
A  20082  -41.77  58.54  1.701624  -27.18  -13.62 
B  97329  100.96  -182.23  1.566911  -4.62  -17.11 
Table 8-4 Percentage changes for size and shape input variables141 
 
A visual inspection of Table 8-4 shows that the percentage changes computed 
from the blob statistics follow a simple trend and can be categorised.  In the column, 
which represents Object A and B’s % change in size, 9 out of the 18 statistics show 
changes within 0 - 30% whilst the remaining 9 values lie within the range 31 – 60%. 
Similarly, in the % change in shape column, 17 out of 18 statistics reflect changes within 
the range of 0 - 30%. However, the % change in size (swap) column depict that, 5 
statistics fall within the range 0 - 30%, whilst the remaining 13 statistics show changes > 
30%. The % change in shape (swap) column shows 2 statistics within the range of 0 - 
10%, whilst the remaining 16 statistics show changes >10%.  
Thus, it can be concluded that the changes in blob size which fall within 0 - 30% 
show a high possibility that the object detected is the original object, hence a low-risk 
threat class. However, changes within the range 31 – 65% suggest that the original object 
is engaged in suspicious activities, hence an elevated-risk class. Additionally, changes in 
blob size which are >66% suggest a likelihood of a change in the original object, hence a 
high-risk threat class. Similarly, the changes in the object’s shape which lie within the 
range 0 - 10% suggest a low-risk, 11% – 30% suggest an elevated-risk and the 31% - 
100%  suggest  a  high-risk  threat  class.  Therefore,  the  numeric  values  xof  the  input 
variables X is categorised and shown in Table 8-5. For this thesis, the linguistic variables 
( ) Tudefined  for  the  input  variables  take  on  three  terms  {low,  elevated,  high}.  The 
linguistic variables represent the derived range of numeric values. 
 
  Input variables 
Linguistic variables  Size   Shape  
 
Low 
 
0 – 30% 
 
0 – 10% 
 
Elevated 
 
31% – 65% 
 
11% – 30% 
 
High 
 
>66% 
 
31% - 100% 
Table 8-5 Size and shape numeric values 142 
 
Frame Activity  Object  % change in 
size 
% change in 
shape  Position  Extent 
Frontal pose 
A  0.0  !"!!# 1.5212282  0.74 
B  0.0  !"!!# -1.485541  0.62 
External person behind Object 
A  -8.32  $$"%&# -1.550529  0.74 
B  -22.77  $%"&!# -1.473013  0.61 
External person beside Object 
A  107.2  '($")*# 0.0520501  0.72 
B  87.49  $+"($# 0.4425047  0.61 
Face to camera 
A  105.14  '+,")%# -1.180514  0.40 
B  37.21  +"+(# -1.239024  0.46 
Cover face 
A  13.72  ("&-# -1.564642  0.70 
B  -24.59  +!"(!# 1.2458946  0.55 
Touch head 
A  4.69  $&"+*# -0.273931  0.75 
B  -10.22  +-"!,# -0.107549  0.51 
Look right 
A  -7.26  $-"(&# -0.340247  0.83 
B  0.07  +%"*%# 0.2474963  0.76 
Look left 
A  42.06  +")+# 0.2414605  0.70 
B  3.18  +,"+$# -0.310793  0.74 
Head on table 
A  -41.77  '+%"$&# -1.087535  0.50 
B  100.96  '*",+# -0.033249  0.78 
Table 8-6 Position and extent input variables143 
 
Similarly, from Table 8-6 the range of values for the input variables position and 
extent is defined. It should be noted that, the position and extent variables are capable of 
explicitly  detecting  potential  object  poses;  thus,  it  is  impractical  to  consider  their 
percentage  changes  as  implemented  for  the  size  and  shape  variables.  Hence,  for  the 
position variable, an orientation statistics of the range 1.22 – 1.57 radians suggest that 
the object is ‘looking straight’ or at a perpendicular angle to the camera’s field of view, 
e.g. an object’s “frontal pose” activity. In a test environment, it is expected that the 
object would constantly assume a posture that is perpendicular to the camera’s field of 
view when taking a test. Therefore, values that lie within the perpendicular angle range 
are acceptable. Additionally, when an object’s pose is tilted (e.g. 45
0) relative to the 
camera’s field of view, this indicates that the range is within 0.87 – 1.20 radians. In 
reality, an object could have a tilted pose as a result of a ‘look right or left’ activity; 
however, the system is unable to determine the possibility  of a suspicious act or not. The 
range of values 0 – 0.86 radians suggests that the object is parallel to the camera’s field 
of view. In examination conditions, activities that lead to such poses suggest that an 
object is engaged in a dishonest act. For example, the “head on table” activity recorded 
in  Table  8-6.  The  statistic  values  for  the  position  input  variables  are  converted  to 
absolute values when used in the ARC fuzzy system.  
From Table 8-6, it is observed that activities which are closer to the camera’s 
field of view produce small extent values. For example in the “face to camera” activity, 
an extent value of ~0.46 is recorded for both objects. Hence, the closer an object is to the 
camera, the smaller the cameras field of view measured by the extent (i.e. percentage of 
occupancy). Therefore, the extent input variable is defined to have two possible states, 
i.e. camera occlusion and acceptable states. 
The count variable records the number of objects detected in a video frame. In a 
test environment, only one object is expected to take a test within a cameras field of 
view; thus, no-object or multi-object detection in the scene is unacceptable. Table 8-7 
shows the numeric values for the position, extent and count variables. 
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  Input variables 
Linguistic variables  Position  Extent  Count 
 
Low 
 
1.57 -1.22 
 
0.57 – 1 
 
1 
 
Elevated 
 
1.20 – 0.87 
 
- 
 
- 
 
High 
 
0.86 – 0 
 
0 – 0.56  
 
0, >1 
Table 8-7 Position, extent and count numeric values 
Recall that the output variable forms the conclusion about the potential threat risk 
of  the  object’s  presence  to  the  environment  and  it  is  represented  by  the  threat 
classification scheme. Thus, the five input variables shown above will be mapped to one 
conclusion  for  every  video  frame  analysed;  hence,  the  proposed  multi-input  single-
output fuzzy system (see section 7.6). Table 8-8 shows the range on which the output 
variable is defined for the three threat classification terms {low-risk, elevated-risk, high-
risk}. 
Threat Class  Output  variable 
 
Low-risk 
 
0 – 0.3 
 
Elevated-risk 
 
0.31 – 0.6 
 
High-risk 
 
0.61 – 1.0 
Table 8-8 Output variable numeric values 
Finally, the numeric values of the input and output variables influence the design 
of the membership functions used in the fuzzy logic system (FLS). Recall in chapter 
seven,  the  FLS  is  useful  for  the  analysing  the  incoming  real-time  video  frame  and 
classifying the risk posed by the activity detected in the frame. This task is accomplished 
using the object’s blob statistics as discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter. 
8.4  Membership Functions 
In chapter seven, the membership function of a fuzzy logic system (FLS) was 
introduced. In the ARC approach the membership functions (MF) is defined to provide 
flexibility for the linguistic range of the input variables. This means that the MF take up 
the values between [0, 1] and they indicate the degree to which a linguistic value belongs 145 
 
to an input variable set. As earlier discussed the five input variables used in the ARC 
approach are: the changes in the object’s blob size and shape statistics with respect to the 
object’s frontal pose statistics, the position (given as orientation), extent and count. In 
section 7.4 the blob classifier operation consists of the fuzzy frontal class engine to 
check for an object’s ‘frontalness’ property.  Thus, in order to proceed in a test, an 
object’s  frontal  pose  must  be  correctly  established  and  the  relevant  blob  statistics 
extracted. The extracted statistics is fed into the ARC fuzzy risk class engine for activity 
risk classification. Figure 8-9 defines the input and output spaces used to determine the 
correctness or non-correctness of an object’s initial frontal pose test. 
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Figure 8-9 Frontal pose membership function 
Figure 8-9 shows that, an object’s accurate frontal pose is established when an object’s 
orientation  statistics  lies  between  1.2  to  2.5  radians  (equivalent  to  70
0  to  90
0). 
Consequently, the output space is defined on the range 0.5 to 1. 
8.4.1  Size Membership Function 
Figure 8-10 defines the input and output spaces for the changes in size. This is 
influenced by the percentage changes in an object’s blob area statistics with respect to 146 
 
the object’s frontal pose statistics. As shown in Table 8-5, the size membership function 
was divided into three groups and defined on the range [0 – 0.3]: low change in size, [0.3 
– 0.65]: elevated change in size and [>0.65] is high change in size. 
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Figure 8-10 Size membership function 
8.4.2  Shape Membership Function 
Figure 8-11 defines the input and output spaces for the changes in shape. This is 
influenced by the percentage changes in the ratio of major and minor axis statistics with 
respect to the object’s frontal pose statistics. The shape membership function is defined 
on the range [0 – 0.1]: low change in shape ratio, [0.11 – 0.3]: elevated change in shape 
ratio and [>0.3] is high change in shape ratio 
8.4.3  Position Membership Function 
Figure 8-12 defines the input and output spaces for the position variable. This is 
influenced by an object’s blob orientation statistics with respect to the object’s frontal 
pose statistics. The position membership function is defined on the range [1.57 – 1.22]: 
low change in position, [1.20 – 0.87]: elevated change in position and [0.86 - 0.0] is high 
change in position. 147 
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Figure 8-11 Shape membership function 
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8.4.4   Extent Membership Function 
Figure  8-13  defines  the  input  and  output  spaces  for  an  object’s  blob  extent 
statistics  with  respect  to  the  object’s  frontal  pose  statistics.  The  extent  membership 
function is defined on the range [0.57 – 1.0]: low extent value and [0.0 – 0.56]: high 
extent value. 
8.4.5  Count Membership Function 
The count is executed as a simple if-then-rule which reflects the changes in the 
number of blobs detected.  The count membership function is defined as low when count 
depicts a single presence value [1] and high when count depicts no-presence [0] and 
multi-presence values [>1]. 
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Figure 8-13 Extent membership function 
 
8.4.6  Fuzzy Rule Base 
The fuzzy if-then-rules are formed using the linguistic variables described above. 
In Table 8-9 the fuzzy rule-base which drives the ARC fuzzy rule engine is shown.  
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Fuzzy rules of Presence Verification 
IF (Size is lowsize) AND (Shape is lowshape) AND (Position is lowpos) THEN (risk 
is low) 
IF (Size is elevatedsize) AND (Shape is elevatedshape) THEN (risk is elevated) 
IF (Size is highsize) AND (Shape is highshape) THEN (risk is high) 
IF (Size is lowsize) AND (Shape is lowshape) AND (Position is highpos) THEN (risk 
is low) 
IF (Size is elevatedsize) AND (Extent is occlusion) THEN (risk is elevated) 
IF (Size is elevatedsize) AND (Shape is lowshape) AND (Position is highpos) THEN 
(risk is elevated) 
IF (Size is elevatedsize) THEN (risk is elevated) 
IF (Size is lowsize) AND (Shape is elevatedshape) THEN (risk is low) 
IF (Size is elevatedsize) AND (Extent is occlusion) THEN (risk is elevated) 
IF (Count is multi-presence) THEN (risk is high) 
IF (Count is no-presence) THEN (risk is high) 
Table 8-9 ARC Fuzzy rules 
8.5  ARC Approach: Experiment 3 
The third experiment was designed to investigate the feasibility of adopting the 
activity risk classification (ARC) approach in the BlobPV system. Table 8-10 shows the 
input  variables  and  the  corresponding  output  result  for  each  activity  performed  by 
Object’s A and B.  As mentioned, the blob statistics values fed into the fuzzy engine are 
converted  to  absolute  values  for  simplicity. 150 
 
Frame Activity  Object 
Size 
(change in 
area) 
Shape 
(change in 
major/mino
r axes) 
Position  Extent  Count 
 
Fuzzy 
Results 
 
Threat  
Class 
Frontal pose 
 
A  0.00  0.00  1.52  0.74  1  0.16  Low 
B  0.00  0.00  1.49  0.62  1  0.16  Low 
External person behind 
Object 
A  1.07  0.32  0.05  0.72  1  0.64  High 
B  0.87  0.06  0.44  0.61  1  0.64  High 
External person beside 
Object 
A  0.08  0.12  1.55  0.74  2  0.72  High 
B  0.23  0.01  1.47  0.61  3  0.53  High 
Face to camera 
A  1.05  0.27  1.18  0.40  1  0.64  High 
B  0.37  0.18  1.24  0.46  1  0.72  High 
Cover face 
A  0.14  0.04  1.56  0.70  1  0.16  Low 
B  0.25  0.04  1.25  0.55  1  0.17  Low 
Touch head 
A  0.05  0.18  0.27  0.75  1  0.16  Low 
B  0.10  0.14  0.11  0.51  1  0.17  Low 
Look right 
A  0.07  0.19  0.34  0.83  1  0.16  Low 
B  0.00  0.12  0.25  0.76  1  0.19  Low 
Look left 
A  0.42  0.03  0.24  0.70  1  0.44  Elevated 
B  0.03  0.11  0.31  0.74  1  0.20  Low 
Head on table 
A  0.42  0.27  1.09  0.50  1  0.44  Elevated 
B  1.01  0.26  0.03  0.78  1  0.64  High 
Table 8-10 ARC approach: Object’s A and B blob statistics151 
 
 
From Table 8-10, it is observed that the “frontal pose”, “cover face”, “touch 
head” and “look right” activities across Objects A and B are classified as a low-risk. 
Additionally,  across  the  two  objects  the  “external  person  behind  object”,  “external 
person beside object” and “face to camera” activities are classified as a high-risk. An 
illustration of Table 8-10 is presented below. Figure 8-14 shows that Object’s A and B 
frontal pose satisfies the ‘frontalness’ requirement; hence, the frontal poses are validated 
and the relevant statistics recorded.  
 
Frontal pose A 
 
Frontal pose B 
Figure 8-14 Frontal pose: Object A and B 
In Figure 8-15, the presence of an external person behind Object B reveals an 
increase in size. The change in size occurs as a result of the two blobs merging into one 
single blob. Additionally, the second frame in Figure 8-15 shows that an external person 
beside an original object can be detected via the blob count. Recall that, only one object 
is expected to be within a cameras field of view. Hence, the significant changes to Object 
B’s presence justify the high-risk output class. In a test environment, these results show 
that the ARC approach is able to detect changes in an object’s size through a blob merge 
or multi-blob count; thus, enhancing its suitability for the BlobPVS.  
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External person behind Object B 
 
External person beside Object B 
Figure 8-15 External person behind/beside Object B 
Figure 8-16 shows the ‘face to camera’ activity for Objects A and B. From these 
frames, it is observed that the objects are positioned closer to the cameras field of view; 
thus, occupying a large percentage of the cameras lens. Thus, due to the ‘close-up’ pose 
low extent statistics values are produced. Recall that, the extent value defined on the 
range [0 – 0.56] suggests that the cameras field of view is obstructed.  
 
Object A face to camera 
 
Object B face to camera 
Figure 8-16 Face to camera: Object A and B 
Figure  8-17shows  the  “cover  face”  activities  for  Objects  A  and  B.  A  visual 
inspection of Table 8-10 reveals that the “cover face” activity was classed as a low-risk 
due to the low changes in the size and shape values of the Objects with respect to their 
frontal (or reference) poses. The low change values recorded for this activity is as a 
result of the addition of the object’s hand on the face, which is still along the position of 
the initial (reference) face pose with respect to the cameras field of view. Thus, a feature 
added to the cameras field of view would be classed as a low-risk provided the addition 
occurs along the position of the object’s frontal pose. 153 
 
 
Object A cover face 
 
Object B cover face 
Figure 8-17 Cover face: Object A and B 
Figure 8-18 shows the ‘look left’ activity for Objects A and B. From Table 8-10 
it is observed that Object A is classed as an elevated-risk whilst for the same activity 
Object  B  is  classed  as  a  low-risk.  In  addition,  Object  A  has  ~42%  increase  in  size 
compared  to  ~3%  increase  for  Object  B.  Thus,  as  defined  in  the  size  membership 
function, a change in an object’s size that falls within the range [ 31% and  65%] 
should be classed as an elevated-risk. In reality, an increase in size for a “look left” 
activity could suggest the likelihood of suspicious activities in a test environment. A 
similar trend is also observed from the “head on table” activity shown in Figure 8-19. In 
this case, Object A has an elevated-risk output, whilst Object B’s presence is classed as a 
high-risk. A visual inspection of the table shows a 101% increase in size for Object B 
and a 42% increase in size for Object A; thus, justifying the output classification. 
 
Object A look left 
 
Object B look left 
Figure 8-18 Look left: Object A and B 154 
 
 
Object A head on table 
 
Object B head on table 
Figure 8-19 Head on table: Object A and B 
8.5.1  Classification Accuracy 
Table 8-11 shows a classification accuracy table obtained from the fuzzy threat 
class results. For this thesis, a classification accuracy table indicates the extent to which 
the fuzzy engine is able to correctly classify the risk of an activity which reflects an 
object’s presence in the environment. In Table 8-11, the ARC fuzzy engine has classified 
correctly 14 activities from the total number of 18 analysed activities; thus, giving a 
classification accuracy of 78%. The remaining 4 activities were expected to be classed as 
elevated-risk;  however,  they  are  misclassified  as  a  low-risk  or  high  risk.  Thus,  the 
misclassification rate is 22%. The classification accuracy is evaluated by the formula:  
100
activities   analysed   of number    total
activities   classified correctly    of number 
x CA =       (8.7) 155 
 
 
Frame Activity   
Object 
Expected threat 
class  
ARC Fuzzy 
threat class  
Frontal pose 
 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
External person behind 
Object 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
External person beside 
Object 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
Face to camera 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
Cover face 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
Touch head 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
Look right 
A  Elevated-risk  Low-risk 
B  Elevated-risk  Low-risk 
Look left 
A  Elevated-risk  Elevated-risk 
B  Elevated-risk  Low-risk 
Head on table 
A  High-risk  Elevated 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
Table 8-11 Classification accuracy table 
8.5.2  Threat Class Reclassification  
Recall in section 7.3.4, that an elevated-risk threat class will attempt to re-classify 
an elevated-risk activity using the perimeter and diameter statistics. Thus, to improve the 
classification  accuracy  rate  and  promote  the  non-interruptive  abilities  of  the  ARC 
approach, it is important to re-classify the elevated-risk activities. The re-classification 
process is accomplished using simple if-then-rule statements that exploit an object’s blob 
perimeter and diameter statistics. Thus, an activity with a change in the diameter (or 
perimeter) statistics [  0.5] would be re-classified as a high-risk, i.e. from elevated-risk 
to high-risk. Conversely a change in diameter (or perimeter) statistics [  0.5] would be 
re-classed to a low-risk, i.e. from elevated-risk to low-risk. Equation 8-7 shows the range 
of values required for the re-classification process: 
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5 . 0 5 . 0
5 . 0 5 . 0
! =
! =
x perimeter
x diameter
            (8.7) 
where, xis the diameter (or perimeter) statistics value.  
Additionally, the re-classification process logically assigns a re-class risk based 
on the logic table shown in Table 8-12. This is useful as is it ensures that a low-risk class 
is assigned only when the two statistics are less than or equal to [0.5]. It is important to 
note  that,  the  perimeter  and  diameter  statistics  of  the  same  object  would  not  vary 
significantly from the perimeter and diameter statistics of the initial frontal pose. This 
implies that, these statistics can vary through an object’s different activities; however, 
the change in values should remain within the range defined in equation 8-7. Table 8-13 
shows  the  re-classification  results  for  the  activities  that  were  initially  assigned  an 
elevated-risk. From the table, it is observed that the “look left” activity for Object A is 
now re-classed as a low-risk; this, is due to the low change (<50%) for both the diameter 
and perimeter statistics. However, the “head on table” activity for Object B is re-classed 
to a high-risk due to the significant change (>50%) in the diameter statistics. 
Perimeter  Diameter  Threat Re-classification 
 0.5   0.5  Low-risk 
 0.5   0.5  High-risk 
 0.5   0.5  High-risk 
 0.5   0.5  High-risk 
Table 8-12 Re-classification logic tables 
Frame 
Activity  Object  Size  Shape  Perimeter  Diameter  Fuzzy 
Results 
Initial 
threat  
Class 
Threat  
Re-class 
Look 
left 
A  0.42  0.03  0.42  0.32  0.44  Elevated  Low 
B  0.03  0.11  0.12  0.42  0.20  Low  - 
Head on 
table 
A  0.42  0.27  0.27  1.01  0.44  Elevated  High 
B  1.01  0.26  0.42  0.32  0.64  High  - 
Table 8-13 Threat re-classification for Object A and B 
As  a  result  of  the  re-classification  results,  it  is  important  to  obtain  a  revised 
classification accuracy matrix. Recall that in Table 8-11 the misclassification rate was 
22% as a result of the 4 wrongly classed activities, where 2 of the activities were classed 
as an elevated-risk. Thus, a re-classification of these 2 activities resulted in a low-risk 
and high-risk class respectively. The “head on table” activity was re-classed to high-risk; 157 
 
thus, increasing the classification accuracy rate to 83%. The “look left” was also re-
classed  to  a  low-risk  threat  class.  It  should  be  noted  that  a  low-risk  threat  class  is 
desirable as the object presents no risk to the test environment. Hence, based on the re-
classification process, the elevated-risk classes in the expected threat class can be revised 
to  a  low-risk  class.  This  implies  that  the  ARC  fuzzy  threat  class  now  matches  the 
expected threat class; thus, a classification accuracy of 100% is achievable as shown in 
Table 8-14 
Frame Activity   
Object 
Expected threat 
class  
ARC Fuzzy 
threat class  
Frontal pose 
 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
External person behind 
Object 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
External person beside 
Object 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
Face to camera 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
Cover face 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
Touch head 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
Look right 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
Look left 
A  Low-risk  Low-risk 
B  Low-risk  Low-risk 
Head on table 
A  High-risk  High-risk 
B  High-risk  High-risk 
Table 8-14 Revised classification accuracy matrix 
8.6  Test Case Scenarios: Evaluating the ARC Approach 
In  order  to  evaluate  the  accuracy  and  stability  of  the  ARC  approach,  the 
remaining  three  datasets  were  evaluated  and  represented  as  Object  C,  Object  D  and 
Object  E  respectively..  Recall,  that  the  datasets  collected  simulate  a  natural  test 
environment; thus, the students are not constrained to a fixed position. To design the 
three case scenarios, the activity examples employed in the trial data were grouped under 
three general headings. These groupings were useful as it made clearer the classification 158 
 
accuracy  of  the  ARC  approach  through  the  different  activities.  For  the  evaluation 
process, the scenarios contain additional example activities shown in Table 8-15. As 
mentioned earlier, the list of possible student activities is quite enormous; however, the 
example activities shown reflect user security activities.  
Test case One: Impersonation Scenarios 
This scenario includes activities that can lead to impersonation threats. In this case, an 
external presence different from the original authenticated student is detected in the test 
environment.  
Test case Two: Occlusion Scenarios 
This scenario includes activities that can lead to obstructing the camera’s field of view. A 
motivation for occluding the camera could be to disrupt the presence verification process 
or an attempt to engage in cheating habits during the test.  
Test case Three: Miscellaneous Scenarios 
This scenario includes a variety of student activities (acceptable and unacceptable) which 
can occur during a test. These activities are characterised by varying body movements 
that may change a student’s original pose, which can lead to a suspicious pose 
8.6.1  Impersonation scenarios 
In this experiment it is expected that the fuzzy results will detect activities that can lead 
to  impersonation  activities  in  Objects  C,  D  and  E.  The  rate  of  change  in  the  blob 
statistics  with  respect  to  the  objects  frontal  pose  is  shown  in  Table  8-16,  whilst  the 
original blob statistics can be found in Appendix A. 
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Case scenarios  Description  Activity examples 
Test case one: Impersonation 
scenarios 
Activities that attempt to provide 
assistance towards a student’s test or an 
attempt to substitute an original student 
during the test  
External person move towards student 
External person behind student 
External person beside student 
External person close to student 
External person substitutes student 
Test case two: Occlusion 
scenarios 
Activities that attempt to obstruct the 
camera’s lens during the test.  
Face close to camera 
Hand blocking camera 
Head blocking camera 
Test case three: Miscellaneous 
scenarios 
A variety of acceptable and unacceptable 
student activities during a test 
Head distant from camera 
Lean on table 
Head on table 
Look left/right  
Look up 
Hand on forehead 
Table 8-15 Test case scenarios and Activity examples 160 
 
Frame Activity  Object 
Size 
( change in 
area) 
Shape 
(change in 
major/minor 
axes) 
Position  Extent  Count  Fuzzy 
Results 
Threat  
Class 
Frontal pose 
C  0.000  0.000  1.387  0.505  1  0.163  Low 
D  0.000  0.000  1.539  0.773  1  0.163  Low 
E  0.000  0.000  1.500  0.488  1  0.163  Low 
External person 
move towards 
student 
C  1.046  0.187  0.772  0.502  1  0.643  High 
D  0.780  0.175  1.356  0.606  1  0.643  High 
E  1.416  0.159  0.113  0.403  1  0.643  High 
External person 
behind student 
C  1.488  0.151  0.355  0.475  1  0.643  High 
D  0.795  0.155  0.455  0.538  1  0.643  High 
E  1.444  0.152  0.119  0.407  1  0.643  High 
External person 
beside student 
C  3.159  0.170  0.856  0.456  1  0.643  High 
D  0.819  0.983  0.338  0.268  2  0.643  High 
E  0.474  0.207  0.948  0.470  2  0.642  High 
External person 
close to student 
C  0.151  0.049  1.302  0.446  2  0.519  High 
D  0.217  0.064  1.163  0.632  2  0.781  High 
E  0.617  0.315  1.568  0.484  2  0.669  High 
External person 
substitutes 
student 
C  0.108  0.166  1.518  0.770  1  0.162  Low 
D  0.084  0.264  1.439  0.456  1  0.159  Low 
E  0.719  0.068  1.391  0.660  1  0.640  High 
Table 8-16 Test case one: Impersonation scenarios for Object C, D, E161 
 
Figure  8-20  shows  that  Object  C’s  frontal  position  elicited  from  the  blob 
orientation is within the acceptable range and the relevant blob statistics are extracted for 
the  verification  process.  However,  during  the  test  an  external  person  appears  in  the 
background and moves towards Object C. It is observed that, due to a merge between the 
two objects, there is an increase in Object C’s blob size and a considerable change in the 
blob shape. The significant increase in size and the change in the objects shape produce a 
suspicious effect which implies that a dishonest activity may be occurring. Thus, these 
changes in size and shape trigger the fuzzy engine and Object C is assigned a high-risk 
threat class. Hence, as the external person gradually moves behind and beside Object C, 
an increase in blob size and change is shape is consistently recorded.  
At the point where the external person moves close to Object C, the two blobs 
unmerge and are separated. This is interesting, because Object C reverts to its original 
blob size and the presence of the external person is undetected. However, at this stage the 
count statistics detects the second presence in the environment and triggers the fuzzy 
engine to produce a high-risk threat class. Additionally from the last frame in Figure 8-
11a, it is observed that the external person has eventually substituted the original student; 
thus, providing a clear impersonation attack. Based on the swap, it is expected that the 
change  in  blob  statistics  would  yield  a  high-risk  threat  class  from  the  fuzzy  engine. 
However, from Table 8-16 the “external person substitutes Object C” activity is assigned 
a low-risk. 
 A visual inspection of this activity reveals that Object C’s initial blob size was 
further reduced by ~11%; thus, the external blob size falls within the low-risk range 
defined for the size membership function. Additionally, the external person’s position 
statistic values are also within the acceptable range defined, i.e. 1.52radians. Therefore, 
based on this blob statistics it is unlikely that the swap between Object C and the external 
person would be detected. However, it should be noted that the external person and 
Object  C  does  not  necessarily  possess  similar  blob  statistics;  rather,  the  near-similar 
statistic scenario occurred as a result of the external person’s distance (in metres) to the 
cameras field of view. Hence, the proximity or remoteness of an individual would affect 
the blob statistics extracted and fed to the fuzzy engine.  
From another perspective, it can be argued that there exists a low chance for the 
external person to substitute Object C. A visual inspection of the frames below show 162 
 
that, it is unlikely that a swap from Object C’s frontal pose to a different frontal pose 
would pass undetected; this is because the merging and separation activities would have 
occurred or even a background with zero objects detected would have been spotted as an 
anomaly. Hence, a high-risk threat class is inevitable for impersonation scenarios. 
 
Frontal pose Object  C 
 
External person move towards Object C 
 
External person behind Object C 
 
External person beside Object C 
 
External person close to Object C 
 
External person substitutes Object C 
Figure 8-20 Object C impersonation scenarios 
Figure 8-21 show Object D’s impersonation scenarios, where an external person 
moving  towards  and  behind  Object  D  results  in  a  high-risk  threat  class  due  to  the 
increase in blob size and change in shape. Similarly an external person beside and close 
to  the  object  is  flagged  by  the  count  statistics  revealing  the  two  objects  in  the 
background. Additionally, a low-risk threat class is assigned for the “external person 
substitute Object D” activity as opposed to the expected high-risk threat class. A visual 
observation from Table 8-16 reveals ~8% reduction from Object D’s original blob size; 163 
 
thus, justifying the external person’s distance (in metres) from the camera’s field of 
view. 
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External person beside Object D 
 
External person close to Object D 
 
External person substitutes Object D 
Figure 8-21 Object D impersonation scenarios 
Figure 8-22 shows Object E’s impersonation scenarios, where an external person 
detected in the environment produces a high-risk threat class. However, in this scenario 
the  “external  person  substitutes  Object  E”  activity  produces  a  high-risk  threat  class 
instead of the low-risk threat class reported in Object C and D. From Table 8-16, it is 
noticed that a ~71% increase in Object E’s blob size was recorded. The statistics value 
falls within the high-risk range defined for the size membership function. The significant 
increase in Object E’s blob size can occur as a result of the external person’s proximity 
to the camera or as a result of additional detectable features (see external person’s hair). 
In a real test environment, the impersonators proximity or remoteness to the cameras 164 
 
field of view may be uncontrolled; however, additional detectable features can expose 
potential student swaps. 
 
Frontal pose Object  E 
 
External person move towards Object E 
 
External person behind Object E 
 
External person beside Object E 
 
External person close to Object E 
 
External person substitutes Object E 
Figure 8-22 Object E impersonation scenarios 
On  a  final  note,  the  Object  C,  D  and  E  impersonation  scenarios  have 
demonstrated the feasibility of verifying presence by spotting the changes in an object’s 
size, shape , position, extent and count statistics values with respect to the objects frontal 
pose statistics. In the impersonation scenarios, a high-risk threat class is the expected 
output for all the frame activities. Thus, when an object is assigned a high-risk class, the 
next step is the re-authentication process using one of the existing strong authentication 
methods,  e.g.  biometrics.  The  re-authentication  process  is  not  considered  for  this 
experiment.  165 
 
8.6.2  Occlusion Scenarios 
In this experiment it is expected that the fuzzy results will detect activities that 
can obstruct the cameras field of view in Objects C, D and E. The rate of change in blob 
statistics with respect to an object’s frontal pose is shown in Table 8-17, whilst the 
original blob statistics can be found in Appendix A. 
Frame 
Activity  Object 
Size 
(change 
in area) 
Shape 
(change in 
major/minor 
axes) 
Position  Extent  Count 
 
Fuzzy 
Results 
 
 
Threat  
Class 
Frontal pose 
C  0.000  0.000  1.387  0.505  1  0.163  Low 
D  0.000  0.000  1.539  0.773  1  0.163  Low 
E  0.000  0.000  1.500  0.488  1  0.163  Low 
Face close to 
camera 
C  1.019  0.118  1.244  0.419  1  0.643  High 
D  1.195  0.095  0.770  0.493  1  0.643  High 
E  0.478  0.137  0.008  0.157  2  0.642  High 
Hand 
blocking 
camera 
C  0.204  2.723  0.331  0.292  2  0.787  High 
D  0.777  0.115  0.741  0.741  3  0.643  High 
E  0.924  0.271  0.158  0.463  1  0.643  High 
Head 
blocking 
camera 
C  1.199  0.282  0.727  0.770  2  0.643  High 
D  3.451  0.011  1.018  0.464  1  0.643  High 
E  0.304  0.286  0.083  0.392  2  0.643  High 
Table 8-17 Test case two: Occlusion scenarios for Object C, D, E 
Figure  8-23  show  three  activities  which  occlude  the  cameras  lens  and  can 
eventually  disrupt  the  presence  verification  process.  In  the  “face  close  to  camera” 
activity, Object C’s face occupies a large percentage of the cameras lens; thus, increasing 
the blob size by ~101%. Additionally, the extent statistics value is decreased to 0.42 
falling  within  the  occlusion  range  defined  in  the  extent  membership  function.  This 
activity attracts a high-risk threat class, alongside the “hand and head blocking camera” 
activities. However, an interesting part of the fuzzy engine is that all the statistic values 
are considered for the decision making. From Table 8-17, it is observed that the count 
statistics is also included in the decision process as it can detect multiple features on an 
object. In addition, the shape and position statistics for the three activities fall within the 
elevated-risk  or  high-risk  range  of  their  respective  membership  functions.  A  visual 
inspection of the “hand and head blocking camera” activity frames show distinct changes 166 
 
in the shape and position of Object C from the initial frontal pose. Thus, the combination 
of this statistics infers a suspicious action that justifies a high-risk threat class.  
 
Frontal pose Object  C 
 
Face close to camera Object C 
 
Hand blocking camera Object C 
 
Head blocking camera Object C 
Figure 8-23 Object C occlusion scenarios 
Figure 8-24 show the occlusion scenarios for Object D, where the combination of 
the  size,  shape,  position,  extent  and  count  statistics  drives  the  fuzzy  class  engine  to 
produce a high-risk threat class. 
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Hand blocking camera Object D 
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Figure 8-24 Object D occlusion scenarios 
Figure 8-25 show the occlusion scenarios for Object E, where the combination of 
the  size,  shape,  position,  extent  and  count  statistics  drives  the  fuzzy  class  engine  to 
produce a high-risk threat class. 
 
Frontal pose Object  E 
 
Face close to camera Object E 
 
Hand blocking camera Object E 
 
Head blocking camera Object E 
Figure 8-25 Object E occlusion scenarios 
In summary, the Object C, D and E occlusion scenarios have demonstrated the 
feasibility of detecting a disruption to the presence verification process when the cameras 
lens is obstructed. This task was accomplished by taking into consideration an object’s 
size, shape, position, extent and count statistics values to produce a decision. In the 
occlusion  scenarios,  a  high-risk  threat  class  is  the  expected  output  for  all  the  frame 
activities; thus, leading to a re-authentication process. 
8.6.3  Miscellaneous Scenarios 
In  this  experiment  it  is  expected  that  the  fuzzy  results  of  the  miscellaneous 
scenarios will correctly detect acceptable and unacceptable activities. The results are 
expected to be stable across the Objects C, D and E. The rate of change in blob statistics 
are shown in Table 8-18, whilst the original blob statistics can be found in Appendix A. 
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Frame Activity  Object 
Size 
(change 
in area) 
Shape 
(change 
in 
major/mi
nor axes) 
Position  Extent  Count 
 
Fuzzy 
Results 
 
Threat  
Class 
Frontal pose 
C  0.000  0.000  1.387  0.505  1  0.163  Low 
D  0.000  0.000  1.539  0.773  1  0.163  Low 
E  0.000  0.000  1.500  0.488  1  0.163  Low 
Head distant from camera 
C  0.491  0.069  1.553  0.595  1  0.449  Elevated 
D  0.871  0.054  0.009  0.767  0  0.643  High 
E  0.869  0.227  0.077  0.423  0  0.643  High 
Head on table 
C  1.111  0.560  0.010  0.679  1  0.643  High 
D  0.629  0.150  0.009  0.781  1  0.450  Elevated 
E  1.115  0.130  0.172  0.550  1  0.643  High 
Look left/right 
C  0.398  0.019  1.475  0.508  1  0.428  Elevated 
D  0.812  0.174  0.587  0.460  1  0.643  High 
E  0.618  0.289  0.662  0.361  1  0.450  Elevated 
Look up 
C  0.365  0.016  1.282  0.324  1  0.370  Elevated 
D  0.203  0.220  1.133  0.745  1  0.161  Low 
E  0.690  0.169  0.037  0.477  0  0.719  High 
Hand on forehead 
C  1.376  0.118  0.922  0.541  1  0.643  High 
D  0.781  0.082  0.113  0.499  1  0.643  High 
E  0.787  1.855  1.217  0.244  1  0.643  High 
Table 8-18 Test case three: Miscellaneous scenarios for Object C, D, E169 
 
The first frame in Figure 8-26 shows Object C’s “head distant from camera” 
activity which reports a 49% change in size from the original size recorded. In this 
activity, the shape, position and extent values are within the acceptable range; however, 
the significant reduction in size triggers the high-risk threat class. In a practical test 
environment, this type of activity is unacceptable as the student is not concentrating on 
the test task and moving away from the camera may imply a suspicious action, such as 
receiving external assistance or attempt to exit the environment. This activity is expected 
to produce an elevated-risk threat class as the fuzzy engine is unsure of Object C’s next 
action.  
Much more than a significant increase in size, the “head on table” activity distorts 
the shape and position of the object. From Figure 8-26 and Table 8-18, it is observed that 
Object C’s position (orientation) has changed from a perpendicular direction to a parallel 
or straight line. This change in position also affects the shape of the object, as the length 
of the major axis lies horizontal to the x-axis. A combination of these statistics reflects a 
significant change from the initial frontal pose statistics extracted; thus, a high-risk threat 
class is assigned. In the “look left/right” activity the blob size records ~49% increase 
whilst the “look up” activity records ~37% decrease in size. The increase in size occurs 
as a result of the change in the object’s shape due to the object tilting to the left direction. 
Thus, the length of the major axis elongated in the left direction changes the shape of the 
object and increases the blob size. Conversely, the decrease in size is as a result of the 
object tilting in an upward direction. In this case, there would be a change in shape; 
however,  there  will  be  no  increase  in  size  due  to  the  objects  direction.  Hence,  an 
elevated-risk threat class is assigned, as the shape predominantly drives the fuzzy engine 
for the two activities.  
The “hand on forehead” activity produces a significant increase in the object’s 
size (~137%), a significant change in object’s position and a decrease in the extent value. 
The increase in size and decrease in the extent value occurs as a result of the additional 
detectable feature (i.e. hand) encapsulated on the objects forehead. Thus, a combination 
of this statistics produces a high-risk threat class. 170 
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Figure 8-26 Object C miscellaneous scenarios 
From  Table  8-18,  it  is  observed  that  Object  D’s  “head  distant  from  camera” 
activity produces a high-risk threat class. From Figure 8-27, it is seen that there exist a 
considerable distance between Object D and the camera. This implies that the object is 
no longer in the cameras field of view and no object is detected during the verification 
process.  The  assigned  high-risk  threat  class  is  driven  by  the  count  statistics  as  no 
presence is detected in the background. In a real world environment, the object may have 
disappeared from the test environment or performing a dishonest activity. Object D’s 
“head on table” activity is affected by an increase in size, change in shape and position as 
discussed for Object C. there is a similarity in the blob statistics recorded; however, an 
elevated-risk  threat  class  is  assigned.    The  “look  left/right”  activity  for  Object  D 
produces a high-risk threat class due a ~81% increase in blob size and a change in shape. 171 
 
 It is observed from Figure 8-27, that the addition of Object D’s shoulder as a 
result of tilting deep into the right direction produced an increase in size. However, the 
tilt in a upward direction resulted in a low-risk threat class. This implies that Object D 
has not incurred significant changes in the “look up” activity. A visual inspection of 
Figure 8-27, shows that the objects size and shape is similar to the geometry in the 
frontal pose frame. This trend is also reflected in the blob statistics in Table 8-18. The 
“hand on forehead” activity results in a high-risk threat class due to an increase in size 
and decrease in extent values as described for Object C. 
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Figure 8-27 Object D miscellaneous scenarios 
From Figure 8-28, it is observed that no presence is detected in Object E’s “head 
distant from camera” and “look up” activities; thus, a high-risk threat class is assigned. 
The “head on table” and “hand on forehead” activities produce a high-risk threat class 172 
 
due to an increase in size, change in shape and position. In the “look left/right” activity, a 
~61% change in size falls within the elevated-risk range in the size membership function; 
hence, an elevated-risk threat class is assigned. 
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Figure 8-28 Object E miscellaneous scenarios 
In summary, the Object C, D and E miscellaneous scenarios have demonstrated 
the feasibility of detecting acceptable and unacceptable activities in a test environment. 
This  task  was  accomplished  by  taking  into  consideration  an  object’s  size,  shape, 
position, extent and count statistics values to produce a variety of low-risk, elevated-risk 
and high-risk decisions. 
8.7  Success Rate 
To evaluate the classification accuracy of the test case scenarios (Table 8-19), the 
formula introduced in Equation 8-6 is adopted: 173 
 
100
activities   analysed   of number    total
activities   classified correctly    of number 
x CA =  
Frontal pose: Object C, D and E frontal poses was correctly classed for each test case 
scenario. 
100%      100
3
3
= = x CA  
Impersonation scenarios: the expected threat class for all the activities in this test case 
scenario is the high-risk class. However, the ARC fuzzy engine classified correctly 13 
activities  giving  a  classification  accuracy  of  87%.  The  remaining  2  activities  were 
classed  as  a  low-risk  threat  instead  of  the  expected  high-risk  threat;  thus,  a13% 
misclassification rate was recorded. Interestingly, the 13% misclassification rate can be 
argued  against,  because  the  ARC  approach  is  designed  to  spot  the  variations  in  an 
objects  proximity  or  remoteness  to  a  cameras  field  of  view.  Consequently,  these 
variations can affect the objects size. Thus, the threat class decisions are assigned based 
on  the  statistics  detected  from  the  object.  However,  it  should  be  noted  that  a 
classification accuracy of 100% is achievable when an object’s distance to the camera is 
controlled.  
87%      100
15
13
= = x CA  
Occlusion  scenarios:  the  expected  threat  class  for  all  the  activities  in  this  test  case 
scenario is the high-risk class. In the experiments, 9 activities were analysed and the 
ARC fuzzy engine classified correctly all the 9 activities; thus, achieving a classification 
accuracy of 100%. 
100%      100
9
9
= = x CA  
Miscellaneous scenarios: the expected threat class in this scenario varies from low-risk 
to  high-risk  depending  on  the  different  activities.  The  ARC  fuzzy  engine  classified 
correctly 6 activities giving a classification accuracy of 40%. 5 out of the 9 misclassified 
activities were assigned an elevated-risk threat class. The elevated-risk threat class is 
useful as it presents an opportunity to improve the success rate of the overall system. 
Thus, assuming the 5 elevated-risk threat activities are re-classed to match the expected 
threat  class;  then  the  current  classification  accuracy  rate  would  increase  by  33%. 174 
 
However, the remaining 4 high-risk threat activities, i.e. “look up” activity for Object E 
and “hand on forehead” for the three objects represent the 26% misclassification rate.   
40%      100
15
6
= = x CA  
Overall classification accuracy: in the ARC evaluation process a total of 42 frames 
depicting three test scenarios and three objects were analysed. The ARC fuzzy engine 
classified  correctly  31  activities  giving  an  overall  classification  accuracy  of  74%. 
However, this figure is expected to change after the re-classification process. Currently 
the overall misclassification rate is 26%. 
74%      100
42
31
= = x CA  
Object C, D and E: in 14 activities analysed for each object, the ARC fuzzy engine 
classified correctly 9, 10 and 11 activities giving a classification accuracy of 64%, 71% 
and 79% respectively. 175 
 
 
  ARC Fuzzy threat class   
  Frame 
Activity 
Expected 
threat class  Object C  Object D  Object E  Classification 
accuracy  
Test case 
scenarios  Frontal pose  Low-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  100% 
Impersonation 
scenarios 
External 
person move 
towards 
student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
87% 
External 
person 
behind 
student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
External 
person 
beside 
student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
External 
person close 
to student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
External 
person 
substitutes 
student 
High-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  High-risk 
Occlusion 
scenarios 
Face close to 
camera  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
100% 
Hand 
blocking 
camera 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
Head 
blocking 
camera 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
Miscellaneous 
scenarios 
Head distant 
from camera  High-risk  Elevated-
risk  High-risk  High-risk 
40% 
Head on 
table  High-risk  High-risk  Elevated-
risk  High-risk 
Look 
left/right  High-risk  Elevated-
risk  High-risk  Elevated-
risk 
Look up  Low-risk  Elevated-
risk  Low-risk  High-risk 
Hand on 
forehead  Low-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
  64%  71%  79%   
 
Table 8-19 Success rate for test case scenarios 176 
 
 
8.7.1  Risk and Success Rate Reclassification 
 For  the  risk  reclassification  process,  the  perimeter  and  diameter  logic  tables 
introduced in Table 8-12 was adopted. 
Perimeter  Diameter  Threat Re-classification 
 0.5   0.5  Low-risk 
 0.5   0.5  High-risk 
 0.5   0.5  High-risk 
 0.5   0.5  High-risk 
 
Table 8-20 shows the re-classification results for the activities that were initially 
assigned an elevated-risk threat class. From the table, it is observed that the “head distant 
from camera” activity for Object C is re-classed as a high-risk due to the significant 
change in the perimeter statistics values.  
Frame 
Activity  Object  Size  Shape  Perimeter  Diameter  Fuzzy 
Results 
Initial 
threat  
Class 
Threat  
Re-
class 
Head 
distant 
from 
camera 
C  0.49  0.07  0.83  0.37  0.45  Elevated  High 
D  0.87  0.05  1.0  1.0  0.64  High  - 
E  0.87  0.23  1.0  1.0  0.64  High  - 
Head on 
table 
C  1.11  0.56  0.55  1.11  0.64  High  - 
D  0.63  0.15  0.29  0.63  0.45  Elevated  High 
E  1.11  0.13  1.50  1.28  0.64  High  - 
Look 
left/right 
 
C  0.40  0.02  0.50  0.40  0.43  Elevated  Low 
D  0.81  0.17  1.08  0.75  0.64  High  - 
E  0.62  0.29  0.39  0.58  0.45  Elevated  High 
Look up 
C  0.37  0.02  0.39  0.49  0.37  Elevated  Low 
D  0.20  0.22  0.12  0.20  0.16  Low  - 
E  0.69  0.17  1.0  1.0  0.72  High  - 
Table 8-20 Risk reclassifications for test scenarios 
In a real test environment, the re-class from elevated-risk to high-risk is practical 
as the presence verification system is unsure of the student’s presence due to the distance 
(in metres) from the camera. Thus, initiating a re-authentication process at this stage is 
non-interruptive. Additionally, the “head on table” activity for Object D and the “look 
left/right”  activity  for  Object  E  were  re-classed  to  a  high-risk  threat  class.  A  visual 
inspection of the activity frames in Figure 8-27 and Figure 8-28 reflects the re-class 177 
 
decisions alongside the significant changes in the diameter statistics. In Table 8-20, it is 
observed that the “look left/right” and “look up” activities for Object C are re-classed as 
a low-risk. However, the newly assigned threat class for the “look left/right” does not 
match the expected high-risk threat class. It is noticed from the table that, the change in 
perimeter statistics is exactly 50%, which is a ‘near-miss’ to being re-classed as a high-
risk.  
Hence,  whilst  a  low-risk  threat  class  is  good  news  for  the  student,  the 
mismatched threat class accounts for the 1 misclassified activity out of the 5 reclassified 
activities. Thus, there is a 7% increase in the misclassification rate of the miscellaneous 
scenarios.  Nevertheless,  the  4  correctly  reclassified  activities  from  the  miscellaneous 
scenarios improve the classification accuracy from 40% to 67%. Hence, based on the re-
classification  process  the  overall  classification  accuracy  (i.e.  the  extent  to  which  the 
fuzzy classifier engine is able to correctly classify the risk of an activity) is improved to 
83%. Table 8-21 and Table 8-22 show the success rate results after the reclassification 
process. 
  Classification 
accuracy rate 
(%) 
Misclassification 
accuracy rate 
(%) 
Reclassification 
accuracy rate 
(%) 
Misclassification 
accuracy rate 
(%) 
Frontal pose  100  -  -  - 
Impersonation 
scenarios  87  13  -  - 
Occlusion 
scenarios  100  -  -  - 
Miscellaneous 
scenarios  40  26  67  7 
Overall 
system 
accuracy 
74  26  83  16 
Table 8-21 Classification, misclassification and reclassification rates 178 
 
 
  ARC Fuzzy threat class   
  Frame 
Activity 
Expected 
threat class  Object C  Object D  Object E  Classification 
accuracy  
Test case 
scenarios 
Frontal pose  Low-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  100% 
Impersonation 
scenarios 
External 
person move 
towards 
student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
87% 
External 
person 
behind 
student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
External 
person 
beside 
student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
External 
person close 
to student 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
External 
person 
substitutes 
student 
High-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  High-risk 
Occlusion 
scenarios  
Face close to 
camera 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
100% 
Hand 
blocking 
camera 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
Head 
blocking 
camera 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
Miscellaneous 
scenarios 
Head distant 
from camera 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
67% 
Head on 
table 
High-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
Look 
left/right 
High-risk  Low-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
Look up  Low-risk  Low-risk  Low-risk  High-risk 
Hand on 
forehead 
Low-risk  High-risk  High-risk  High-risk 
  79%  86%  86%   
Table 8-22 Success rate after reclassification process 
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8.8  Discussion 
Recall that the aim of the three experiments carried out in this chapter was to 
investigate  the  suitability  of  the  pose  estimation  and  the  activity  risk  classification 
approaches for the Blob PV system. This section discusses the experimental results and 
the usefulness the approaches towards achieving presence verification. 
8.8.1  Experiment 1  
In  the  pose  estimation  approach,  the  idea  is  to  map  each  activity  to  a  blob 
statistics to determine a student’s presence status. Thus, one of the lessons learnt in 
experiment 1, is the use of blob orientation statistics to estimate a student’s frontal pose, 
i.e.  to  determine  when  a  student  is  looking  straight  (directly)  at  the  camera.  This 
information was useful in establishing a student’s reference pose; thus, all other poses 
occurring from the different activities can be calculated relative to the frontal/reference 
pose. However, findings from experiment 1 also showed that mapping each activity to a 
blob statistic proved problematic for non-frontal activities. This implies that relating an 
increase or decrease in blob area statistics to a “lean on left” activity or “right hand on 
cheek” activity is unreliable as a result of inconsistent measurements. The blob statistics 
values  yielded  dissimilar  values  across  the  different  activities,  making  it  difficult  to 
determine the sameness of the student. For instance, an increase in blob area for a “look 
left” activity could yield a decrease in blob area for a “look right” activity of the same 
object.  Thus,  the  findings  in  experiment  1  indicate  uncertainty  when  using  the  pose 
estimation approach to determine that the same student at the start of the test is still the 
same student detected, due to the inconsistency in blob statistics 
8.8.2  Experiment 2 
One of the findings in experiment 1 was the usefulness of the blob orientation 
statistics  in  determining  a  student’s  frontal  pose.  This  information  was  adopted  in 
experiment 2 and it also informed the goal of this experiment. Still based on using the 
pose estimation approach (i.e. mapping an activity to a blob statistics), it was suggested 
that, the difficulty in determining the sameness of a student would be minimised by 
establishing a trend in the blob statistics values of similar activities across two students. 
This implies that, an increase in blob area for Student A’s “hand on cheek” activity 
should yield an increase in blob area for Student B’s “hand on cheek” activity. However, 180 
 
the findings from experiment 2 indicate dissimilarity in the blob statistics for the two 
objects performing similar activities. In reality, this requirement would be impractical, as 
it would require that the students respond to activities in a similar fashion. Nevertheless, 
one of the useful lessons in experiment 2 was the changes to a student’s pose as a result 
of the changes to the student’s position and size relative to the cameras field of view. 
This also revealed significant information relation to a blob’s extent statistics. 
8.8.3  Experiment 3 
From experiments 1 and 2, it was observed that irrespective of the problems 
associated with the pose estimation approach, some valuable lessons which were adopted 
in the activity risk classification (ARC) approach were revealed, i.e. the usefulness of the 
blob’s  orientation  and  extent  statistics.  Thus,  in  experiment  3  the  ARC  approach 
considered changes to the student’s size (area statistics) and shape (major axis/minor axis 
statistics) with respect to the cameras field of view. In addition, the changes in the size 
and  shape  were  combined  with  the  position  (orientation  statistics),  extent  and  count 
statistics. The values from the individual variables were fed into a fuzzy logic controller 
to  make  a  decision  on  the  detected  student’s  presence.  The  fuzzy  logic  controller 
operates using a known logic-rule base that was informed from the statistics obtained in 
experiment 1 and 2. Thus, findings from the experiment indicate a significant change in 
size, shape, position, extent and count variables to suggest the likelihood of a student 
performing acceptable or unacceptable activities.  
For example, when a student performs a “look up” activity, it is expected that the 
student’s sameness attributes would be established provided that there is no significant 
change to the student’s size, shape, count and extent statistics values.  However, changes 
would be detected in the position statistics values as a result of the student’s upward 
direction. Hence, by combining the statistics, the fuzzy controller makes a decision to 
determine the risk of the student’s presence to the test environment. In the example 
given, a low-risk class is expected. The low-risk class is assigned provided that the other 
statistics values fall within the acceptable range, then the change in position only would 
be  insufficient  to  determine  the  likelihood  of  an  unacceptable  activity.  In  reality,  a 
student facing an upward direction is most likely the same student staring at the ceiling. 
As used in the pose estimation approach (experiments 1 and 2), the ARC approach was 
also tested using the trial datasets, Object’s A and B. In this experiment, the findings 181 
 
indicate stability and consistency in the blob statistics across the two different students 
performing similar activities. Additionally, an initial percentage of correctly detected and 
classified  activities  were  given  at  an  accuracy  rate  of  78%;  however,  a  100% 
classification accuracy rate is achievable after the reclassification process. This can be 
accomplished when the elevated-risk activities in the expected threat class is revised to a 
low-risk. 
8.8.4  Evaluation  
The evaluation experiments of the ARC approach was carried out on the datasets 
representing  Object’s  C,  D  and  E.  the  goal  of  these  experiment  was  to  evaluate  the 
stability and the classification accuracy of the ARC approach across three different blob 
statistics  extracted  from  three  students  that  have  not  been  involved  in  the  trial 
experiments. Thus, three test case scenarios containing 13 activities were introduced to 
be simulated by the three students. The findings from the test scenarios show stability in 
blob  statistics  across  the  students.  The  classification  accuracy  of  the  frontal  pose 
activities and the occlusion scenarios was 100%; this indicates that the presence of the 
detected  students  was  correctly  classified.  In  the  impersonation  scenario,  the 
classification accuracy rate remained at 87% since there were no elevated-risk classes for 
reclassification. However, in this the scenario majority of the cheat/dishonest cases were 
correctly classified. The miscellaneous scenario was a combination of acceptable and 
unacceptable activities. 40% of the activities were correctly classified and majority of the 
classifications were an elevated-risk.  Thus, a reclassification of the risks improved the 
accuracy rate to 67%. Finally, the overall accuracy rate for the evaluation experiments 
was set at 83% for correctly (re)classifying 35 out of 42 activities. It should be noted that 
issues relating to camera calibration, variable video frame rates, processing power and 
performance measurements of the ARC approach are relevant but not considered for this 
research; however, these issues will be discussed in the next chapter. 
8.9  Summary  
This chapter presented three experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of using a 
binary image to detect and verify presence in a test environment. From the experiments, 
the  ARC  approach  emerged  as  a  suitable  method  for  the  BlobPV  system  during 
summative e-assessments. Finally, in this chapter an evaluation of the ARC approach 182 
 
was presented and the results were found stable across different objects. The evaluation 
experiments have confirmed the potential of blob-based presence verification solutions. 
The results confirm the capability of the BlobPV system to detect, verify and classify the 
risks  observed  from  the  student’s  presence  in  the  test  environment.    The  results 
demonstrate the feasibility of automatically controlling the decisions made about the 
student’s presence from a set of well-defined logic rules. The next chapter describes the 
main  contributions  of  this  research  and  suggests  the  future  outlook  of  presence 
verification in potential research areas such as un-supervised summative e-assessment, 
games assessment and non-assessment environments.   
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Chapter 9.  Conclusion 
and Future work  
This thesis capitalises on the importance of an extended user security model for 
summative  e-assessments;  thus,  the  concept  of  presence  verification  using  a  blob-
analysis solution was proposed.  This chapter presents the conclusions which reflect the 
research questions and objectives introduced in chapter one. Additionally, this chapter 
summarises the main contributions and a future outlook depicting the role of presence 
verification in security environments.  
9.1  Conclusion 
In an e-learning environment, the approach to learning and assessment is largely 
influenced by the existing learning theories which govern the educational process. To a 
behaviourist, assessment means a re-take of tests until the learning content is mastered, 
whilst cognitivists’ view assessment as a process to enhance the prior knowledge of a 
learning resource. In a constructivists mind, the assessment process is a two-way process 
which involves interaction between the lecturer and the student. Thus, from an education 
perspective,  the  constructivist’s  school  of  thought  promotes  the  modern  methods  of 
learning and assessing i.e. online learning and assessment.  Influenced by information 
technology, the assessment process has gradually metamorphosed from the traditional 
pen and paper, classroom confined experience to an electronic environment that is not 
limited with walls. The e-assessment process embodies great benefits such as delivery of 
online  tests,  automatic  marking,  immediate  feedback  and  opportunities  for  lifelong 
learning. Additionally, an online assessment can be designed to monitor the student’s 
progress (formative), identify the student’s strengths and weaknesses (diagnostic) or to 
report  on  the  student’s  achievements  at  the  end  of  a  course  (summative).  The 
aforementioned assessments are designed to improve the student’s learning; however, the 
high-stake nature of the summative e-assessments makes these tests a target for user 
security challenges. It is the responsibility of the user security process of a summative e-184 
 
assessment to ensure that only the correct student takes the summative test. Hence, the 
existing user security model solicit answers to the “who are you” (show your identity) 
and “is it really you” (confirm your identity) challenge questions. Commonly employed 
responses include the combination of a username and password or a username and a 
biometric  (e.g.  fingerprint).  Thus,  the  Identity-Authentication  user  security  model  is 
simple, easy-to-use and it ensures that only the correct students can gain access to the 
assessment. However, the Identity-Authentication user security model is susceptible to 
security challenges which threaten the reliability and validity of the summative tests. One 
example  of  a  pertinent  user  security  challenge  which  poses  a  risk  to  the  academic 
community is an impersonation threat.  
Therefore, the first research goal of this thesis was focused on determining the 
reasons for the susceptibility of summative e-assessments to impersonation threats. To 
provide  answers  to  the  research  question,  the  generic  description  associated  with 
impersonation  challenges  was  further  classified  into  Type  A,  Type  B  and  Type  C 
impersonation threats. The type A or ‘connived impersonation’ threat can occur when an 
invigilator willingly colludes with fraudulent students to perpetrate an impersonation. 
The Type B impersonation threats can occur as a result the strength or weakness of the 
authentication method adopted; whilst, the Type C impersonation threat occurs, when an 
external  person  substitutes  a  correctly  authenticated  student  during  the  test  session. 
Hence, the results from the literature exploration suggested that the vulnerability of the 
Identity-Authentication (I-A) user security model is linked to a weakness in the model 
itself; thus, making the model fallible to the Type A, B and C impersonation threats. As 
proposed in this thesis, one way to improve the user security process is to combine the 
verification  of  the  student’s  presence  with  the  existing  student’s  identity  and 
authentication  processes.  Thus,  it  is  responsibility  of  the  Presence-Identity-
Authentication  (P-I-A)  user  security  model  to  ensure  that  the  correctly  authenticated 
student at the beginning of a test is the same student that completes the test whist taking 
the test void of external assistance. This implies that, the model continuously solicits 
answers to the “are you the expected person there all the time” challenge question.  
Recall from the first paragraph that, the username represents a response for the 
student’s  identity,  whilst  a  biometric  represents  a  suitable  response  for  the  student’s 
authentication. Thus, the second research goal was focused on providing a method to 
represent a response for verifying the student’s presence throughout the test session. In 185 
 
chapter  six,  potential  approaches  such  as  face-to-face  monitoring,  continuous  user 
authentication and continuous user monitoring were reviewed; however, these solutions 
are  unsuitable  for  achieving  presence  verification  during  summative  tests.  The 
disadvantages of these solutions include connived impersonation threat, high-processing 
power, interruptive and distracting abilities. Hence, to provide answers to the second 
research  question,  an  object  tracking  approach  using  a  blob  analysis  solution  was 
proposed. The blob analysis solution is a video processing technique that attempts to 
verify the student’s presence throughout the test session.  
By  employing  the  blob  analysis  operation,  a  blob-based  presence  verification 
(BlobPV) system was designed to verify the student’s presence in a non-interruptive and 
non-distracting  fashion.  From  the  BlobPV  system  architecture,  two  strategies  were 
proposed  as  suitable  approaches  to  detect  and  verify  presence  using  the  geometric 
statistics from binary images. Hence, to provide answers to the third research question, 
the feasibility and stability of the pose estimation and activity risk classification (ARC) 
approaches were evaluated.  Results from the experiments, show the ARC approach as a 
suitable method for the BlobPV system as the approach was found stable across different 
objects. Additionally, the ARC evaluation results confirm the capability of the BlobPV 
system  to  detect,  verify  and  classify  the  risks  observed  from  the  student’s  presence. 
Finally, the verification of a student’s presence in a test environment presents valuable 
improvements  to  preserving  the  user  security  of  summative  e-assessments.  From  an 
education perspective, verifying a student’s presence promotes the fairness, reliability 
and validity principles of online summative assessments. 
9.2  Summary of Contributions 
This  thesis  has  presented  a  novel  approach  to  improve  the  user  security  of 
summative e-assessments. In the process this thesis has made a number of contributions 
as noted below: 
9.2.1  A goal-oriented user security model 
The Presence-Identity-Authentication (P-I-A) user security model was developed 
has a result of the fallibility of the existing Identity-Authentication (I-A) user security 
model to user security challenges. One of the main security challenges in the I-A model 
is the exclusion of presence verification which can lead to the increase of impersonation 186 
 
threats. Thus, the P-I-A model is an improved summative e-assessment user security 
model which emphasises the need to satisfy the presence security goal beyond the initial 
login/authentication  procedure.  In  summative  e-assessments,  it  is  required  that  the 
correctly authenticated student at the start of a test remains the same student for the 
duration of the test; hence, the importance of verifying the student’s presence throughout 
the test session. Additionally, verifying a student’s presence preserves the security of the 
online summative test environment and promotes the reliability and validity of the e-
assessment.  
9.2.2  A presence verification system 
The  existing  user  security  model  employs  suitable  methods  to  achieve  the 
identity  and  authentication  processes,  e.g.  username/password  or  username/biometric 
fingerprint.  Thus,  having  established  the  need  to  verify  a  student’s  presence,  it  is 
essential to employ a suitable method to achieve the verification process.  The blob-
based presence verification (BlobPV) system is a novel solution which adopts a video 
blob analysis operation to detect and classify the changes to a student’s presence status in 
the test environment. The BlobPV system operates using a low processing power and the 
system  does  not  require  a  high  computational  effort,  which  is  synonymous  with 
performing a constant biometric authentication. From a security perspective, the system 
has an advantage of deterring students from engaging in fraudulent activities, such as 
cheating or Type C impersonation threats. This security advantage occurs as a result of 
the quick detection of the significant changes in a student’s pose which simultaneously 
reflects the student’s activity in the test environment.  
9.2.3  A blob classifier engine 
In an assessment process it is essential that the use of technology does not inhibit 
a student’s performance (QCA, 2007). Thus, employing technologies that can lead to 
frequent re-authentication requests may become interruptive and distracting to a student. 
The  key  contribution  is  that  a  blob  classifier  engine  initiates  change-driven  re-
authentication requests using fuzzy logic systems (FLS) for the decision making. In a 
change-driven system, the student is interrupted only when significant pose changes are 
detected from the blob statistics; hence, providing minimal distraction to the student 
throughout the summative e-assessment process. 187 
 
9.2.4  A threat classification scheme 
The threat classification scheme represents the decisions made by the fuzzy blob 
classifier engine; these are the low-risk, elevated-risk and high-risk threat classes.  By 
using the threat classification scheme, the low-resource benefits of the BlobPV system is 
accentuated. For example a student can be at a low-risk to the test environment for the 
duration of the test. Thus, eliminating the need to employ high-level techniques or incur 
extra computational cost for verifying presence. Additionally, the classification scheme 
reduces  the  amount  of  re-authentication  requests  initiated,  since  the  students  are 
interrupted  only  when  it  is  necessary.  The  minimised  re-authentication  requests  is 
intended to replace the frequent re-authentication requests which can become frustrating 
to the student, especially when the student is still the same person. Hence, the dynamic 
nature of the threat classification scheme is also reflected in the elevated-risk class. An 
elevated-risk class can be referred to as a suspicious class, where the system estimates 
the likelihood of a dishonest activity based on the student’s current pose. However, in 
this case the student’s presence is not accurately verified; thus, a reclassification process 
which  is  oblivious  to  the  student  is  carried  out.  The  outcome  of  this  process  would 
determine the necessity of initiating a re-authentication request. 
9.3  Future work 
This thesis has introduced solutions to improve the user security of summative e-
assessments. Suggestions to extend this work are described below: 
9.3.1  Enhancing the efficiency of the reclassification process  
A reclassification process is initiated when the detected presence is assigned an 
elevated-risk threat class. In its original implementation, the perimeter and diameter blob 
statistics from the student’s frontal pose and current pose is compared. Thus, based on 
the amount of changes in the blob statistics, the blob classifier engine reclassifies the 
elevated-risk to a low-risk or high-risk threat class. The BlobPV system has provided a 
basic framework for the reclassification process that can easily be extended to include 
other methods. Hence, to improve the overall efficiency of the BlobPV system, a non-
intrusive biometric method (e.g. face biometric) and a clock timer can be used in the 
reclassification process. Recall that, regardless of the student’s activities within the test 
environment, a student’s face is required to be within the cameras field of view for the 188 
 
duration of the test. Therefore, a student engaged in suspicious activities would incur 
significant  changes  in  blob  statistics  and  would  be  at  an  elevated-risk  to  the  test 
environment.  
Hence, in the enhanced method when an elevated-risk threat class is assigned, the 
system would automatically initiate the face biometric process in order to detect and 
authenticate the student’s face within a specified period to time. For example, the timer 
is set at 15secs to detect, capture and authenticate the student. In the event that within the 
15secs (or specified time) the authentication process is successful a low-risk threat class 
is re-assigned; otherwise, a high-risk threat class is assigned.  
9.3.2  Conducting wide-scale experiments for the BlobPV system 
This research has successfully demonstrated the feasibility and stability of a blob-
based presence verification system.  However, it is important to take the BlobPV system 
to  real-world  test  environments  and  conduct  widespread  experiments.  Whilst  these 
experiments could be a complex process, the deployment of the BlobPV system in real-
life scenarios would determine the stability of the solution across a wider population. 
One of the benefits from this study would be determine the effects of different head 
sizes,  head  with  scarves  or  turbans,  gender  and  race  on  the  blob-based  presence 
verification system. 
9.3.3  Presence verification in unsupervised e-assessment environments 
This  research  focused  on  presence  verification  in  supervised  summative  e-
assessments, where the human invigilator is employed as a secondary form of security in 
the test environment. Thus, the invigilator can work alongside the automated verification 
system  to  ensure  security.  A  future  outlook  would  be  to  introduce  the  presence 
verification process in non-invigilated test environment, e.g. in distance learning courses. 
The focus would be to determine the impact of presence verification in improving the e-
assessment user security in unsupervised environments. Additionally, the acceptability 
and privacy issues would be considered.   
9.3.4  Presence verification in non-assessment online environments 
There exists a wide range of applications that can benefit from incorporating the 
presence security goal into their existing Identity-Authentication user security model. 
Thus, verifying the presence of a user beyond the initial authentication procedure would 189 
 
determine  the  sameness  of  the  user  throughout  the  application  session.  Future  work 
would focus on integration of the presence verification process in variety of sectors such 
as  online  banking,  online  gaming  and  accessing  computers  in  high-security 
environments. 
9.4  Summary  
The  contributions  of  this  research  will  improve  the  user  security  process  of 
summative e-assessments from a presence-oriented user security model. Additionally, 
the video-based blob analysis solution depicts the feasibility of incorporating emerging 
technologies  into  higher  education  to  provide  a  secure  test  environment;  hence, 
promoting reliable, valid and fair summative assessments.  190 
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Appendix A – Original 
Blob Statistics for Object 
C, D, E 
Frame Activity  Object  Area  Major axis  Minor axis  Orientation  Extent  Count 
Frontal pose 
C  21261  286.0868  184.019  1.386602  0.505444  1 
D  27791  225.8474  164.03607  1.539372  0.772616  1 
E  23133  286.0819  195.88117  1.50045  0.488069  1 
External person 
move towards 
student 
C  43509  372.83  295.0673  0.771746  0.501672  1 
D  49457  290.6023  255.85236  1.355859  0.605534  1 
E  55881  511.8144  302.46279  0.112718  0.403269  1 
External person 
behind student 
C  52901  457.9309  255.847  0.35458  0.474674  1 
D  49879  360.2165  226.48596  0.455082  0.537825  1 
E  56537  511.6389  304.08743  0.118576  0.407093  1 
External person 
beside student 
C  88419  487.3256  377.6271  0.856224  0.455721  1 
D  5032  190.7193  69.86876  0.337647  0.268245  2 
E  34105  289.7863  250.07594  0.947578  0.46996  2 
External person 
close to student 
C  24480  319.0891  195.7513  1.30189  0.446341  2 
D  33833  255.7823  198.40009  1.163474  0.631543  2 
E  8868  201.2501  104.75109  1.568208  0.483692  2 
External person 
substitutes 
student 
C  18968  181.5104  140.0482  1.517957  0.769805  1 
D  25462  341.2683  196.14244  1.439074  0.456014  1 
E  39760  279.1929  205.20624  1.391304  0.659808  1 
Impersonation Scenarios: Original Blob Statistics for Object C, D, E 
Frame Activity  Object  Area  Major axis  Minor axis  Orientation  Extent  Count 
Frontal pose 
C  21261  286.0868  184.019  1.386602  0.505444  1 
D  27791  225.8474  164.03607  1.539372  0.772616  1 
E  23133  286.0819  195.88117  1.50045  0.488069  1 
Face close to 
camera 
C  42932  465.9693  268.1093  1.243719  0.418931  1 
D  60994  395.6331  262.39731  0.769867  0.493359  1 
E  12081  417.1879  251.19107  0.00795  0.157481  2 213 
 
Hand blocking 
camera 
C  6045  229.1088  61.36547  0.330614  0.292131  2 
D  49374  287.0751  235.52843  0.741295  0.740918  3 
E  44514  396.7635  213.77295  0.157539  0.462849  1 
Head blocking 
camera 
C  46743  265.7664  237.9355  0.726596  0.770256  2 
D  123703  570.0566  418.59937  1.018174  0.463534  1 
E  30159  324.2947  172.64105  0.083075  0.391675  2 
Occlusion Scenarios: Original Blob Statistics for Object C, D, E 
Frame Activity  Object  Area  Major axis  Minor axis  Orientation  Extent  Count 
Frontal pose 
C  21261  286.0868  184.019  1.386602  0.505444  1 
D  27791  225.8474  164.03607  1.539372  0.772616  1 
E  23133  286.0819  195.88117  1.50045  0.488069  1 
Head distant from 
camera 
C  10814  178.1817  123.1689  1.553475  0.595091  1 
D  3587  84.15369  57.970001  0.008733  0.767273  0 
E  3023  132.1032  73.71718  0.077031  0.422797  0 
Head on table 
C  44874  387.2208  159.6796  0.009739  0.678911  1 
D  50368  376.8663  233.13316  0.586941  0.460369  1 
E  48918  348.9756  211.40189  0.171683  0.550333  1 
Look left/right 
C  29727  293.6331  192.6124  1.47529  0.508302  1 
D  45261  310.2054  195.85124  0.008995  0.780766  1 
E  8828  168.7048  89.62405  0.66196  0.361285  1 
Look up 
C  13493  287.0408  187.6383  1.281776  0.32446  1 
D  22161  179.7643  167.31694  1.13273  0.745058  1 
E  7173  167.9834  98.40503  0.037212  0.476865  0 
Hand on forehead 
C  50513  380.4709  277.3537  0.921683  0.5413  1 
D  49501  317.3228  250.99887  0.112587  0.49871  1 
E  4931  226.5512  54.32388  1.217404  0.244157  1 
Miscellaneous Scenarios: Original Blob Statistics for Object C, D, E 
 